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ABSTRACT 
 
 Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of the Third Reich’s Fortress Europa, 
has received considerable historical coverage since it occurred, Moreover, on the 60th 
anniversary of the Normandy invasion, historians of the U.S. Army’s Center of Military 
History, supplemented by members of the 44thMilitary History Detachment from Fort 
McPherson, Georgia, plus three other Reserve Military History Detachments, the 49th , 
the 305th, and the 53rd  Military History Detachments interviewed nearly 200 invasion 
veterans in tents just up the hill from Omaha Beach. Transcriptions and distillations of 
these interviews yielded considerable historical material that allowed a qualitative study 
of American leadership in Normandy in late spring 1944. These oral histories reveal that 
compelling circumstances activated a core set of leadership competency traits in most of 
the troops. Other postwar leadership theories simply do not apply for Normandy 
operations.  
 I observed leadership behaviors applicable when put to the test of real life 
situations, where making sound and timely decisions in the compacted battle space of the 
Normandy Beaches and countryside resulted in people living or dying. The measure of 
this qualitative study was the observations of whether a core of leadership traits, skills, 
training, and experience or other factors was present in the examples set by those who 
participated in D-Day.  
I hypothesize that a core of leadership competencies emerged in the American 
troops, regardless of their background, in times of crisis. Using the knowledge gained 
from both individual and collective histories of the group studied, this study will seek to 
 ix 
 
discover some of the critical factors that enabled leadership to emerge among the 
participants in the fog of war. 
The study revealed that compelling circumstances activated a core set of 
leadership competency traits in most troops. Based on these results we conclude that 
there is core of leadership traits that are carried by most people.   These findings led to 
the development of two theories on leadership: Emergent Leadership During Crisis 
(ELDC) and Emergent Leadership Over Time (ELOT).  These two terms describe the 
process that occurs within individuals as crisis precipitates reaction, based on 
circumstances of the event, the individual’s readiness in terms of trait maturity (the level 
of development of particular traits needed to act in the situation), and the event itself. 
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PART I 
 
STUDYING D-DAY TO UNDERSTAND EMERGENT LEADERSHIP THEORY 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE D-DAY INVASION AND ITS RELEVANCE TO 
LEADERSHIP STUDIES 
 
Knowledge gained from examining leadership displayed at Normandy, put in 
context with extant leadership theories, reveals this dissertation’s thesis of emerging 
leadership traits. A historical precedent exists in this methodology, since during World 
War II, historians interviewed many veterans, and, after the war, they studied various 
topics and campaigns to produce several dozen volumes of scholarly works on the war 
colloquially known as the “Green Books.”  
The WWII 60 historians interviewed people from all walks of life who were 
involved in the war, including civilians, but most were military personnel. They inquired 
about a number of topics, including, among other things, training, logistics, and weapons. 
For this study, the .key question was: What was the type of leadership that was displayed 
during those critical hours, days and weeks that spanned the Normandy Invasion? 
I have conducted a descriptive case study (Berg, 2007) of the histories of the D-
Day 60 Veterans. Using information thus collected, I acquired a better understanding of 
leadership theory, identified trends in leadership during crises, and developed a broader 
understanding and improved theoretical knowledge for understanding and developing 
leadership. Using examples from the oral histories, I looked for different patterns of 
leadership approaches that emerged in life and death, combat, and high-intensity training 
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situations. Using modern theoretical approaches in leadership discussion as well as my 
own leadership theory framework, I analyzed the situation and present the results in this 
work.    
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LONG ROAD TO THE NORMANDY LANDINGS 
 
It was the famed German Field Marshall Erwin Rommel who first described the 
6th of June 1944 as “The Longest Day” (Zabecki, 1999). Wielding combined forces of 
2,876,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen, along with 11,000 aircraft and ships, the Allies 
attacked. Nearly 200,000 soldiers swarmed ashore in the initial days and weeks of the 
Normandy Campaign (Stokesbury, 1980; Brinkley, 2006). The objective was only about 
twenty-five miles across the English Channel. Nearly a millennium earlier, Duke William 
had left this same area to conquer England in 1066.  
On a visit there in 2007, I was struck by the irony when I read an inscription at 
Bayeux which related that the English, who William of Normandy conquered, returned to 
liberate it from Nazi Germany. The primary Allied leaders at D-Day included General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower (the Supreme Commander), General Omar Bradley (the G.I.’s 
General), Brigadier General Teddy Roosevelt, Jr., who died on the beaches of a heart 
attack after gallantly leading his soldiers ashore in the fight and directing operations 
under fire, and Sir Bernard Law Montgomery (Monty), the colorful and sometimes 
vexing British General. (Stokesbury, 1980; Brinkley, 2006). Against them was fortress 
Europe, with its many cliffs and other obstacles such as barbed-wire and hedge rows, all 
covered by gun emplacements, along the French coast. Invading this hornets’ nest was a 
daunting prospect, involving elaborate planning and deceptions. Indeed, one of 
America’s most flamboyant generals, George S. Patton, posed as commander of a 
fictitious field army, replete with troops wearing its purported insignia, dummy 
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equipment, and radio transmissions that tricked the German leadership into thinking the 
Allies could not launch an invasion as early as they did.  
The veterans addressed in this study had various roles, and thus differing 
experiences, in the struggle. Some soared to Normandy in gliders before landing. Others 
walked ashore and watched comrades cut down as they hit the beach. Many spent the first 
day on a ship watching the battle, and some had the nightmarish task of filling bins with 
arms and legs from casualties.  
 The operation’s magnitude was so immense that the Allies towed pre-fabricated 
harbors to within a mile or so of the beaches. Cargo ships disgorged their contents onto 
these “Mulberry harbors,” and troops drove heavily laden vehicles ashore. The British 
and Canadian advances on Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches went reasonably well, and the 
American and French landings on Utah Beach cost about 200 casualties. In contrast, 
fierce German fire put the issue in doubt at Omaha Beach. Ultimately, the Allies gained a 
foothold, but the subsequent breakout did not come cheaply. Fortunately, the surprised 
Germans failed to mass their troops, as their planning lacked flexibility to react 
responsively to the attack, and ultimately the Allies established their foothold 
(Stokesbury, 1980; Hastings, 1984).  
There were five beach locations where the fighting occurred.  The first was the 
area between the Orne River on the east flank to the next beach five miles west. The 
second was Juno, by the town of Courcelles. Next, going west, was the town of 
Arromanches, a town situated between two high bluffs, where Gold Beach was located.  
The fourth location was Omaha Beach, between Vierville and St. Laurent. Finally, the 
fifth location was at Utah Beach. It was located just past the Carentan Estuary.  
 5 
 
Additionally there were two other locations where Invasion troops would be converging- 
the inland drop site at Sainte-Mère-Église, and the critical glider-borne attack location of 
Pegasus Bridge (Stokesbury, 1980; Hastings, 1984; Personal Notes, 2002). 
 The invasion literally caught the Germans napping. Early in the morning of 6 June 
1944 paratroopers jumped into the French countryside. Gliders landed and crashed into 
fields. There followed a heavy bombing of the coast.  That morning, when German 
soldiers looked to the sea, they saw thousands of ships coming in heavily laden with 
troops, tanks, and supplies (Stokesbury, 1980; Hastings, 1984; Brinkley, 2006).  
In a staff ride there in April 2002, I visited battlefields in and around the 
countryside in the hedgerows and the beaches. Terrain features proved crucial. The 
hedgerows were fields that had been divided and then re-divided by the Norman 
descendants of the Vikings who moved into the territory during the reign of Charles II, 
grandson of Charlemagne. Thus, the land of the men from the North was named 
Normandy.  The Norman countryside is unique from the rest of France. The divided 
lands passing from fathers to sons were reinforced with hedgerows to keep in and 
preserve the soil. The land has stayed in families for generation upon generation. 
Therefore, the countryside during World War II was dotted with small square fortresses 
all around. This made the fighting especially difficult because it obscured the enemy until 
it was upon the Allied tanks. Also, when the tanks went over the hump of the hedgerow, 
the bellies of their tanks were exposed and vulnerable to attack. The Allies had to go 
from hedgerow to hedgerow for miles, cleaning out enemy forces (Stokesbury, 1980; 
Pierce personal notes, 2002). This countryside clearing took several weeks. Nevertheless, 
Allied support kept coming in, due mostly to the success of the Mulberry harbors.  
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The only way to get into the countryside was by way of the Allies clearing the 
beaches. The terrain was uphill off of the beach. Much of it was high cliffs. Only a few 
spots along the coastline in the area were suitable to drive up out of the water and uphill. 
These spots were clearly identified by the German defenders who mined and wired the 
beaches and built iron and cement barriers to create a seemingly impregnable obstacle 
course. Overlooking the beaches was artillery with range enough to reach the ships at sea. 
To get past the waterline, one had to traverse several hundred meters in full battle gear.  I 
ran from the low tide mark up the beach to where the grass line was at Omaha Beach. 
Imagining the bullets, noise, chaos, and obstacles the liberators experienced showed me 
the enormity of the task these soldiers faced. Amazingly, many survived and to tell their 
tale. 
In late summer 2007, I walked along the beach at Arromanches, France, with my 
wife and children. The tide was out, and the Mulberry harbor remnants from the great 
invasion were easily accessible by foot. One can still touch the massive objects that 
served as a giant bridge from the sea. The sandy beach gives way to rocks as one 
approaches the shore line, and a deteriorating gun emplacement still commands a hill on 
the far right. 
Although I freely borrow from Stokesbury (1980) in this review, the topic of D-
Day and Normandy has been written about by countless authors such as Astor (1994), 
Ambrose (1985; 1992; 1997), Brinkley (2005), and Hastings (1984). In the current study, 
the oral histories of the men who were there add a new richness to this history lesson. 
Using a broad theoretical base to examine it today, we can look at their actions in a new 
light and develop a deeper appreciation of not only the history but also the character of 
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the men who fought there, as well as the impact their leaders had on them. There is no 
doubt that if the leadership had failed, then the invasion would have been a disaster. Time 
and time and again, the Allies had been pushed back and beaten in previous campaigns, 
especially in the early part of the War (Brinkley, 2006; Stokesbury, 1980). In the days 
prior to the invasion, Rome fell. But, that was more a factor of the Italian Government’s 
political maneuvering, changing sides in the middle of the War and joining the Allied 
cause, than of the Germans’ lack of fight. The Germans had made up their minds that if 
Italy was too weak, they would withdraw to pre-determined lines. However, they put up 
significant resistance before they withdrew, forcing an Allied invasion off the Italian 
coast which was stalled for months (Stokesbury, 1980).  
The earlier African campaign was considered a secondary effort by Hitler, the 
German Fuhrer. He kept putting more of his resources into fighting the Soviet Army. The 
failure to properly mass his resources at a critical time and place led to defeat in Africa. 
As time passed and the war with the Soviets went wrong, the German forces began losing 
ground since they did not have the limitless resources needed to hold all of the territories 
newly acquired from the first several years of the war. They started retreating slowly at 
first, pulling out from Africa into Sicily and from there into to Italy, and then further 
north to defensive lines. As the territory shrank, so did their supply chain, while at the 
same time Allied shipping started to re-emerge in the Mediterranean, and expeditionary 
forces gained momentum. Additionally, Hitler’s habit of firing his generals when they 
failed to agree with him had further diminished his army’s ability to function as well as it 
had earlier in the European War (Stokesbury, 1980).  
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Hitler’s initial success in the Soviet Union was crushed by General Winter (as 
described by Stokesbury, 1980). While the Germans were at the outskirts of Moscow in 
December of 1941, they failed to bring their forces together due to Hitler’s plan to split 
his forces and take several key cities at once. This caused his forces to become divided 
and gave the enemy time to regroup while the German forces reconfigured themselves 
into new battle formations. In the second year of the campaign against the Soviets, they 
used up even more resources. They were still unable to crush the Soviet resistance, 
missing critical opportunities to capture Soviet armies, primarily because of interference 
from Hitler, who continued to fire those who disagreed with him.  Additionally, he 
refused to move within his lines of supply or those avenues for providing for the 
sustainment of his forces and defense. When he finally did this later in the year, the 
balance of the war had shifted (Stokesbury, 1980). In 1944, the Soviets were on the move 
and heading east, recovering territory they had lost to the Germans as quickly as they had 
lost it. All of these events were adding to the pressure on the Germans.  
Even though Italy pulled out of the war in mid-1943, the Germans still held half 
the country. As 1943 turned to 1944, Allied invasion forces were bogged down in Monte 
Cassino and Anzio. They stayed there for several months, fighting what Stokesbury 
(1980) called the closest thing to trench warfare in Europe during the Second World War. 
I went to visit these battlefields in the spring of 2004. The ruins of the little village of San 
Pietro still lie atop a hill near Monte Cassino, bearing witness to the heavy fighting that 
occurred there 60 years earlier. The crumbled homes, caves for taking shelter from the 
bombs, and the bombed-out church still stand much as they did after the battle. Monte 
Cassino was the home of a famed Benedictine Abbey. Allied forces believed it to be in 
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use by the Germans and bombed it, inadvertently creating a better fighting position for 
the Germans (who had not actually been using it for combat operations). Once it was 
bombed, it became a nightmare for the Allied troops who had to fight their way past it. 
The monastery has been rebuilt, but the graves of thousands of soldiers of many nations 
are in the areas all around it, a sad testimony to the intensity of the carnage.  
The landing at Anzio was an important battle that occurred prior to the invasion of 
Normandy. Many lessons learned during the Italian campaign were applied to Normandy. 
The Allies failed to exploit the relative ease of getting onto the beach. This gave the 
Germans time to re-fortify and maneuver forces to keep them pinned down for months. It 
was not until May that they finally broke the German lines of defense and forced them to 
retreat north of Rome. The Italian campaign did not decide the War, but the fall of Rome 
created some of the momentum the Allies needed psychologically as they went forward 
with the D-Day Invasion (code named Operation Overlord) (Stokesbury, 1980; Personal 
Notes, 2004).  
The Germans had now suffered reversals in the south and in the east. Their 
territory had shrunk by the spring of 1944. However, the straw that broke the proverbial 
camel’s back was the successful Allied landing and subsequent break-out at Normandy. 
Hitler had been lucky in his first few ventures. However, he had pushed his luck too far 
when he took on the Soviet Union. Stokesbury (1980) described him as having only a 
rudimentary understanding of the military equations necessary to fight his war. He 
overplayed his hand badly, wasting resources bombing England without invading. This 
was made worse through land grabs in Africa. Finally, he underestimated the Soviet 
Union. His micro-management of the military meant that he and Germany would pay a 
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significant price for those errors. By this point in the War, the Allies, led by the 
Americans, had air supremacy.  British and American bombers virtually controlled the 
skies over Europe.  The invasion of Normandy cracked open the wall of the fortress, and 
as wave after wave of Allied soldiers moved ashore and into the hedge rows of France, 
Hitler continued to delay, waiting for America’s General Patton to attack him. By the 
time Hitler realized what was happening, it was too late. The Americans had learned the 
lessons from the Italian Campaign and were quick to get off the beach. Field Marshal 
Rommel had warned if the Allies were not contained on the beaches that they would win 
the War (Stokesbury, 1980). When they tried to contain the Allies, the German forces 
were denied the critical resources they needed. Forced back, they were finally given the 
resources, but these were too few and too late to contain the Allies. The Normandy 
campaign was a resounding success due to the ineptitude of the German high command 
and the successful application of better leadership at the top among the Allied Generals 
(Stokesbury, 1980). 
In the military, there are three levels of conflict: the strategic level, the operational 
level, and the tactical level (Zabecki, 2005). In reviewing the events that led to D-Day, 
we see that Germany over-extended its resources at the strategic level by going too far, 
too fast, without the resources to maintain them. On the operational level, German 
leadership failed to provide adequate resources to commanders when they needed them, 
and this resulted in battles that led to additional lost resources. Leadership issues at the 
top of the German staff, where Hitler had been too involved for years, resulted in a failure 
of the highest magnitude for Germany’s forces (Stokesbury, 1980). Earlier in the War, 
similar leadership deficiencies in the Soviet Army had given the Germans an early 
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advantage. However, political appointees and party favorites of Stalin were soon replaced 
by more competent generals.  
Leadership at the operational and strategic level was important. But, the tactical 
leadership on the ground was also a critical factor. General Matthew B. Ridgway was one 
of the leaders at D-Day. His leadership and vision made him an archetype for a 
transformational leader (Bass, 1990). According to Northouse, a transformational leader 
is one who engages with others and raises the level of both morality and motivation in 
followers and leaders (Northouse, 2004). Ridgway led the 82d Airborne Division and 
ensured his troops were trained and capable soldiers who could do the mission. In a short 
article about him in the Land Warfare Papers, Bryan N. Groves quoted Major Dick 
Winters of the 101st Airborne Division: “Ridgway was a solid man; (there was) nothing 
phony about him… (While) talking with his troops (he) had everyone’s respect. (There 
was) never any doubt on (his) character, manhood or leadership” (Groves, 2006, p. 3). 
Winter’s description of Ridgway as a man of character, with the ability to gain people’s 
respect thru his honesty and integrity, exemplified critical leadership traits, and these 
proved necessary for success at that level. Moreover, one must wonder how much these 
traits trickled down to the soldiers by example, or, were they already part of their 
character?   
 Ridgway left a strong cadre of leaders at the 82nd’s base in England to train 
replacement troops while the rest of the unit was in Normandy. In so doing, the cadre 
emphasized and built tradition into their character. His insistence on a strong tradition, a 
focus on basic skills and conditioning, remained in effect, as the 82d Airborne Division 
not only went on to success at D-Day but also serves as the preeminent division in the 
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Army today. Thus, a strong leader can effect an organization in the long term as well as 
the short.  
Before he assumed command of the 82nd, Ridgway had benefited from General 
Omar Bradley’s tutelage (Groves, 2006).  This may have been crucial, as the latter’s 
moniker was “the GI’s General”, a nickname bestowed upon him by the famous war 
correspondent Ernie Pyle (Zabecki, 1999). Thus, the Army’s very nature employed a 
veritable chain of leadership, not just in the hierarchical sense, but in the sense of passing 
tacit knowledge, sharing values, and creating conditions for success.  
Bradley and Ridgeway served well at the top, but did the men they led have the 
same character and values?  Under different circumstances, might they also have become 
division commanders? Impressions left by the leaders at an organization’s apex can 
inspire others to follow them, but they do more to catalyze that seed of leadership. For 
those who make it through the early challenges of leadership development, this results in 
successful leaders who do not act as “buffalo” when the leader falls (Belasco & Stayer, 
1993).  
D-Day veterans certainly did not stop what they were doing and wait for the top 
buffalo to emerge. Countless examples appeared where the mission continued without 
skipping a beat when seemingly key leaders fell. Many of the soldiers who displayed this 
leadership had benefited from the transformational leadership of men like Ridgway and 
Bradley. Transformational leadership brings both the follower and leader to a higher level 
of morality, and results in an intrinsically higher motivation coupled with similar 
performance results.  
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Consider Corporal Duke Boswell of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) 
He did not follow the paradigm that if the lead buffalo (leader) falls, the herd sits 
(Belasco & Stayer, 1993). Instead, he took charge and led his soldiers until they met up 
with the rest of the unit since he was among the first of his unit to hit the ground. 
 
I landed just north of the Ste Mere Eglise Church. Since I jumped first 
through the door, I had to go in a particular direction to round up the rest 
of the guys. We had a small flashlight on a pole I put together to help 
others find both myself and others I grouped with within minutes of 
landing. (Boswell) 
 
 This is one example of how these soldiers would successfully perform because of 
the leadership that had nurtured them. They did not stop functioning because the 
Commander was not there to tell them what to do. Studying the oral histories of the D-
Day veterans 60 years after the battle gives us the opportunity to see the follower and the 
leader, as well as to get a sense of what some of those who were impacted by leadership 
of the time did afterwards.  Many of the veterans who were interviewed at the D-Day 60 
Commemorations were from the 82d Airborne Division.  Others were from the 101st 
Airborne, and the 4th Infantry and 29th Infantry Divisions.  Some of the veterans arrived 
immediately or soon after the event. In some cases, the veterans included in the accounts 
had served in different locations, but their accounts provided a unique insight for their 
situation, while at the same time, demonstrating that the actions and leadership displayed 
at D-Day were not isolated only to that day and location.  Their words speak volumes 
about the impact of leadership, tradition, and character at the individual level during one 
of the most important military campaigns of World War II.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HOW D-DAY UNFOLDED: THE VETERAN’S PERSPECTIVE 
  
Aspects of the Invasion 
A partial chronology of D-Day, Operation Overlord, is given here according to 
the accounts of the men in our study group who participated in the invasion and 
witnessed it firsthand. The purpose of the chronology is to provide the reader with an 
understanding of the magnitude of the event, to provide a sense of what the participants 
felt and thought, and to become acquainted with the style of both summarized accounts 
and interview formats used as the basis for the observations in this work. Many of these 
same interviews are seen in other chapters, as the analysis of the accounts is presented.  
The veterans interviewed were not historians, and there are several inaccuracies in the 
interviews regarding caliber of weapons, or ranks and names of persons mentioned.  
Overall, though, the events mentioned did happen, and while a caliber of weapon may be 
incorrect, the fact that a weapon was used or that an aircraft was taking fire is clear. From 
a personal perspective, I doubt that 60 years after my tour in Iraq whether I will be able to 
recall all the details about the type of weapons and vehicles in use. The chronology is not 
complete, but it does give a good picture of much of what went on during Operation 
Overlord from the participants’ view points.  More importantly, it shows the breadth of 
the sample: soldiers, sailors, airmen, enlisted, non-commissioned officers, junior officers, 
partisans.  Even the recollections of a German soldier are included.   
Many books have been written specifically about D-Day. Two examples are June 
6, 1944: The Voices of D-Day (1994) by Gerald Astor, and the Stephen Ambrose work 
D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II 
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presented here in our limited chronology are only a small fraction of the thousands that 
have been taken and preserved by historians.   
 
I. Prelude: Aerial reconnaissance 
A good reconnaissance can determine success or failure of a military operation. 
Maps and information from people familiar with Normandy helped, but the Allies needed 
to supplement such information with aerial photography to contribute to the mosaic that 
gave intelligence analysts a textured image of what the invaders faced. At the same time, 
the Allies had to reconnoiter Normandy in a way that would not make the 
Oberkommando der Wehrmachts (the German High Command) suspicious that frequent 
over-flights heralded an invasion. Returning from bombing Cherbourg, Milton Abernathy 
had orders to fly over the invasion beaches late in 1943. He had no idea he was flying a 
reconnaissance mission of the Normandy countryside that analysts later used to plan the 
invasion.  
 
I served with the 303rd Bomb Group, 358th Bomb Squadron, Army Air 
Force. On the 31st of December 1943, we went on what we were told was 
a bombing run to Bordeaux, France to attack a ship at an altitude of 16,000 
feet. After flying through clear skies, we arrived at our objective but the 
ship was missing. We did not run into any opposition and enjoyed good 
visibility to Cherbourg, where we saw the beaches. On a good day at 
16,000 feet, you can see a lot, but not the little things. 
 
On the way back our group leader ordered a 360 degree turn around 
Cherbourg, thus we covered the whole of Normandy and returned very 
late. We looked in the bombers’ bomb bays and found they carried lots of 
 16 
 
cameras; most of our planes were just taking pictures. We mused we may 
have been some kind of decoys for the Bordeaux run. 
 
The 360 degree turn allowed us to cover most of the beaches and when we 
came around from Cherbourg, we turned back east and over London even 
though it was getting dark. We were barely able to land in the dark for our 
New Year’s party, which none of us felt like attending since the long flight 
had exhausted us. A week later, we learned our bomber carried the 
cameras to examine potential landing beaches for invading the continent. 
(On a Clear Day You Can See Forever: 303rd’s Milton Abernathy’s New 
Year’s Eve Party at 16,000 Feet- (Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall) 
 
Another key aspect of the prelude to invasion was the prerequisite training that 
involved rehearsing several divisions’ moves to the coast, boarding ships, landing, and 
maneuvering in a war zone. This training was realistic but cost many lives. Harold 
McCauley spoke of Exercise Tiger, one of the costliest training debacles of the entire 
war. The Allied invasion was only weeks away, but critical synchronization of troop, air 
and sea movements was incomplete. This confusion, coupled with a coinciding attack by 
German U-boats led to the deaths of hundreds of Allied troops, who drowned because 
their Landing Ship Tanks (LST) were sunk.  The British naval support for the training 
exercise was inadequate due to several critical errors in communication between the 
British and American military. McCauley drove a self-propelled amphibious vehicle. Not 
only did he participate in the training exercises, but he also literally fished bodies out of 
the water with other crew members. Additionally, they had to spend time in confinement 
after the exercise so that word of the loss of life during the training event did not leak to 
the press. 
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I was in “Exercise Tiger,” the mock invasion at Slapton Sands, England. 
We were not briefed until the night of the exercise. The British were 
supposed to be our escort. I had been in three invasions, so at four o’clock 
I told my sergeants we lacked escorts. The British left, and we had no 
protection... 
They must have sunk the ship I was on a few minutes after I got off and it 
put back out on the water. They classified me as a survivor after that...  
they kept it quiet for forty years and made us swear that we would not say 
anything or we would get court-martialed if you were in the service. I 
don’t know what they could do if you were milking cows, but it was kept 
secret for forty years.  
I was in charge of three DUKWs [Author’s Note: a six-wheel-drive 
amphibious truck].  One guy had been in the engineers, and had been in 
every outfit in the Army. He ended up in our outfit because there was only 
one place worse than our unit, and that was the gliders. If we could not 
handle them they went to the gliders. We got into a fight. I was his 
corporal and he said something to me. I broke his nose and he broke my 
nose. Somehow, we ended up as the best buddies that ever was. We got 
together at the reunions and cried every time.  
 
We didn’t know what was going on. The Navy was supposed to fire naval 
guns that night. We thought that was it. We could see and hear all the 
noise. Pretty soon the water caught fire… A guy I knew, his name was 
Dwight Coles from Branch, Arkansas… and I took DUKW’s out to look 
for floaters… bodies of dead Americans floated in the water after the 
landings. We called them that because they floated with their butts in the 
air and their heads down. We had to look at their dog tags as they all 
looked the same.  
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There was a bulldozer that came up ahead of me to this pill box. The small 
caterpillar dug a trench, and we buried a lot of Americans in it, but nobody 
would admit it and they called Cole and I liars. They closed the hatches of 
the LST’s during the attack. A few guys got out. They are still in the 
channel with a lot of equipment out there.   
 
I knew too much about burying the dead after Slapton Sands. One general 
committed suicide over it. 1 They were keeping us quiet about what had 
really happened. They put us behind barbed wire for fourteen days, with 
guards on us in seven-man tents. I can’t tell you where it was in England, 
but there was a castle not far from us. 2 (Slaughter at Slapton Sands- 
(Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall, edited by Dr. Alan Koenig)            
                    
 
II. Bringing in the airborne attack  
Besides amphibious operations, the Allies delivered troops to Normandy by 
gliders and by cargo planes.  The gliders were towed by C-47s, and were designed to land 
along with their troops in the Normandy countryside. The paratroopers would jump into 
what were hoped to be the right pre-designated drop zones. As the accounts suggest, the 
air drops were not very precise in many cases. This resulted in troops being scattered 
throughout the hedges and fields below. The gliders that landed stealthily around Pegasus 
Bridge were a fortunate exception to the norm, and their troops secured the bridge with 
light casualties. 
                                                 
1
 Rear Admiral Donald P. Moon’s suicide was attributed in part to the Slapton Sands incident (Yung, 
2006). 
 
2During Exercise Tiger two German E-boats came upon the exercise and slipped in and sank two of the 
LSTs and severely damaged a third.  It was critical to maintain this as secret until after the invasion itself 
because making it public would have completely blown the cover of the invasion (Zabecki, 2009). 
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The next series of accounts illustrate the invasion’s first few hours from the 
perspective of the men who delivered the warriors. In so doing, the invaders displayed 
uncommon courage just to get into some of the light craft, unarmored aircraft, and 
gliders, which had to land in foreign fields at night.  
Frederick Crispin and Robert Dains were navigators in the C-47 aircraft that 
brought troops over the landing zone around Sainte-Mère-Église. They were part of a 
massive air armada that crossed the English Channel in the early morning hours of D-
Day. Crispin arrived in England in January of 1944. He was in a troop carrier squadron.  
He and his fellow pilots flew in to Normandy from Southampton. Their course took them 
through the Jersey-Guernsey islands, where they made a ninety degree turn that took 
them to their destination.  Crispin, a second lieutenant and aerial navigator provides the 
following description of his mission: 
 
The weather was rotten. We come across from Southampton at twelve 
hundred feet. By the time we got to the French coast, the Jersey Islands, 
we were down to a thousand feet and lowering. By the time we made the 
turn in we were at eight hundred feet, and by the time we got to the drop 
zone, we dropped them at seven hundred feet... I dropped the 505th (PIR), 
82nd. Those men were magnificent. Buddy, the spirit of those guys… 
when they got in that airplane on the night of the 5th they were so heavy 
with equipment. When they went up on that back door into the C-47 you 
had to help them in, that's how loaded they were. Good troops! I mean 
they were super troops. (Frederick Crispin, Army Air Corps Navigator, 
2nd Lieutenant, aerial navigator- (Summarized by Lisa A. Zafirov, edited 
by Dr. Alan Koenig) 
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Flying the gliders was dangerous but necessary.  Robert Dains was a navigator in 
a C-47 that towed Gliders across the channel for this mission and describes the touch-
and-go aspect: 
On the 6th of June, 1944, I was a navigator on a C-47 that pulled a glider 
into Normandy. We dropped our troopers on Sainte-Mère-Église at 1:14 in 
the morning, and they weren’t due in until 6:30 in the morning, so we 
were a little bit ahead of things. {Author’s Note: Dains is referring to 
releasing the glider infantry into the area, not paratroopers who were 
jumping from other aircraft.}We flew abeam of Cherbourg and got a lot of 
antiaircraft fire. We didn’t know for sure what we were in for, but we had 
a job to do and we did it.  
 
We were the seventy-ninth aircraft of an eighty-one ship formation, and 
we saw the show ahead of us well. We almost bought the farm twice on 
that one, but we got through it. On D+1 we towed another glider into 
Normandy, but we had nothing inside our plane because the glider’s 
weight was all the C-47 could take. For the gliders, it was a one-way trip. 
They worked out well for what they did.  
 
This description of the mood and men on the flight over captured what was going 
on in hundreds of gliders and airplanes on 6 June 1944. Derek Fearon landed in a glider 
at Pegasus Bridge, where troops fired the battle’s first shots. Fearon described the ground 
invasion’s first hours as he and his fellow British soldiers waited for the relief forces to 
link up with them as they held critical bridges that delayed German reinforcements from 
reaching the beach area and allowed the Allies to gain their foothold.  As a member of the 
British 7th Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, 5th Brigade, 6th Airborne Division, he 
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helped to secure Pegasus Bridge in the early morning hours of June 6th.  He describes the 
mission below: 
 
We lost a lot of men who were dropped in the wrong river valley. Of 
course, the aircraft dropped people in the wrong places, but they managed 
to make their way to where they were supposed to be. Eventually, after 
D+2 or D+3 we were pretty well up to strength. We inevitably deployed 
120 men out of a whole battalion.  
 
The role of the parachute and the glider borne, there were three gliders that 
crash landed on the bridges over the River Orne, and the River Canal, and 
they did a marvelous job for within twenty minutes, the two bridges had 
been secured, and we found the demolition charges under the bridges, but 
fortunately for us the detonators had not been primed and we made it 
across the bridge.  
 
It was a sheer surprise; but a number of us were still killed as two German 
panzer tanks had located our movement and probed into us with heavy fire 
but I don’t think they knew exactly what was taking place... (God Save the 
Queen! British 5th Brigade’s Derek Fearon’s Bridge Too Far- 
(Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall) 
 
 
III. Hitting the ground in Normandy 
Having left the airplane or glider, the paratroops began their real work at 
Normandy. The months of training, previous military campaign experience, and abilities 
of all the men would soon pay dividends as they faced their greatest challenges yet. Men 
from different units assembled as their planes had scattered them across the countryside. 
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Accordingly, they formed into ad hoc squads, fighting when meeting the enemy, hiding 
when outnumbered, and slowly working their way to rally with other units. 
Thomas Alley was in the 101st Airborne Division, serving in the 2nd Battalion, 
506th Infantry.  He and his compatriots landed miles from their objective and had to 
gather members of their unit, fight their way to rally points, and continue the fight. They 
often met other units’ troops, who joined them for awhile and then sought to join their 
own units.  Alley boarded a ship in September 1943 in New York and headed to 
Liverpool, England.  He was one of the soldiers flown in by men like Frederick Crispin 
and Robert Dains. Jumping out at a little over seven hundred feet made for a fast descent 
to the ground, and he could hear the church bells of a French village on the way.   
  
I was with a group of three companies, Dog, Easy and Fox, 2nd Infantry 
Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment. We spent about a week 
studying maps, especially Pecuville, (Author’s Note: Turqueville) and we 
even knew which building the town mayor was in. Each unit had an 
assignment, and everybody knew where the enemy positions were, and 
what we needed to do to take that town.  
 
I landed in a pasture or vineyard, and had to cut all my parachute gear off. 
I assembled my M-1 rifle, got my cricket out, and crawled to a hedgerow. 
I heard a noise and used my cricket. An 82nd Airborne Division sergeant 
responded. We went around and picked up other 82nd and 101st troops. We 
heard a sound like squeaking wheels and we all jumped into a ditch. 
German soldiers with a donkey and a cart made the noise. The sergeant 
and I jumped out and the five Germans surrendered to us three Americans. 
The sergeant took the automatic weapon from the first German soldier, but 
when he went to take the second soldier’s weapon, he hit the sergeant 
 23 
 
across the face with a leather donkey whip. From where I stood four feet 
away, I shot that guy with my M-1 right in the head and he went down 
right there. This other guy from the 82nd was still holding the German’s 
automatic weapon and opened up on the other ones who had begun to run 
and fire at us. We killed the remaining four quickly with their own 
weapons. We decided to get out of there and began walking down the 
road. We picked up seven more of our guys a hundred yards or so down 
that road… The 82nd paratrooper3 who was timely with that automatic 
weapon went another direction with the All-American troops that appeared 
from a field. I never saw him again. (Two Years in the Making-
(Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall)  
 
Troops of the 82nd Airborne Division, Ed Asbury, Reuben Breitling, and Carl 
Hatcher, landed near Sainte-Mère-Église. Before long, they engaged in hand-to-hand 
combat that showed just how serious things had become. The men experienced the full 
spectrum of combat at Normandy, complete with war’s ironies and contrasts. Some 
paratroopers narrowly missed being burned alive when they landed among buildings set 
afire from the earlier bombing runs; but others were not so lucky.  
Ed Asbury was a pathfinder and among the very first of the invasion force to 
arrive. His cargo pockets ripped open during his jump, and he lost most of his 
ammunition and rations. The harsh reality of combat, danger, and confusion were 
recurring themes as the men struggled to find comrades, evade the enemy, and 
accomplish their missions. Once he found his unit at the rally point, Asbury was told to 
go find the pilots of the gliders and his commander. He took a jeep and found the men 
and got his commander to an aid station. During this time, his jeep hit a mine and one of 
                                                 
3
 Author’s Note: The 82nd Airborne is known as the All-American Division. 
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his comrades lost an arm in the blast.  Another man lost his leg and most of his hip.  
Throughout the ordeal, Asbury remained calm, even repairing a tire that was blown up 
during the explosion.  
 
I landed just north of the Sainte-Mère-Église Church. I jumped through the 
door first, so I had to go in a particular direction to round up the guys. We 
had a small flashlight on a pole I put together to help others find myself 
and others with within minutes of landing.  
  
German soldiers appeared around a big burning barn. One of our troopers 
actually landed in the barn fire, and the Germans wouldn’t let the French 
townspeople pull him out. He died in the flames.  
  
We killed a lot of the enemy who refused to leave the town, and finally 
pushed the enemy out, and things got quiet for awhile. My unit took 
control of a key enemy intersection. We kept them from getting down to 
the beach to reinforce their troops while more of our troops landed and 
took the pillboxes as the Germans ran out of ammunition and did not get 
reinforcements.   
 
At about 4:30 a.m., our brigade commander, “Cannonball Krause,” 4 
declared Sainte-Mère-Église secure. He had been carrying the same flag 
he had raised in Naples, Italy. He raised it over the town hall. This was the 
first town that the Allies officially liberated during the D-Day invasion.  
 
After the first twenty-four hours, we didn’t know exactly where the enemy 
was but they were definitely all around us. I remember 42% casualties in 
                                                 
4
 Author’s Note: LTC Krause was a Battalion Commander. Some accounts refer to him as the Regimental 
or Brigade Commander, others describe him as the Regimental Executive Officer, but at D-Day he was the 
Battalion Commander for 3rd Battalion, 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment (Zabecki, 2009). 
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the first twenty-four hours of our landing. I think the enemy was as 
confused as we were, but they didn’t seem to be scared of us.  (A Native 
American’s War Dance- (Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall) 
 
Reuben Breitling landed in a hen house and met two French girls bearing a bottle 
of wine, recalling a similar incident in Erich Marie Remarque’s powerful anti-war classic 
All Quiet on the Western Front (Remarque, 1929). 
 
On D-Day, I landed two blocks east of Sainte-Mère-Église’s center, 
disturbing a chicken coop in someone’s back- yard. Soon, two girls came 
running outside saying “American” and offered me wine. I told them I had 
a war to fight but still had some wine and then convinced the girls to go 
back inside house before I left.  
 
I killed three or four enemy soldiers near the church as they approached 
me. I stayed in that area about three weeks, and was under fire two-thirds 
of the time. I remember a German 88 firing at us, seemingly non-stop. 
(One Flew ‘Onto’ the Cuckoo’s Nest- (Summarized by SGT Kenneth 
Hall).  
 
 
Others faced more serious situations on the ground.  Carl Hatcher was with the 
Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment.  Hatcher commented, 
“What some called foolish I called opportunity, thus I volunteered to go into all the tough 
operations coming our way.”  His unit jumped just outside of Sainte-Mère-Église. They 
met fierce resistance for several days because the town was a communications center for 
the Germans. Hatcher describes the leadership of “Cannonball Krause,” his battalion 
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commander, and the action going around as the soldiers landed, rallied, and went in to 
take the town of Sainte-Mère-Église. 
 
Our regimental executive officer, Major Edward Krause, 5 lost his flares 
(Author’s Note: flares would have been used as signals by units to mark 
assembly points for the troops who were landing.) when he jumped. 
Luckily, we landed fairly close, for the most part, to where we were 
supposed to be. Others landed miles away from the green smoke zone, 
northeast of Sainte-Mère-Église.  
 
A barn burned near to where we landed, but we extinguished the blaze and 
met the French resistance. They wore orange arm bands for identification 
as Allies, which helped us considerably. The first night after we landed, 
we killed about a dozen Germans and captured about twenty others.  
 
For the average soldier, the situation seems confusing and chaotic; it’s 
hard to make sense of the things. You’re looking over your shoulder and 
trying to protect yourself and accomplish the mission. While we were still 
scattered, Major Krause did well at reorganizing us. Having carried an 
American flag that had flown at Naples, he raised this symbolic banner 
over the town hall once we took the town. (82nd’s Carl Hatcher Brings Big 
Action into ‘Little Village’ Viva la Resistance! (Summarized by SGT 
Kenneth Hall) 
 
 
 
IV. The sea approach 
 The invasion force leaving for France had ships and craft of all types and size, 
from battleships and cruisers, to LSTs (landing ship, tanks), DUKWs, and towed blimps 
                                                 
5
 ibid 
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to discourage air attack. Thousands of sailors and seaborne soldiers facilitated this huge 
logistical undertaking. Delivering the troops and supplies was just part of their job, since 
the naval craft also had to support the troops ashore, being their only link back to home. 
Thus, the ships evacuated thousands of wounded on their return journey, and they 
brought in the massive Mulberry harbors that served as ports until the Allies secured 
Cherbourg and other facilities. Without them, the Allies would have wasted the airborne 
and glider-borne troops’ gains, since they required a huge influx of troops and supplies to 
sustain the invasion. 
 William Dabney was trained to manage the barrage balloons that were used to 
ward off air attacks on naval vessels used in the invasion.  His equipment for his mission 
was damaged and lost on the way across the channel, but he still was an eyewitness to 
history. Dabney was a balloon chief in the 320th Barrage Balloon Battalion. This unit 
was the only African-American combat unit to take part in the initial D-Day landings. As 
a balloon chief, Dabney was responsible for training his men and deploying the balloons.  
His account describes the work involved in putting this critical asset to use.    
 
To make the skies above a lucrative target hazardous to an attacker, 
defenders deployed barrage balloons, which were large captive blimps 
secured with steel cable capable of destroying or damaging aircraft. Some 
even carried bombs set to detonate if an aircraft struck the cable. We 
trained on a much bigger balloon than the one we brought in on the beach. 
We learned how to inflate, moor, and patch the balloon. We learned how 
to operate the wench in the strong wind because they would dip and dive 
ascending or descending. When the wind was strong, we turned the winch 
slowly to maintain control.  
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For my crew, there was myself, I was the chief, and my three men. There 
were four men to a crew. I was the only one in the crew who went to 
school because I was the one commanding. I told my men what to do. I 
picked the sights where we would bed the balloon down. I got orders for 
specific areas and then I needed to find a level spot for the equipment. 
 
Sometimes, while on board the ship we flew the balloon. I think the barge 
must have been about half a mile out in the English Channel. Before we 
hit the beach, my balloon got shot out from under me and of course I had 
to cut the strap because it had a bomb, and it fell to the water because the 
bomb has to catch the wing of the plane for it to explode and so it must 
have fallen into the water.  
 
I cut the cord and I came in without my balloon. Incoming fire was pretty 
strong so when we made it to the beach we literally hit the sand—and 
stayed there. The tide was coming in so we had to raise our heads above 
the water. They were scrapping (Author’s note: Sweeping the beach 
looking for mines). Finally, the engineers had cleared enough mines to let 
us move inland in relative safety. Once we were inland, troops delivered 
equipment, supplies, more balloons, tanks and other weapons…  (Air 
Defense by Barrage Balloon- (Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall, edited 
by LTC Alan Koenig)  
 
Roy Chilton served with the British Navy. He served on a Mark V landing craft 
during the Normandy Invasion.  He landed with American engineers and endured direct 
fire from the trenches. Once his craft unloaded the 20 Americans on board, they ran a 
tape to either side of them to show the passage for follow-on landing craft.  The departure 
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was delayed for 24 hours because of rough weather. The American soldiers and their 
British Navy hosts finally set off for Normandy at 4 o’clock the morning of 6 June, 1944.  
We all knew what we were there for, and the Americans were all nice lads. 
I think that we were all scared when we went over. There were some older 
ones … and we would share a cup of tea and good conversation while we 
were waiting.  
 
There was a gun on the front end of our Mark V, and I was also trained on 
that weapon’s use. We could hear the German machine guns ahead of us. 
The only thing that was worrying to me was the beach was being shelled. 
That was powerfully dangerous.  
 
We got into a trench for several hours, and one of our lads got hit in the 
leg. We had to stay in there until the sea came in enough to let us go back 
out. Our injured lad was taken to an American tent for treatment. When 
the ocean came back in, we pulled out to an American repair ship as we 
had taken damage. An American repair ship was out in the channel and 
asked us if we needed assistance, but we couldn’t make that connection 
then so we carried on until later when a British cruiser fired on us as we 
were not able to signal it to let it know who we were. Since our call sign 
changed every day, our skipper didn’t know the current call sign. We were 
lucky that they missed us and figured out who we were before they sent us 
to the bottom. We made it back to England for a short time for repairs and 
returned to Normandy, but this time it was on a Mark III to Utah Beach. I 
went into the tents on an American camp. I lined up and had chow with 
them and the next day, I went to Omaha Beach with the Americans again. 
I remember a film being shown about Gentleman Jim Corbet and Jack 
Dempsey and that was an “experience” to be watching that film on a 
beach just weeks after an invasion of France. (British Royal Navy’s Henry 
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Roy Chilton: LNO to Omaha Beach-      (Summarized by SGT Kenneth 
Hall)  
 
Few accounts portray the direct effect of a concerned leader better than the 
Happle and Howell account of a colonel who personally saw to it that a Medal of Honor 
nominee would receive prompt and immediate medical care and get safely aboard a 
medical transport.  Louis Happle and Gordon Howell met while serving in the Navy.  The 
lifelong friends worked on an LST (Landing Ship Tank) from 1943 until D-Day.  Gordon 
Howell described their experience at D-Day as they ferried the wounded back and forth 
from the beach to the USS Texas. 
 
The LST was 327 feet long, and had three Higgins boats (Landing 
Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP) on each side. Loading and lowering the 
boats were not easy tasks, and it took about fifteen minutes to get the 
troops into them and lower the boats into the water. For the Normandy 
landings, Happle served as the starboard gunner and Howell was the 
coxswain on Higgins Boat Number Six They headed to shore after others 
had already done so. Howell skillfully delivered the troops of the 29th 
Infantry Division to Omaha Beach’s Red Easy area. The Germans had 
many heavy weapons in the hills just off the beach, and they fired 
incessantly.  
 
On D+1, Happle and Howell evacuated wounded troops from the 
beach.  Suddenly, a jeep arrived and a colonel got out and helped a 
wounded staff sergeant toward the Howell’s boat. Both men were from the 
101st Airborne Division. Howell’s LST had three doctors and about twenty 
corpsmen on board, but the colonel asked him how long it would take to 
get to the USS Texas off the coast, and he replied about a half-hour. The 
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colonel said that wasn’t fast enough. At the time, five or six Higgins boats 
evacuated wounded from the beach with Happle and Howell’s boat. The 
colonel and the wounded sergeant got on board their boat, and Howell 
headed for the Texas. He approached a gangway, and a sailor said, “This is 
an officer’s gangway, you can’t pull up here.” The colonel replied, 
“Young man, let me tell you something- I have a wounded man here that I 
am putting in for the Medal of Honor, and I don’t want to hear anything 
about gangways. I want him brought up there right now!” A naval officer 
hastened to the scene and took the staff sergeant on board. It was the only 
soldier Happle and Howell ever saw taken to a battlewagon for treatment. 
(Shipmates Gordon Howell and Louis Happle on Course - (Summarized 
by SGT Kenneth Hall, edited by LTC Alan Koenig) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Normandy Beach Area, June, 1944 
Source: National Archives Photo # 26-G-2517  
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V. Sea landings 
 
 Despite the short distance between England and France, the sea journey lasted 
several hours. By the time the men arrived all packed and ready to hit the beaches, many 
had become seasick and soaked to the bone. When the invasion fleet drew near and the 
LSTs (landing ship, tank) deposited their precious cargo, there were no wharves, docks, 
or gangways to cross. There was only the sea, barriers, mines, and automatic fire coming 
from well defended positions to greet the invaders. The men had to wade through water 
that had treacherous sink holes, also called ruttles, where many men lost their lives.  
Others were gunned down within steps of leaving the water craft.  Some water craft never 
made it to the shore, taking whole tank crews to the watery depths with them.  The 
accounts in this section give a partial feel of the fight from the landing craft onto the 
beaches. 
 The paratroopers faced their share of challenges as they landed in the fields across 
Normandy, but the men coming in off of the landing craft faced direct fire from the 
enemy in broad daylight.  As they poured ashore, their comrades falling around them, 
these men continued to make their way ashore under fire, often detaching themselves 
from the reality they faced in order to endure it.  From Omaha Beach to Utah Beach, each 
unit had to overcome challenges.  Charles Arcieri provided signal support under fire as 
troops came onto the beach.  He was more worried about losing a limb than getting 
killed.  In his account, he shared some surprising insights about what a young man is 
thinking while under fire. 
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In the days leading up to D-Day, we spent our time loading and getting 
things to work right before we packed everything for the LST to the 
beachhead.  
 
We landed in the pre-dawn hours of D-Day… Once we hit the sand, there 
wasn’t much difficulty getting communications set up. We were 
responsible for the transmitters. Morse code guys would run this 
equipment. The biggest concern was certain types of gear burning up or 
breaking down, like the generators and the quality of the gas we used for 
the generators.  
 
Even more of a potential problem was in the constant securing of that 
bunker on Normandy beach where we landed to set up all the 
communications arrays to keep the ships in contact with the command 
elements of the land forces. My biggest concern was that I might lose an 
arm or a leg and not be able to do my duty. All the bullets flying overhead 
didn’t faze me really, just what would happen if I got hit.  
  
The Army got the worst of it that day and we had it easy in comparison to 
the taking of one of the bunkers on the beach head that would serve as our 
base of operations. The Army still kept moving forward off the beach and 
enabled us to set up all our gear when we were ordered to.  (Shipmate 
Charles W. Arcieri Brings Bunker Online- (Summarized by SGT Kenneth 
Hall) 
       
Carl Cannon of the 4th Infantry Division gives a close up view of Medal of Honor 
recipient Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., walking the beaches and making on 
the spot decisions, leading by example and undeterred by the fire.  His account shows 
that while people may have found a way to contain their fear, “anyone who tells you they 
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weren’t afraid is either a damn fool or a damn liar” (Cannon). The beaches were a scene 
of death; yet despite that, men survived and made their way inland. Cannon’s account is 
especially noteworthy in the way it captures General Roosevelt’s words at Utah Beach. 
 
 
I was still in the 4th Infantry Division on D-Day at Utah Beach. The 
landing was south and the stiff winds and the high waves pushed us 1000 
yards too far south. We knew from the briefings how our landing looked. 
General Roosevelt came in and the first thing he said was “This is the 
wrong place.”  
 
General Roosevelt talked to Colonel Johnson and Colonel Howell and 
suggested we withdraw, reload, and try and get to our designated landing 
point. Well, we ended up making our way in right where we landed. 
General Roosevelt had a walking stick in his right hand, and a .45 pistol in 
his left. He was directing all of us to get in to Sainte-Mère-Église 
[Author’s Note: Sainte-Marie-du-Mont] and we all thought he was the 
best.  
  
If anyone tells you they weren’t afraid, they were a damn liar or a damn 
fool. When we hit the beach with machine gun nests, pillboxes, and 
artillery facing us, and soldiers all around us were getting blown in half 
with body parts landing in the foxholes we took up positions in, we were 
all terrified.  
  
The engineers removed 15,000 mines off the beach. Someone set off a 
“Bouncing Betty” mine and if you were within 15 or 20 yards of that 
explosion, you weren’t coming back.  
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Another thing we had to face was flooded swamp land on the other side of 
the dunes, between us and Puckaville (Author’s Note: Turqueville). The 
Germans had flooded a lot of places to about waist deep or six feet in 
places. A lot of paratroopers drowned in those areas because of their 
chutes and equipment and it’s too hard to swim with all that weight on 
you. (4th ID’s Carl Cannon Faces the Visible Enemy Head-On- 
(Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall) 
 
 Walter Condon was up and packed early on the 4th of June, 1944.  He and his 
fellow infantry men from the 29th ID were loaded down with 72 pounds of gear and 
ammunition, plus two days worth of food rations, and a single canteen of water.  
Equipped with an inflatable life preserver, that often left its users floating upside down in 
the water, he and the others disembarked from England on an LCT carrying a bulldozer 
and one thousand pounds of dynamite to be used for clearing obstacles on the Normandy 
beachhead.  But for Condon and the others, it was the typical “hurry up and wait” that 
soldiers of every war had had to encounter. 
 
It was four in the morning when we finally got the message the invasion 
was delayed. On the second day, there was no place on the LCT to sit 
down. After two days of standing up on the LCT, we finally got in to 
Normandy two miles off the mark we were supposed to land on at Omaha 
Beach. All we thought about was our mission. We should have gone 
straight in, but we were too tired to worry about it.  We were about the 
first vehicle to get off the beach to the D-1 transit area. We went on to St 
Lo from there. We dug a good trench so the cows or enemy soldiers 
couldn’t get over. (29th ID’s Walter Condon Stood Fast on the Brink of 
Infamy- (Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall) 
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    VI. Scaling the cliffs with the Rangers  
 
The cliffs in the vicinity of Omaha Beach were one of the key early invasion 
targets.  It was critical to the success of the mission for the large gun emplacements 
along the heights to be neutralized, as they were directly set to stop any entry from 
Omaha beach.  Former Company Commander Ralph Goranson of 2nd Ranger 
Battalion, Company C, led his men in the attack on this important beach flank.  
Others went up Pointe du Hoc to knock the guns out of commission at that location.  
Both sets of men going up the cliffs were Rangers.  They were an elite group of men 
that had been trained for this very purpose, and much more. Months of training in all 
types of terrain had made these men capable of thinking on their own and exercising 
initiative without delay. Their ability to make decisions quickly and soundly had been 
honed through the most rigorous training the Army had to offer.  Sixty years later, 
Ralph Goranson gave his account of what it was like to lead his Rangers up the cliffs 
of Normandy. He was a twenty-two year old Company Commander leading men in 
combat. There was no doubt in his mind about the task before him.  He recalled this 
exchange between his brother, who also was in the invasion, and himself, “‘One thing 
I want you all to do: The minute you get out of that boat, if you get a shot, kick ass!’ 
So we knew what we had to do.”   
Goranson’s mission was to secure the right flank of Omaha Beach. He and his 
men had two hundred feet of sand to cross before scaling cliffs of fifty to seventy-five 
feet in an area that in Goranson’s words was “littered with machine gun nests and 
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dugouts.”  Goranson gives details of his company’s heroic ascent and subsequent 
encounters with the German defenders. 
 
Oh, they were worried when we went in. And when we went there, there 
weren't many left. I mean we had gotten in there but … we knew it would 
be fortified and it was. There were a lot of honeycombs…. 
 
I was in a right flank boat and my boat was destroyed... Everybody got off 
but the boat was destroyed and the crew got on another boat... What 
happened immediately was machine gun fire all over the place. And my 
instructions were you know: The rest is going to be fine. Get your fanny 
across the beach and get in a firing position and then go about our 
missions. And our mission was to clear the right flank of the beach but 
unfortunately, I lost thirty-five men out of seventy - almost eighty, before 
they got out of the boat. 
 
We knew where we were going and the area that we wanted to tree climb 
was too high and there was a bunch of wire around and in the middle these 
old, weathered signs - achtung minen you know. I looked at it and I said 
“bullshit.”  …It wasn't mines. So we went up and right over into the 
country...over here. This is where the only paved roads came down to the 
beach and then the road went east… I tell you we had a cliff that was 
about fifty to seventy feet and it wasn't the easiest to get over...I took a 
couple guys and I said go. And they went into the barbwire and they cut it 
and…they got up there and… well once they got up there, here was a 
trench system. It led every which way and there were very few people left, 
but over here was the box. This great big bunker…and the bullets and the 
bodies and everything all piled up…we had C-46 … then when the door 
                                                 
6
 C4 was not used in World War II. Its forerunner was called Nobel 808, and was typically used for 
missions described by Goranson. 
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went we put in one of those nice grenades that do a lot of burning - I don't 
know what you call it… incendiary, and then moved on. But they were 
crawling back … along the shore that connected to the highway, which I 
think the villagers called Hotel Samira, and that's where the German 
headquarters were…It was a mess… quite a few gave up. I think they 
could see the handwriting on the wall...you could see it was hidden and 
heavily fortified.  
 
The idea was to protect that road that had been left open because … it ran 
all the way to where the others were coming from. (Ralph Goranson, 2nd 
Battalion Rangers, Commander of Company C- (Interview conducted by 
49th MHD, transcribed by Lisa A. Zafirov) 
 
 
 
VII. Moving inland 
 
 Once the gliders landed, and the planes and ships had discharged their passengers 
onto the beaches, marshes, and fields of Normandy, the real work began.  It did not take 
long after the initial surprise attacks at places like Pegasus Bridge and Sainte-Mère-Église 
for word to get out that the long expected Allied invasion was occurring. There was no 
doubt in the minds of the Germans who were on the beaches of Normandy or in the 
towns along the Channel; but, still, it would be days before the German High Command 
in Berlin would approve the commitment of more forces and reserves. Worse still for the 
Germans, Field Marshall Rommel was away.  The American and British forces 
commanders were being led by men empowered to make decisions at the center of 
gravity of the fight, rather than from the vantage point of a table map.  Ultimately, this 
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costly delay would hurt the Germans and set the stage for a complete collapse of the lines 
(Stokesbury, 1980).  
 Sainte-Marie-du-Mont saw heavy fighting as Airborne troops landed around the 
village.  At the cliffs and bluffs overlooking the channel, Rangers climbed up to surprise 
defenders in the heavy gun emplacements that were guarding the beach entry points.  
 Morning saw masses of American troops coming ashore at Utah and Omaha 
beaches, as well as a larger combined force of British and Canadian troops at Gold, Juno, 
and Sword Beaches.  Wave after wave of troops came forward.  They started to move 
inland. Airborne troopers scattered across the Norman landscape started to re-group and 
make their way to rally points.  The next evening saw more troops flown over, even as 
bitter fighting continued along many of the beach villages. Within days, a long line of 
sustaining operations and logistical support started to emerge from the thousands of sea 
transport craft that lay in the channel between England and France.  Instead of simply 
infantry men coming ashore, new specialties were arriving including special intelligence 
units and other units designed to go into the French interior and link up with allied French 
resistance or gather information from prisoners.  The fighting would spread its way 
across a huge swath of villages and eventually turn into a field by field battle through the 
hedgerows dotting the Normandy countryside.  A wearing down process started to occur, 
but the Germans were far from being beaten, and the Battle for Normandy was far from 
being won.  
The accounts in this section include parts of the initial beach fighting and 
landings.  They also provide other details of the fighting and experiences beyond the 
initial contact and days of the invasion. S.M. Harris was an intelligence officer for the 
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Allies who landed early on D-Day. He was in the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.  He was 
with a group known as “T” force.  This team searched for people or documents that 
would give more information about the current situation of the German forces, and he 
was able to take a German official with top secret documents as his prisoner.  Harris was 
responsible for six men. They came into the far end of Utah beach, an area known as Red 
Beach. Gathering his men together in all of the chaos while being shot at was a challenge. 
Harris noted, “I was scared to death and very nervous … At times, we were a little lost, 
were being shot at, but not too bad off because we were focused on the job we had to do.”   
 
Once ashore, the men headed toward the U.S. First Army Headquarters.  Harris 
reported with a pass granting him full access across the entire area of operations. It 
stated “This officer is to be given any aid he requires, and is free to go where and do 
what he wanted.”  Armed with this pass, Harris and his men scoured the Normandy 
countryside and soon had a number of prisoners. 
 
Our ‘un-disclosed’ mission was to look for places or people that might 
have intelligence, then seize and guard them.  In North Africa, a lot of 
good intelligence was lost because troops didn’t know what they had.  We 
did our best to keep everyone informed as to what was valuable, assist in 
forwarding that information, and try and not get killed in the process. We 
were composed of different teams to seize enemy soldiers, operatives and 
their safe-houses.  
 
We had some prisoners for awhile – about six or seven. They were really 
happy to be taken prisoner. They were not the hard-core fighting types.  
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Harris made his biggest contribution when he captured a German in civilian clothes 
carrying vital information, about 100 miles from Paris.  
 
My coup of the war was when my driver and I stopped this German in 
civilian clothes, asking for ID. He said “I have many things that will be of 
interest to you.” …The German had left his command, taking top secret 
stuff with him and was ready to turn it over to the Allies, and happily be 
taken prisoner in the process.  As a result, I got a trip to London.  Later on, 
this German defector had turned into quite a useful guy.  (S.M. Harris Was 
Finding Enemy Secrets - (Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall) 
 
 
Shirley Hartline was one of the original members of the 82d Airborne Division 
and survived every campaign it fought in World War II.  He was a Private first Class in G 
Company, 325th Glider Infantry.  His company was committed on D+1, after the initial 
forces had already encountered stiff resistance and heavy losses. He recalls that June 7, 
1944, a rainy day, was the coldest day of his life. They were attacked the day after their 
glider landed in Normandy.  The heavy fighting that followed did not leave him 
unscathed. He spent 31 consecutive days in combat, was wounded, and later returned to 
his unit for another operation in Holland.   
 
After 31 consecutive days of combat, without any replacements, we had 
one officer and five enlisted men left in G Company of the 325th Glider 
Infantry.  I did not return unscathed from that operation as I was wounded 
during that time. The injury did not prevent me from rejoining what was 
left of my company, and jumping into Holland with the rest of the 82nd 
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during Operation Market Garden. (82nd’s Shirley R. Hartline Returns from 
Normandy Abyss- (Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall) 
 
 
 
John Johnson arrived into the fighting on D+4.  He spent a month under fire and 
then was wounded and sent back for medical treatment.  He recalls D+6, when he was 
surrounded by a beach filled with bodies of both Allied and German dead, as well as 
animals caught in the cross fire. Overhead, rounds from naval guns in the channel firing 
at the enemy were exploding, both on the land and in the air.  He and his men moved in 
quickly and were immediately in the action.   
 
We went in pretty quick and the crews that I was with started clearing 
villages and taking friendlies back to the beach, they had a compound, 
until they started putting soldiers into the 4th and 90th Infantry Divisions. 
 
I don’t know the name of the town, but it wasn’t very far in…it was very 
active… I was wounded on the sixth of July and I left the 90th [Division] 
then.  I was going to stabilize in a field hospital… … around an area 
known as L122.  (John Johnson, Private, Grenadier in the 9th Infantry 
Division- (Interviewer: J. Patrick Hughes, V Corps Command Historian, 
transcribed by Erin Livingston)  
 
 
 
 
VIII. One German soldier’s account 
 
Joseph Horn was a German soldier who survived D-Day.  He was on his dinner 
break when the first Allied paratroopers started to land near his post.  His account shares 
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some of the same perspectives of the Allied soldiers of the time.  Horn was German, but 
he shares a common bond found in the descriptions of all soldiers fighting for their 
country, Axis or Allied.  His account and background is not so different from many of the 
American World War II vets.  He was born in 1925 and drafted into the military in 1943. 
He trained in basic soldiering, was given a specialty in signal, and recalled that he had 
seen combat in Africa prior to being assigned to Normandy with the recently formed 91. 
Luftlande Infanterie-Division, a combat unit that had formed in January 1944 and 
transferred there in May.  We find in Joseph Horn not a German Nazi, but a young man 
who also happened to be a soldier, who became caught up in the middle of the same 
struggles as his peers on the battlefield, far from the politics but in the middle of the 
fighting.  He was trained as a telegraph operator, sending Morse code messages for an 
artillery unit providing fire support to the Division stationed at Carentan.  His position on 
D-Day was one kilometer behind Sainte-Marie-du-Mont. Horn recalls the 6th of June, 
1944. 
  
I had been given the order to look after the telephone wire. Three hours 
northern direction and three hours back all the way testing the telephone 
wires and back at 9 o’clock in the afternoon (evening). And I was told I 
could eat something and make telephone service from 10pm until 
midnight. Shortly after midnight you could hear very low flying American 
airplanes, 100 or 200 meters high and you could see parachuters jumping. 
Parachuters had ammunition and food and camouflage... This area was not 
under water but most of the area around Carentan was flooded. (Herr 
Joseph Horn, German Army - Interview by Dr. J. Patrick Hughes, 3 June 
2004. Transcribed by Julie Heacock) 
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IX. The liberated 
 
 The purpose of the Invasion was to liberate the people of mainland Europe from 
their Nazi occupiers.  Two accounts from D-Day 60 provide a glimpse into the vantage 
points of the occupied people.  Alfred Fauvel was a young boy during the Nazi 
Occupation of France.  He tells of his experiences of helping Allied prisoners escape and 
of how his family faced great danger in aiding the escape of and linking allied personnel 
with members of the French Underground.  
Fauvel was a ten year old French boy whose family took in Allied soldiers fleeing 
from the Germans in July, 1944.  Fauvel’s family took in a Canadian and an American 
soldier, provided them with clothes, and worked with the resistance in assisting them to 
get back to the allied lines. On another occasion, seven soldiers escaped from where they 
were being held by the Germans.  One of his neighbors, Monsieur Ourela, took the 
Americans and hid them in different villages, two at a time moving them day or night, 
whenever German eyes were not looking. Fauvel gives details about how such escapes 
were conducted. 
  
Our village was surrounded by Germans. We gave them civilian clothes so 
they would look like us. One of the American prisoners would not take off 
his combat boots. He had a tattoo on his forearm of the American flag. 
He’d roll his sleeve up and we would keep telling him to keep his sleeves 
down. A member of the French Resistance Movement came and took them 
to the fisherman. From there, they went out to sea where they would join 
up with an American ship. (Going Underground: Young French Boy helps 
Allies Escape Prison Camp- (Summarized by SGT Kenneth Hall) 
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  Pierre Collard was a member of the Maquis, 7 the French Underground.  His 
compelling account shows how a man even in his 90’s remained a true patriot.  During 
his interview, he commented that he was disappointed that the French government would 
not let him and the other veterans do a jump into Normandy.  In 1940, Collard saw the 
occupation of his country and took up arms against his oppressors and joined together 
with others to participate in the liberation of their homeland. Collard was actually a 
member of the French battalion of the U.S. 2nd U. S. Infantry Division during the time of 
the invasion.  The activities of the Maquis forced the Germans to obligate or deploy 
forces throughout the invasion.  According to Collard, General Eisenhower said that the 
work of the Maquis Resistance was the equivalent of 15 Divisions.8  Collard describes the 
resistance activities conducted by his organization to his interviewer, who had the help of 
a translator.  All the men in his unit were former French soldiers. Though the Germans 
disbanded the army, these men and others decided to continue the fight against the 
occupier.  Armed with a variety of weapons such as an English STEN Gun (submachine 
gun), M1 Carbine, no anti-tank weapons and little else, Collard and his fellow resistance 
fighters sabotaged “trains, roads, bridges…” and conducted ambushes. Collard and his 
comrades received orders from London via radio and worked with Allied agents who 
helped them plan and coordinate their activities. 
 
                                                 
7
 Collard was in his 90’s at the time of his interview. He may have his mixed some of his facts here.  
Technically the Maquis was a separate part of the French Resistance movement, just like the communists 
and other organizations.  There were multiple sources of command and direction.   He also said he was in 
the  FFI, the Maquis, and the U.S. 2nd INF DIV.  He may have changed units or his organization may have 
changed.  Additionally, the interpreter himself may not have fully translated or understood the difference 
between the units as he provided the translation.  Collard’s report still offers tremendous insight into the 
spirit and leadership of a man who fought in the long struggle to liberate his country..  
8
 General Eisenhower, in his book, My Crusade in Europe (1948) wrote that the work of the Maquis was 
equivalent to fifteen divisions 
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They had … an American officer helping direct the Maquis.  And they 
also had two British officers and an Irish woman who also worked with 
them... at the time when he participated in the Maquis, he was in his 
twenties.  He said … that his unit was a regular army unit (FFI) Forces 
Francais de Interieur.  It was one company. 
 
Collard goes on to describe the actions of his unit during the time of the invasion 
at Normandy.      
 
They say the first big prefecture was liberated in Bayeux by the British, 
but that is not true, because we liberated the first office in... a prefecture in 
La Creuse.  [La Creuse was in Central France where the Maquis Operated. 
According to Zabecki (1999) there were several resistance groups, but the 
Maquis were not active in the Normandy area.  Nevertheless, Collard was 
involved in operations against the German forces at the time of Operation 
Overlord.] We only kept the city for two days.  It was hard to defend 
against a German unit that came from southern France, from Toulouse.  It 
was an SS division and they were responsible for a horrible massacre, 
burning women and children in a church.  But we held them off for eight 
days, ambush after ambush on their way out.  They were on their way to 
Normandy, this SS unit, but they arrived twelve or thirteen days late, and 
by then, we had established a good foothold…  (Interview with Pierre 
Collard translated by LTC Millett for LTC Alan R. Koenig.)  
 
 
 
Summary of the chronology 
 
This chronology showed many aspects of Operation Overlord.  Several of the 
accounts provided direct examples of leadership in action. Other examples showed 
indirectly what leaders (and followers) felt or saw.   As mentioned earlier, this 
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dissertation is not a history of Operation Overlord. Countless books, articles, and movies 
have been written about its historical importance.  There were many errors in the 
historical facts in the accounts.  These were addressed as much as possible.  However, 
this does not diminish the main points of the study or the value of the accounts 
themselves.  The veterans did not have their notes with them, nor did they have the time 
(most of them) to sit and write it all down as it happened.  They all experienced these 
events, and whether they got the facts straight or not is less important in this study than 
what they took from their experience of being at, or taking part in D-Day, Operation 
Overlord. It is the impression that these events left on them and the leadership that was 
evoked during that time that this study will be focusing on as it is discussed and analyzed. 
Some accounts refer to events that follow D-Day, and in a few cases, there are accounts 
of events that did not take place there. But in all cases the accounts are from WWII 
Veterans who attended one of the many World War II 60th Anniversary commemorative 
events.  This study is an examination of leadership during a crisis, using the accounts of 
these veterans. Even in this short review of the various battlefield scenes, we get a clear 
sense that there were countless instances where different leadership styles and skills came 
in to play. Every situation differed, and every decision was based on the factors and 
environment in which the individual was placed.   CPT Goranson had to lead his men up 
the cliffs and then face the enemy on the high ground, going through the networked 
trenches that made up the German defense.  His critical mission enabled success for the 
men who hit the beaches because it prevented the Germans from using part of their 
transportation network.   Similarly, Derek Fearon and the men at Pegasus Bridge affected 
German movements and prevented reinforcements from getting to the beaches area.  
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Another example given here of the kind of leaders we are studying was Pierre Collard, 
whose Maquis resistance fighters so harried a German SS Division in another part of 
France, that it arrived too late to reinforce the beaches and towns of Normandy.  
Together, these men, and all of the others fighting at Normandy were part of a greater 
effort that slowly, but thoroughly, chipped away at and eventually broke through the wall 
that kept the Allies out of Hitler’s Fortress Europe.  Many of them never made it beyond 
the beaches of Omaha or Utah, or past their drop zones around Sainte-Mère-Église and 
Sainte-Marie-du-Mont.  Some men fought bravely but were nevertheless later captured.   
Others fought all the way through to the end of the war and seeing its worst atrocities.  
The accounts described leadership experienced from the lowest level- such as 
between two comrades of equal rank- to the first line squad leaders and NCOs leading the 
way, and on up to the level of the officers leading platoons and companies. It presented a 
commentary on organizational level leadership as well, such as that described in the 
Slapton Sands incident by Harold McCauley. 
Ultimately, it comes down to cause and effect.  The situation, the environment, 
and the mission all made up the causes for the actions that were taken by leaders, with the 
effect being the success or failure of a landing, a skirmish, a reconnaissance patrol, or 
even landing troops at the beaches or dropping them from the sky.  This compelling 
sampling of accounts by the men who were there gives us the setting for the D-Day 
leadership laboratory that we used to explore leadership theory.  Though it in no way 
gives the whole picture of the battle, it provides a basis for understanding the nature of 
the chaotic experiences and challenges faced by the men we studied.   We used these 
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accounts and others to illustrate observations of leadership in action and how it affected 
personnel at all levels.  
I will next review what the body of leadership theory consists of, my own 
leadership theory, methodology, and observations from the accounts using qualitative 
analysis. These firsthand accounts of leadership situations will be analyzed in the context 
of current leadership theory.   I will discuss first line, team, and senior level leadership; 
training and its impact on leadership. This is followed by perceptions of leadership, and 
then I will describe the impact it had on the men who were at D-Day.  Following that, I 
will present my findings on the factors that helped these men rise to the occasion or 
challenge presented to them. Finally, I will comment on where such findings might be 
applied in today’s environment - whether on the battlefield or elsewhere, by presenting a 
chapter describing the D-Day effect, as well as my own theory that I believe specifically 
describes the type of leadership that develops from these and similar situations.  
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PART II 
LEADERSHIP THEORY AND D-DAY 
 
CHAPTER 4 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEADERSHIP THEORY  
 
Historically, the ancient Greeks had their own view of what the ideal leader was.   
David Cawthon writes in Philosophical Foundations of Leadership, “Like Plato, Aristotle 
held that there are those who are born to lead. The rest are born to follow” (Cawthon, 
2002, p.29). Modern leadership theory discussion has spanned from trait-based leadership 
(Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 2006; Zaccaro, 2007) to expectancy/ path-goal theory (Graen & 
Uhl-Bien, 1995), to style approach (Blake & Mouton, 1964), as well as the situational 
approach to leadership (Blanchard, Zigarmi & Nelson, 1993; Blanchard, Zigarmi, & 
Zigarmi, 1985; Hersey & Blanchard, 1977, 1988).  This section will present many of the 
leadership theories that have been developed over the last century.  The purpose of this 
discussion is to present the key aspects of many of these theories, but it is not necessarily 
to prove one or the other is better.  Having a thorough foundation of leadership theory 
gives the framework around which the study of the D-Day veterans can be built.  In many 
cases, several theories have parallel ends and means, but they differ in degrees of 
semantics or are simply updated to reflect a change in values and attitudes of both society 
and the academic community.  The body of leadership theory discussion appears to be 
leading us back to where we started.   
 51 
 
The theories reviewed come from the works of Stogdill (1947), Katz (1955), 
Fiedler (1967), Burns (1978), House (1992), Hersey & Blanchard (2001), and others.  
These in turn have been reviewed in works by Northouse (2004), Yukl (2006), and 
Stogdill (1974). Kouzes & Posner (2003), Bennis & Nanus (1997), Peters (1983),  
Belasco & Stayer (1993), Bass (1990), Goleman (2006), & Zaccarro (2007) are also 
notable authors on different facets of leadership theory.  Their works range from 
discourses on transactional leadership (Bass, 1993), charismatic leadership (House, 
1974), emotional intelligence (Goleman, 2006), and finally back to trait-based leadership 
in the 21st Century (Zaccaro, 2007).  
The field of leadership is incredibly vast, with the beginnings of its study 
stretching back to ancient times.  Though there was undoubtedly plenty of discussion 
prior to the Greeks, it can arguably be said that the first real discussions of what goes into 
being a leader and making a leader goes back to the golden age of Athens. From the 
discussions of Plato, Socrates, Herodotus, and Thucydides (325 B.C.) and others emerged 
a picture of what a leader ought to be (Cawthon, 2002; Sherover, 1974).  The age of 
chivalry brought its own enhancements to this ideal, leading to the generally held idea 
that a man was born a leader, that leadership was passed through one’s noble birth or 
through the favor of the Gods for those rare individuals who were born to be leaders.  The 
virtues of such a leader became the ideal for all following discussions in Western 
literature through the 18th century.  Commentaries along the way by individuals such as 
Machiavelli (Sherover, 1974) added to the discussion, but the idea, concepts, and 
perceptions of what the ideal leader was supposed to be stayed nearly the same for the 
better part of the last two millennia. 
 52 
 
 It could be argued that a change in the traditional Western perception of 
leadership was first put to pen by Rousseau and other authors during the 18th Century 
Age of Enlightenment (Cawthon, 2002; Sherover, 1974).  The development and 
realization of the democratic idea and its subsequent rise in society closely parallels the 
leadership literature of today.  In a sense, this is a symbiotic relationship that has worked 
well for society - a more egalitarian society spawned similar thinking in the arena of 
leadership. The proposition that all men are created equal helped open the doors to both a 
more enlightened leader and a better follower.  On the practical side, it helped encourage 
and foster a revision of how those who are the workers are perceived by the managers 
and vice versa.  The discussion of leadership theory is not simply an exercise for those in 
the ivory tower. These theories and concepts have a very real and important impact in our 
society. 
If one considers leadership discussion in terms of school, then there is a line of 
thought that can be traced from Plato and Socrates to Machiavelli, to Gallatin and to 
Nietzsche.  This is not a straight line. The Great Man (Stogdill, 1948) school of trait-
based leadership has taken many turns, but as the saying goes, “the more things change, 
the more they stay the same.”  Many scholars today are once again revisiting this school 
of thought when it comes to discussing leadership.   
A comparison of Plato and Aristotle shows a divergence in the school of 
leadership thought that occurred during the Golden Age in Greece. Cawthon (2002) 
argues that Aristotle’s impact on leadership theory and philosophy has been significant 
over the centuries.  It gave impetus to the development of the divine right of kings in the 
old World, “Jim Crow laws” in America, and even continued into the general hierarchical 
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nature of many modern organizations where elitism or right to lead, is still based on birth.  
Plato’s leader composite was different in one key aspect from Aristotle’s.  Plato believed 
that the gold of leadership was spread among all levels of society and it was the 
responsibility of the society to groom those who showed such attributes early on.    
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Plato’s Leader Attribute Composite 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aristotle’s Leader Attribute Composite 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leaders should seek the “ultimate good” for the group 
they lead 
 
Leaders should be “rooted in justice and virtue” 
Many talents or traits are inherent in an individual and 
emerge at various times.   
 
Aristotle says in his Politics that they show up at 
different time s in people’s lives, citizens should be 
warriors when young, leaders when middle aged, and 
priests or religious leaders when they are old. 
 
Aristotle differed from Plato in that leadership was more 
a product of a place in society.   
 
Only freemen could beget freemen, and slaves were 
locked in because of the condition of their birth, and 
because they lacked the time to contemplate “ultimate 
good”. (Cawthon, 2002) 
 
 Souls were divided into three categories-  
 
Appetitive souls look to satisfy physical needs 
and desires  
 
Spirited souls are fighters, warriors and power 
seekers  
 
Rational souls seek wisdom and delight in the 
acquisition of knowledge; unencumbered by 
physical passions, recognized by their 
goodness, and seek out higher callings of the 
mind and philosophy. 
 
Those identified to be leaders need to be trained to 
enhance their skills 
Men and women were born with certain talents, these 
talents ought to be developed by a society. 
Leadership could be found among any level of the 
population and was not limited to the nobility. 
Leaders should provide vision and understanding for 
their followers (Cawthon, 2002) 
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Leadership was not a divine right.  One striking aspect about Plato’s philosophy 
on leadership is that he does not leave the leadership arena as being the sole venue for 
men. Thus, his theory applies to both genders.  This was ignored for centuries, and only 
in recent times have women been given the right to hold leadership positions in a more 
equal manner.  Although Aristotle differed from Plato in this aspect of leadership theory, 
he noted that even those among the chosen group could have leadership traits appear at 
different times (i.e., stages of life as warrior, leader, priest).   The combination of some of 
Plato and Aristotle’s views is a partial basis for the Emergent Leadership During Crisis 
theory that is discussed later in this work. 
Unfortunately for many would-be leaders of past centuries, the Artistotelean 
school of thought won out.  Its comfortable inevitability kept the mass of people under 
the yoke of leaders who accepted the former part of Aristotle’s theories about the right of 
leading, but they often overlooked the virtuous search for wisdom and understanding, 
enlightened rule of subjects that Aristotle also discussed.   
Stoicism was another philosophy that influenced leadership development as well.  
It was built upon the Classical school and added a new dimension to it. Marcus Aurelius 
was considered one of the greatest of all the Roman Emperors. He ruled from 161-180 
AD.  During that time he faced several challenges.  There was war on his borders, 
barbarian invasions, and plague.  He handled all of these crises well.  Many attribute his 
success to the Stoic philosophy that he followed. Pollock (1879) writes that “the Stoics 
were eminently practical… {they believed} that the worth of philosophy consists in its 
power to guide the conduct of life (Pollock, 1879).”  Stoicism added a higher degree of 
morality into the exchange between the leader and the follower, or subject.   
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Today, a derivative of this approach to leadership can be seen in the 
transformational leadership approach (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1996) that is discussed in the 
next chapter. Despite this, the bedrock approach to leadership remained Aristotelean in 
nature.  Hobbes himself wrote this in Leviathan (1651), “ “The method hitherto followed, 
especially in the universities, has been to rely on the authority of selected writers and 
books.3 The universities, indeed, have come to rely so heavily on one particular writer 
that their teachings no longer deserve to be called philosophy, but merely Aristotelity.4” 
(Skinner, 1989).” 
John Locke presented a radical new idea in his works.  He said that the human 
mind was like a blank piece of paper and that “all our subsequent knowledge and 
understanding of external reality develops from these origins” (Magee, 1998, p.104). As 
this and other aspects of his philosophical ideas became applied there was a shift in many 
circles as to the entire order of society.  Some applied these ideas to education and 
worked for a more universal approach. Others applied this in discussing the natural rights 
of men, and therefore, who has the right to lead. If based on the premise that if all were 
minds were equal at the start, why did one have the right to lead simply by accident of 
birth? Furthermore as far as discussion of the leadership process itself goes, Locke’s 
attitude towards governmental purpose played a role in the development of a more 
egalitarian attitude in leadership as well. Locke said that the government should protect 
the rights of the governed, a radical idea for the time, including protection of life, liberty, 
and property for all (Magee,1998).  Through these and other ideas, Locke made a 
profound impact in many areas that would manifest themselves later on and culminate 
with the American Revolution.  Likewise, though it took time, his ideas, or rather their 
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manifestation, came to play a very significant role in the development of modern 
leadership theory. 
Still, the Great Man concept was the dominant leadership theory through the 
centuries. As late as the 19th Century this was the prevalent school of thought.  Despite 
more democratic ideals being developed for the privileged classes, the idea of the born 
leader remained at the forefront in the concept of leadership. Francis Galton’s Great Man 
theory was first published in 1869 (Stogdill, 1948).  The application of this theory, and 
others, such as those espoused by Nietsche were cherry picked and used to justify what 
culminated in the Eugenics movement that led to such disastrous results in World War II 
with the rise of Nazism. [The eugenics movement was not limited to Hitler’s Germany.  
But certainly its extreme was manifested in Nazism]. 
Perhaps because of this, the Great Man leadership ideal (Stogdill, 1974; Gabert, 
2003; Gabert 2006) is not at the top of today’s contemporary leadership discussions.  
These theories that were embraced by the Nazis were rejected. The idea that some are 
born to lead and the rest follow was out of vogue in the Post-World War II period.  
Instead, other models gained momentum that brought leadership to the masses.  This 
discussion has centered on the egalitarian approach and the idea that leaders are now 
simply catalysts for SDWTs (self directed work teams) to get the job done.  They are not 
necessarily anything special in and of themselves.  According to this school, a leader is 
just another manager who has developed the required skills that can be further developed 
and honed with the right coaching.  
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Leadership Theory Development  
                             Emerging Theory 
               Emergent Leadership               
 During Crisis- Pierce    
  
        Current Leadership  
        Transactional-Transformational 
        Burns 1978, Bass 1996  
                           Multiple Linkage- Yukl 2006  
        Charismatic - Zaccaro 2007  
     
      Modern Leadership     
      Situational- Reddin,1967 (Managerial grid)  
                          Hersey& Blanchard 1969   
      Contingency- Fiedler et al 1964,1967,1974  
      Path-Goal- House et al 1974   
 
     Post-WWII      
      Traits- Stogdill 1948     
      Skills – Katz 1955;  Mumford 2000    
                     Style- Blake and Mouton 1964    
            
Industrial Revolution        
Great Man- Nietzche 1844-1900      
  Galton 1869 
Enlightenment                             
 Hobbes   1651 
Locke  1689 
Rousseau 1762         
 
Renaissance          
Machiavelli 1460-1527                 
 
Classical  
Marcus Aurelius 161-180 AD    
Aristotle    450-350 BCE              
Plato 450-350  BCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Over time, Leadership Theory has focused on traits and innate ability to lead. Although 
Plato supported a more egalitarian approach, it was Aristotle’s view that eventually 
became the accepted order.  Starting with the Enlightenment, there was a divergence 
from this perspective that coincided with the modern development of democratic ideals. 
In the mid-20th Century, the focus changed to the idea that there was an acquired ability 
to lead through learning skills, style and method. Most recently there has been a return to 
an approach that at its core once again focuses on traits (Ex. Charismatic Leadership 
(Zaccaro (2007)).  
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The basis for this current leadership theory can be traced to when the leadership 
schools started to diverge.  The works of Hobbes (Leviathan,1651), Locke (Two Treatises 
of Government,1689), and later, Rousseau (The Social Contract, or Principles of Political 
Right,1762), with their treatises on the Social Contract (Sherover, 1974, Skinner, 1990, 
Tienda, 2002) were catalysts in this change.  This new school of thought was 
revolutionary. Indeed, it was the precipitator of many revolutions that resulted in 
overturning the old order.  Nevertheless, the former ideal leader theory continued even 
while this more egalitarian approach started to take root.  As pointed out in Cawthon 
(2002), p.64, “Rousseau sustained that although man is born free, he finds himself subject 
to the will of others.”   From this concept that all men are equal there developed the idea 
that a leader could emerge from any sector of society.  The realization of this is 
exemplified in the story of Andrew Jackson, born of humble circumstances, who, born in 
a log cabin, rose first to being a war hero, and then later to become President of the 
United States.  A new paradigm was being developed that argued that all men were equal 
and thus all could be leaders if given the proper circumstances and tools.  Rousseau, like 
Locke and Hobbes, did not express it in these exact terms, but many of today’s 
contemporary authors have essentially taken this idea and further developed it, as well as 
taken credit for coming up with other ideas that were really discussed centuries ago. 
 It is clear that the development of democracy helped to further develop the ideas 
of how to approach leadership.  American democracy has benefited from such thinking.  
Indeed, without such works by these authors, the American Revolution probably would 
not have happened, or if it did, it certainly could have ended up with a completely 
different outcome.  This realization of how to lead the free soldier who fought for home 
 60 
 
and country at a time when most soldiers were conscripts or mercenaries sent off to fight 
wars for empires was summed up by Major General John M. Schofield’s dictum on 
discipline written in the 19th Century: 
The discipline that makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is 
not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such 
treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible 
to impart instructions and to give commands in such manner and such a 
tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to 
obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite 
strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of 
dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast 
of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot 
fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while one who feels, and hence 
manifests disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to 
inspire hatred toward himself (Schofield, 1879). 
 
Slowly but surely, a more democratic, collaborative approach has been brought 
into the mainstream of the American workplace, largely as a result of the foundations 
discussed by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (Sherover, 1974).  It is important to note this 
because of the impact on today’s thinking, whether contemporary theorists are aware of it 
or not.  Therefore, it is meaningful to research leadership among the soldiers of a free 
country who grew up under the ideals of freedom, democracy, personal initiative and self 
reliance. 
Personal experience with military leadership is another area from which we can 
draw leadership observations. This area has clearly been important, playing a role in the 
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foundation of leadership ideals.  It has been the arena where many true leaders have 
emerged to lead their troops or people to victory or defeat. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CURRENT LEADERSHIP THEORIES 
 
 Before we go further with discussion of leadership theories, a definition of 
leadership itself should be put forth.  Just as there are many theories about how and why 
leaders lead, so are there many definitions of leadership itself.  For example, Northouse 
(2004) cites Stogdill’s (1974) observation that there as many ways to define leadership as 
there are people who have defined it.  
 Leadership has been described as a process “whereby an individual influences a 
group of individuals to achieve a common goal” (Northouse, 2004, p.3).  Northouse 
(2004) further described leadership as composed of four parts: process, influence, group 
involvement, and goal attainment. 
 There are several different ways to study leadership.  According to Yukl (2006), 
there are five basic approaches to the study of leadership: 
 Trait approach: Leadership is based on values, motivations, attributes and skills 
that are inherent to the individual. 
 Behavior approach:  This approach focuses on studies of managers in the 
workplace, how they spend time, and what their focus is.  
 Power influence approach: This approach examines the nature of the relationship 
between followers and leaders. Specifically, it is a leader-centered perspective 
that includes the premise that leadership is unidirectional.  That is, leaders act and 
followers react; the link is not specific or planned but is part of the power 
possessed by the leader. 
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 Situational approach: This approach looks at the context or factors that comprise 
leadership situation or scenario. The research in this category has focused on 
defining these situations and attempting to map them. A second focus has been to 
look for what leadership factors come into play in these different situations. 
 Integrative approach: This approach looks at multiple factors or parts of different 
leadership theories coming together as a way of explaining leadership.  Yukl 
(2006) points out, however, that it is rare to find studies that combine all elements 
of leadership into one study.  
 Northouse’s (2004) description of leadership as a process goes beyond trait-based 
leadership.  Traits denote characteristics such as physical stature, intelligence, motivation, 
innate values and abilities.  The most basic and fundamental approach to studying 
leadership is the trait approach.  However, contemporary researchers have sought better 
ways to explain why leaders are successful.  The belief that some people have leadership 
ability and some do not was challenged after studies conducted by Stogdill (1948) 
seemed to indicate a host of attributes that made up the leadership traits.  The feedback, at 
first glance, appeared ambiguous.  This was one of the factors that led researchers to go 
into different directions in leadership study (Zaccaro, 2007).  
 
Trait Approaches 
 Leadership traits have been pared down to as few as three (Lord, DeVader, & 
Alliger, 1986): intelligence, masculinity, and dominance.  Others have reported as many 
as ten, as described by Stogdill (1974), who originally started out with eight in his earlier 
work (1948).  Stogdill’s traits of leadership include achievement, persistence, insight, 
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initiative, self-confidence, responsibility, cooperativeness, tolerance, influence, and 
sociability. Northouse (2004) sums up leadership traits as intelligence, self-confidence, 
determination, integrity, and sociability.  
 The trait approach basically says that organizations will perform better when they 
have people who have the right traits in leadership positions.  This goes a further step by 
having people with different profiles selected for different jobs by virtue of their traits. 
 
Skills Approach 
 The next school of leadership is the skills approach.  Yukl (2006) has lumped this 
in with the traits approach because it is leader-centered, while the Northouse work that 
reviewed  leadership theories (2004) draws the distinction of it being a learned approach 
to leadership as opposed to something inherent in the individual.  In essence, if one is 
willing and has the capacity to learn the requisite skills, then one can become a leader.  
Northouse (2004) cites Katz’s 1955 article from the Harvard Business Review, “Skills of 
an Effective Administrator,” as the initial starting point for research on this aspect of 
leadership.   
Up to this point, the leadership arena had been dominated by researchers who 
were looking for the right traits and innate skills that were part of an individual’s make 
up. Under the skills approach, a whole new concept came into being.  Suddenly, the idea 
gained ground that even if one is not born to be a leader, one can learn how to display the 
attributes necessary to attract followers and lead them.  This school of thought developed 
over the next forty years through follow-on studies. Eventually, a capabilities-based 
model was developed and used to link performance potential with a person’s knowledge 
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and skills.  The latest version of this model was developed by Mumford, Zaccaro, 
Harding and others, who published it in 2000.  An important distinction between the 
skills approach and other approaches is that the skills approach looks at the capabilities 
that make the performance of a good leader possible through what they learn through 
either formal or informal training rather than on behavioral patterns or situations. 
 The Mumford skill-based model has five parts: competencies, individual 
attributes, leadership outcomes, and environmental influences (Northouse, 2004). 
The model is shown: 
 
 
Figure A. The Mumford Skill-Based Model 
 
Most of the model is fairly straightforward.  However, one should note the 
distinction drawn between general cognitive ability and crystallized cognitive ability in 
this context.   General cognitive ability refers to a person’s general intelligence and 
ranges information collection and processing, creative ability and similar skills.  
Individual Attributes  Competencies  Leadership Outcomes 
        Effective Problem  
Problem solving skills  Solving 
General Cognitive ability 
    Social Judgment Skills  &  
Crystallized Cognitive   
Knowledge   Performance 
Ability   
Motivation 
Personality 
 
  Career experiences 
 
  Environmental Influences 
Source: Adapted by Northouse, P. (2004). Leadership theory and practice, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
from Mumford, D. J., et al, “Leadership skills for a changing World: Solving complex social problems,” 
Leadership Quarterly, 11(1), 23, 2000. 
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Crystallized cognitive ability refers to the learned experience and skill development over 
time.  This refers to skills such as problem solving, social skills, and ability to grasp 
concepts.  
The model shows how the combination of the individual attributes and 
competencies form the career experiences that are drawn upon to affect leadership 
outcomes.  In each category, there is the underlying factor of environmental influences.  
The engine that drives the model is the center column of problem-solving, social 
judgment, and knowledge. 
In summary, the skills approach is “a leader-centered perspective that emphasizes 
the competencies of leaders” (Northouse, 2004, p.62). The work of Katz (1955) 
represented a shift in thinking about how leadership is studied.  Mumford (2000) and 
others brought this to a culminating point with their skills model of leadership, which has 
served as a basis for developing leaders in both in business and the military. 
 
Style Approach 
The next approach to leadership study is the style approach.  It focuses on the 
behavior of the leader instead of the personality (traits), or the capabilities (skills).  It 
focuses on two areas – task behaviors and relationship behaviors (Northouse, 2004). 
There were three schools which emerged in this area.  The first was at Ohio State in the 
1940’s, where researchers built upon the work of Stogdill’s findings (1948) that there 
may be more to leadership than simply traits. Several years later, studies at the University 
Michigan by Katz and Kahn emerged during the 1950’s (Katz.  Finally, Blake and 
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Mouton (1964) spent nearly 20 years studying this area and developing models based on 
their work. 
 Researchers Ralph Stogdill and J. K. Hemphill, from Ohio State, published the 
Leader Behavior Description Questionnaire in 1957 (Northouse, 2004).   They observed 
through their research and analysis of questionnaires that task behavior (organizing work, 
giving structure) and relational or consideration behavior (camaraderie, trust between 
leaders and followers) were two distinct areas within the field of leadership.  The result of 
this was the idea that there were leaders who were low task and high relationship, high 
task and low relationship, and everything in between.  It changed the view of the 
leadership map.  The Leadership Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ) was 
ground-breaking in identifying this and providing a tool for mapping the style or type of 
leadership one exhibited (Northouse, 2004).   
 Meanwhile, at the University of Michigan, other researchers were trying to find a 
niche and came up with their own survey and labeled leadership behaviors called 
“employee orientation” and “production orientation.”  “Employee orientation” closely 
parallels the leadership behaviors called “consideration” in the Ohio State study. This 
aspect is focused on how the employer treats the employees and attends to their personal 
needs.  “Product orientation” refers to the technical and production aspects of a job. One 
difference between the University of Michigan and Ohio State studies is that the 
Michigan studies put the behaviors along a linear continuum but at opposite ends, while 
Ohio State researchers put their observations into two separate lines.  Later on, though, 
the Michigan school also set these as two separate lines (Northouse, 2004). 
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 Blake and Mouton (1964) designed the most well known management model.  
The Managerial Grid © has been in use since the 1960’s and has undergone several 
updates along the way.  It was re-named the Leadership Grid and was used to describe 
how leaders reach their organizational objectives through concern for people and concern 
for production, in many ways similar to the Ohio State and Michigan studies. In fact, the 
Leadership Grid simply codifies what the other two studies describe, and it specifies 
certain specific types of behavior in various quadrants.  The grid identifies certain 
culminating behavior classifications for individual styles of leadership.  Blake and 
Mouton (1964) proposed that an individual has a dominant style, as well as an alternate 
style that emerges when they are under pressure.  
 Examples of styles that form the grid include the “country club” management 
style, the “team” management style, the “impoverished leadership” style, the “5,5” leader 
style, two combination styles and the “opportunism” style of management.  The “country 
club” management style includes high attention to the needs of the people for a 
comfortable, friendly organization.  In the “team” management style, work is 
accomplished by committed people, and there is interdependence through a common 
stake, built on relationships.  The “impoverished” leadership style features a leader who 
is unconcerned for the needs of the employees, nor for accomplishing the task; he or she 
goes through the motions but is generally apathetic and withdrawn.  Other styles 
highlighted include the “5, 5” leader or Mr. “middle of the road.” This leader finds a 
balance between tasks and relationships.  He or she is predisposed to being willing to 
settle or give way in one area for progress.  Then we have the combination models- the 
“1,9” and “9,1” special or what is commonly known paternalism/maternalism 
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(benevolent dictator). Lastly, we have the “opportunism” style of management where the 
leader will try to be all things to all people to get the maximum advantage (Blake & 
Mouton, 1964).  
 The style approach is more or less a descriptive format allowing for 
identifications of behaviors in leaders.  It can be used to coach or engage leaders in ways 
to improve either their or the organization’s performance. This approach is important for 
identifying a link between how leaders act and the performance of their team or 
organization. With the advent of the style approach, the onus was no longer on the 
personal skills or traits of the leader but rather the leader’s focus on either task or 
relationship styles.  Thus, it represented a step forward for leadership study. 
 
Situational Leadership Theory 
 While the style approach may have indeed been a step forward, Hersey, 
Blanchard (1969), took leadership theory development even further with their situational 
leadership theory and model.  They based their work on Reddin’s 1967 3D Management 
style theory. 
Situational leadership (Hersey and Blanchard, 1969) is basically adapting one’s 
leadership style to the situation with which one is presented.  A leader’s ability to adapt 
to the situation reflects his or her success: the more versatile the better.  According to this 
theory, there are two aspects that the leader must focus on: the supportive dimension and 
the directive dimension.  Additionally, it is incumbent on the leader to be able to evaluate 
the abilities of his or her subordinates to determine what level of presence or involvement 
is required to successfully lead in the situation.  Leaders must assess the competencies 
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and commitments of their subordinates. The classic model of situational leadership, SLII, 
is shown below.  It illustrates the four quadrants of situational leadership.  The model was 
developed by Blanchard (1985) and Blanchard et al. (1985) to reflect the leadership 
emphasis required for different levels of competence and commitment. 
Hersey and colleagues (2001) describe four distinct leadership styles. These are 
summarized as follows: 
 S1-Directing focuses on goal achievement and little emphasis on supportive 
behaviors 
 S2- Coaching focuses on both goal achievement and maintenance of subordinates 
socio-emotional needs.  The leader gives the subordinates feedback and a freer 
hand, but still retains control of how and what of goals achievements. 
 S3- Supportive focuses on both goals and bringing out the skills needed to 
accomplish tasks.  It involves listening, praising, giving feedback.  The 
subordinate runs the daily business, but the leader is there to facilitate problem 
solving when necessary. 
 S4- Delegating focuses on empowering the subordinates with most aspects of an 
operation.  The leader here has enough confidence in the subordinates that he or 
she doesn’t need to be involved, but rather assign the mission and await results 
(Hersey, Blanchard & Johnson, 2001). 
 
The other important aspect of situational leadership is measuring the 
developmental levels of subordinates.  Their level of competencies correspond with the 
model, with D1 being the least competent and committed through D4, with high 
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competency and high commitment.  This discussion included not only the four quadrants 
of situational leadership but also the important SOAR Peak Performance Model: L-
Leader S- Situation O- Organization   A- Activities  R – Results < V- Vision 
(Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson, 2001).  Figure B below shows the four quadrants of the 
Situational Approach to leadership. 
 
 
     Figure B. 
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From Blanchard, K., Zigarmi, P. & Zigami, D. (1985) Leadership and the one  
minute manager: Increasing effectiveness through situational leadership. 
New York: William Morrow. 
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Situational leadership is an excellent way of approaching different leadership 
challenges.  It does however present a challenge to keep a consistent image to 
subordinates.  A good leader manages this through communication and consistency in the 
rest of his or her activities, as well as has the capacity to adapt to the situation. 
A foundational aspect of situational leadership theory is the contingency theory.  
It was most widely described by Fiedler (1967).  Contingency theory focuses on placing 
the leader in a situation where the leader is matched with the context of the situation.  The 
theory deals with the leader’s style in various situations.  Much of the work done by 
Fiedler involved study of military leaders.   
The theory is built on three specific areas: leader-member relations, task structure, 
and position power.  Leader-member relations refer to the environment created between 
the leader and the followers.  Specifically, confidence, loyalty, and attraction are critical 
in this area. The next category is the task structure. This refers to the clarity of instruction 
and requirements presented.  This can vary from a very rigid and defined task, such as 
how to work the milk shake machine at McDonalds, to an ad hoc committee running a 
fundraiser, an activity that can quickly become unstructured. The last aspect of the 
contingency theory model is the position power of the leader. A leader with higher power 
might have the power to hire and fire or give rewards.  A person with low position power 
would be one who is weak in these areas, or who has no ability to reward, coerce or 
control others in the relationship.  On the one hand, a better situation would be favorable 
leader member relations, well defined task structure, and adequate power to accomplish 
the task presented.  The opposite is a recipe for a bad situation.  The model is shown 
below in Figure C. 
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From A theory of Leadership Effectiveness, by F.E. Fiedler, 1967, New York: McGraw-
Hill. Found in Northouse, P. (2004). Leadership: Theory and practice. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: SAGE Publications, p. 111. 
Figure C. 
 
The model includes the least preferred coworker scale.  The LPC scores task-
oriented leaders lower and highly relationship-oriented leaders higher.  The gist of the 
theory is that a high relationship scoring LPC means that the leader will generally be 
successful in situations which require moderate but not absolute control, and low LPCs 
would be appropriate for a leader to be successful in situations where high degree of 
control is required.   
The contingency theory has a good deal of empirical data behind it and is a fair 
predictor for leadership; but it also has some drawbacks.  Among these are the weak 
explanations for the relationship between styles and situations, as well as the “how to” 
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part for organizations to successfully take action on the results of the model and integrate 
it into a strategy for the organization (Northouse, 2004).  
Beginning in the 1970’s, House (1971) and others (Evans, 1970; House, 1974; 
House & Dessler, 1974; House & Mitchell, 1974) presented the Path-Goal theory.  This 
was based on the leader and the characteristics of the setting and subordinates.  It relies 
heavily on expectancy theory: in a given situation a subordinate will be motivated if they 
believe they will be able to complete a task, if they will receive a reward for their efforts, 
if they can see what the outcome might be, and if they feel that the reward or pay is worth 
the effort. 
Path-Goal theory (House et al., 1971, 1974) is built around the concept that there 
are four leadership behaviors: directive, supportive, participative, and achievement-
oriented.  Northouse (2004) writes that there are two primary characteristics of these 
behaviors - subordinate characteristics and task characteristics. These lead to motivation, 
where the subordinates reach goals or achieve levels of productivity.  Subordinate 
characteristics are based on the perceptions of subordinates at work. Critical aspects here 
are needs for affiliation, structure, control, and the individual’s own self efficacy 
perceptions.  On the other hand, task characteristics refer to the formal structures of the 
organization and the actual job description of the subordinate. Under this concept, 
subordinates are able to find paths to their goals through the structure and formal 
pathways in the organization.  This minimizes the need for the leader’s role in the 
organization.  Northouse (2004) writes that the theory is based on expectancy theory, i.e., 
subordinates will act in certain ways based on the idea that they will receive a reward for 
their behavior. 
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It is the vision and the leader which has really emerged into the forefront of 
today’s leadership discussions.  For example, Bennis and Nanus (1997) write that 
“leaders have an uncanny way of enrolling people in their vision through their optimism.”  
They must paint the picture – the vision, then state where the organization is going, and 
most importantly, they must lead—not manage.  This is a recurring theme in the 
contemporary leadership literature.  The distinction between leading and management is 
significant.  Many authors point out that a responsibility of a leader is to build the 
organization in such a way that it will not fall apart when the leader is out of the net.  In 
the Flight of the Buffalo (1993) Belasco and Stayer write that if the organization is built 
upon a leader who is one deep and one-dimensional, the organization tends to stagnate or 
fall apart when that person is either gone or leaves the organization.  This is where the 
important transformational models of leadership come into play.  Peters (1982) describes 
the importance of preparing others and makes the case that this can be a key to the 
success for an organization.  Leaders should cross-train, nurture and develop everyone in 
the organization in order to strengthen it and increase its efficiency by developing a 
common understanding and knowledge base.  His example of improvement at 
Johnsonville Brats was a model which showed where this benefited the organization 
greatly.    
 
Recent Developments in Leadership Theory 
 All of this leads us to the Yukl (2006) Multiple-Linkage model, which in many 
ways ties these themes together by outlining a strategy for leaders to follow.  His 
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discussion encompasses the studies which essentially back up what the others are saying; 
but he also goes further.  Yukl (2006) says that there are four variables in leadership:  
 Leader behaviors (as discussed in Covey, 1990; Peters, 1983; Belasco & Stayer, 
1993) 
 Intervening variables-factors that precipitate leadership actions to occur 
  Criterion variables-factors of environment, internalized skills that are requisite 
for leadership 
 Situational variables (as described in Hersey, Blanchard & Johnson, 2001).   
This model gives flexibility to the leader to adapt to a variety of situations, but Yukl says 
that it is difficult to study and is best applied when studying team models of 
organizational leadership (Yukl, 2006, p. 235). 
Kouzes and Posner (2003) discuss the role of the leader in change.  The leader 
should challenge the process, inspire a shared vision, enable others to act, model the way, 
and encourage the heart.  Again, vision is a prominent part of this discussion.  But there is 
more here.  This is a recipe for leaders to follow for effecting change in the organization.   
And, the encouragement of the heart - recognizing and celebrating the accomplishments 
of those in the organization - is a key factor to success.  As well, empowering the people 
in the organization to act is in line with what Belasco & Stayer (1993), Peters (1982), and 
others discuss as a pre-requisite for successful organizational performance. 
Transactional and transformational forms of leadership are among the other topics 
regarding styles of leadership that have come into the forefront of the current 
philosophical and theoretical discussions of motivation. Bass (1990) discussed 
transactional versus transformational leadership.  Bass said that there is a clear difference 
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between transformational and transactional models.  This difference is what makes the 
difference between good and great.  The definitions of transactional and transformational 
leadership are often compared and contrasted with each other.  Northouse (2004) and 
Yukl (2006) both quote Burns (1978), whose classic Leadership was presented as the 
embarkation point of the discussion of transformational leadership.  Transactional 
leadership is leadership through exchange, either implied or directly outlined in the 
exchange between leader and follower.  Transformational leadership (Bass, 1996; Gabert, 
2006; Yukl, 2006) is leadership that (as its name implies) transforms both the follower 
and the leader while accomplishing the mission or objectives of the leader through the 
creation of more open, mutually supportive work relationships.  Such relationships bring 
out the best in both followers and leaders, and foster positive attitudes.  It is a more a 
feeling or mood that permeates the team that is focused on trust, loyalty, higher levels of 
morality and inspiration.  According to Yukl (2006), this results in followers doing more 
than would have ordinarily done because of their inspired regard for the leader. 
Transactional leadership (Northouse, 2004; Yukl 2006; Bass, 1996) is done through 
various forms of motivational behavior. The leader gives rewards as a consequence of 
behavior or performance, or the leader may take punitive action, as in the case of 
management by exception where the leader becomes involved only when things are going 
wrong, rather than maintaining situational awareness and applying coaching or corrective 
measures before a situation develops.  
 Yukl (2006) borrows from what most U.S. Army leaders of all ranks find listed in 
the FM 22-100 Leadership manual.  The short table he uses to describe the two distinct 
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leadership styles is borrowed from Bass’s New Paradigm of Leadership published by the 
U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences (1996): 
  
 Transformational Behaviors 
Individualized influence 
 Individualized consideration 
 Inspirational motivation 
 Intellectual stimulation 
  
 
Transactional Behaviors 
 Contingent reward 
 Active management by exception 
 Passive management by exception 
 
 Transactional leadership (Bass, 1996) and transformational leadership (Bass, 
1996; Gabert, 2006) are not on the same leadership plane.  There is a stark distinction 
between the two.  Simply put, one can write pages and pages of fascinating theories and 
discuss the works of learned researchers and thinkers, but in transactional leadership, it 
all boils down to something that is found inside of a leader.  There is a certain quality that 
a transactional leader is lacking that a transformational leader has.  It is an intrinsic 
quality and an innate understanding of human nature that is not part and parcel of 
transactional leadership.  This distinction is what makes up the divide between these two 
theories of leadership 
The experience of the veterans who survived D-Day, and their accounts of the 
leadership they observed shows that many of the assumptions being made or proposed by 
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modern theory are pared down when people face a life and death operation, especially 
one where death is the expected outcome and survival is the exception.   
Leadership is defined in many ways and there are several approaches to it.  
However as noted in this review, there is much to be said for the transformative nature of 
those leaders who have certain abilities and traits to get better performance out of their 
subordinates.  As I looked at the D-Day Campaign and the role of leadership there, I saw 
examples of where these theories may or may not have fit. 
  
The Role of Leadership at D-Day 
 
It can be said with reasonable certainty that much of the leadership experience in 
the last 50 years does not come close to the magnitude of scale in effort, planning and 
performance required by the participants of the D-Day Invasion. This great feat was done 
without the benefit of computers, satellites, or amazingly enough, email. 
Some might argue that the recollections of these veterans, sixty years after the fact 
might embellish details or have a false sense of what was going on around them.  But the 
veterans provided vivid details about the events, and if a town or place name was 
misspelled or forgotten, it can be overlooked, for this is not simply about the historical 
record of everything that went on at D-Day.  Everyone from Tom Hanks to John Wayne 
has had a role in shaping the public perception of D-Day for the last 60 years.  Much of it 
has been said in books and movies.  Most people with a basic background in American 
History know about D-Day.  
 80 
 
However, there is reason to trust the memories of leadership at D-Day, if not the 
details. Dr. Robert Rush from the Center for Military History did a comparative study of 
veterans from the 22nd Infantry Regiment.  In his study, he interviewed veterans, 
comparing their recollections to the daily logs taken at the time.  His view is that details 
do in fact get lost, and the historical accuracy does get blurred over time.  Some events 
others may have witnessed become shared memories.  Yet, the impressions of the 
leadership and how the soldiers reacted and felt was still internalized.  These impressions 
were carried for 60 years, and, whether historically accurate or not, they shaped the 
individuals and the lives they went on to lead (Rush, 2007).  The current study is about 
the essence of leadership, what these men experienced, how they reacted to challenges, 
how they met even simple objectives, and what made them go forward.  
I believe that Normandy best illustrates that leadership is not a flat, planar realm 
but one that is spherical, with multi-dimensional aspects, involving many factors coming 
together.  The successes and failures of the Allies at Normandy, as told by the veterans 
themselves, indicate to me that there is room for all leadership styles.  But, what truly 
makes the difference between leaders and followers? Is it the traits internal to the person 
doing the leading and the ability to get others to see that character, to have a vision of 
where they are going and to get others to embrace that vision and be willing to go 
forward, even if it means they won’t be coming back alive?   The distillation of 60 years 
has left these veterans with an essence of what they each saw as leadership in the field.  
Many of them went on to do great things after Normandy.  Some were memorialized in 
books or movies for what they did there.  Others simply did their job in an extraordinary 
place and time.   
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Northhouse (2004, p.21) describes an example of a leadership theory that I 
believe may best fit D-Day: “The trait approach does not lay out a set of hypotheses or 
principles about what kind of leader is needed in a certain situation or what a leader 
should do, given a particular set of circumstances.  Rather, this approach emphasizes 
that having a leader with a certain set of traits is crucial to having effective leadership.  
It is the leader and his or her personality that is central to the leadership process.” 
 Examples of how trait leadership theory could be placed into this context would 
be to look at an example of one D-Day veteran and then see what he did.  Take, for 
example, Staff Sergeant Francis Williamson, a former soldier from the 82nd Airborne 
Division.  When dropped into Normandy he was separated from most of his fellow 
soldiers: “They had missed the drop zone by several miles, and then they scattered us 
another thirty-five miles, and out of about twenty-five thousand paratroopers, seven of us 
got together” 
(Williamson, 2004).   
Just this simple statement tells a considerable amount about the kind of situation 
he faced.  Williamson was heavily packed and jumped from an aircraft amidst anti-
aircraft fire. How do we know this?  One pilot, 2nd Lieutenant Frederick Crispin, 
describes men just like Williamson who he dropped in: “The weather was rotten. We 
come across from Southampton. We were at twelve hundred feet. By the time we got to 
the French coast, the Jersey Islands, we were down to a thousand feet and lowering. By 
the time we made the turn in we were at eight hundred feet, and by the time we got to the 
drop zone, we dropped them at seven hundred feet.”   Crispin later goes on to describe 
the men who jumped in:  “I dropped the 505th 82nd. Yes, those men were magnificent. 
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Buddy, the spirit of those guys….when they got in that airplane on the night of the 5th 
they were so heavy with equipment. When they went up on that back core into the C-47 
you had to help them in, that's how loaded they were. Good troops! I mean they were 
super troops” (Crispin, 2004). 
This raises many questions.  What kind of a person gets fired up enough to drop 
into a hot war zone with anti-aircraft guns firing at you?  How much leadership is 
displayed by the leaders, and how much is shown by every single person there?  This 
example says to me that every single one of those men was trained and led by people who 
managed to motivate them to do extraordinary things, and that in so doing, they became, 
if only for a brief time, extraordinary men, and in many cases, true leaders who displayed 
character and ability at a new level.  They stepped up to meet the challenge.   
The current study looks at how factors such as courage, bravery and reacting to 
the critical situations presented affected leadership on the ground.  Through studying the 
histories, I was able to analyze some of the factors of upbringing and family.  It helped 
me to formulate conclusions that showed how much leadership is based on a common 
core of traits possessed by most of us, whether we realize it or not. 
   It may be possible that trait-based theory fits here.  But not all of these men had 
evaluations saying they had the right characteristics.  It could be that through the process 
of training and surviving, these men somehow managed to evolve to a higher form of 
leader or self-actualization.  Did these men have traits which enabled them to get better 
information, better connections, and build loyalty, or was it skills (Katz, 1955), charisma 
(Bass, 1990), or something more? 
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Although this is only one example, it shows how useful this discussion can be.  If 
compared to a number of other theories reviewed (Northouse, 2004; Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 
2006), it can be a challenge for some of these theories to stand up to such a test.  Does 
this mean that military leadership should exclusively use newer, more refined techniques 
and approaches?  No. It may be that there are other useful approaches in other stages of 
training or development for the team.  I believe that the observations we see from the 
research demonstrate leadership to be made up of multiple dynamics: showing skills, 
traits and situational dimensions, as well as lessons in both approach to missions and 
execution of them.  Many leadership styles came into play at Normandy: ethical, 
charismatic, transformational and transactional (Bass, 1990). But, at the core of all of 
these were the basic traits of leadership which have been noted and discussed in the later 
sections of this work using the reference material of these survivors of the D-Day 
Campaign. It should also be noted that many of these soldiers had been through difficult, 
challenging processes before they ever joined their units. Many of them had obviously 
demonstrated leadership aptitude prior to D-Day.   
I believe the study has demonstrated through the interviews being studied that the 
trait-based approach to leadership is a relevant basis for a core leadership theory that 
demonstrates that under the right circumstances most human beings do have the ability 
to lead, and that leadership itself takes many forms and manifests itself in many 
unexpected ways, often lingering in the memories and actions of a person long after the 
catalyst of the action has been forgotten.  There may be many instances where this inner 
core could be the base explanation for the actions of soldiers at D-Day.  Thus, through 
this primary source material, we can build a model of leadership in action, focusing on 
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one of the most critical moments in history.   I believe this model will demonstrate how 
trait-based theory represents the core essence of leadership. 
Through this qualitative analysis and research, I hope to show that many people 
possess a core leadership sphere or seed that provides successful leader traits unique to 
each person that emerge when triggered by events. Furthermore, I hope to demonstrate 
that this leads to further growth when subsequent circumstances allow for maturation of 
the leadership ability.  This is not to say that this is a theory about situational leadership 
(Hersey and Blanchard 1969).  That theory suggests an approach based on the maturity 
level, competence, and motivation of the group.  It comes very close to this in many 
ways, but does not encompass the other critical motivating aspects demonstrated by the 
leadership in these situations. Instead, this is an idea that focuses on how certain key 
traits may manifest during high-pressure situations. 
One might pose the question of whether the actions at D-Day were simply valor 
and not leadership.  That is a fair question.  Throwing oneself onto a live hand grenade is 
valor.  Running up and taking out a machine gun’s nest is valor.  Taking 132 prisoners of 
war and leading them back to your own lines with a squad of six soldiers, an action 
performed by Corporal Alvin C. York in World War I, however, is a bit more 
complicated and requires a high degree of leadership.  This study will provide examples 
of men who took similar actions that show there is a difference and put it in a clearer 
light.   Certainly, valor plays a role in leadership.  Stephen Crane’s book, The Red Badge 
of Courage (1895), is a tale of a young soldier’s first experience with combat in the 
American Civil War.  The soldier runs in fear in his first encounter with it.  Later on, he 
finds the fortitude to fight, and literally becomes a new man.  Eventually, he emerges as a 
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leader.  Thus, valor is a trait that can facilitate one becoming a leader.  Consider the 
Flight of the Buffalo concept:  
“If the leader falls, what happens to the Buffalo?  The Metaphors - If the lead 
buffalo is killed, the herd will stand—easy targets for hunters. The classic command and 
control leader is, metaphorically, the lead buffalo: the individual who directs all day-to-
day operations of the company and expects subordinates to defer all important decisions 
to the top. The Head Buffalo plans, organizes, commands, coordinates, and controls” 
(Belasco & Stayer, P.16, 43).  
The actions of the men at D-Day do a lot to disprove the idea that if the leader 
falls then the organization will crumble or become inert.  Many men from entirely 
different units and organizations came together and performed remarkably well despite 
the chaos and carnage.  Much of this can be attributable to the training they received. But 
there were factors beyond training that brought about the actions of the men in the study.  
Whether because of military training or because they were being shot at, the men at D-
Day instinctively knew they had to act.  Their actions and how they performed them will 
be studied here. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS OF EXISTING THEORIES 
 
 The old adage, “the more things change, the more they stay the same…” may 
well come into play when it comes to leadership theory.   As more and more study of 
leadership theory has occurred, it has nearly gone full circle back into the realm of trait 
theory.  Doyle and Smith (http://www.infed.org/leadership/traditional_leadership.htm), 
write, “The first problem is that the early searchers after traits often assumed that there 
was a definite set of characteristics that made a leader - whatever the situation. In other 
words, they thought the same traits would work on a battlefield and in the staff room of a 
school. They minimized the impact of the situation (Sadler, 1997)” (Doyle & Smith, 
2008).  
As pointed out, this flows well with the situational-based leadership models, such 
as those of Hersey and Blanchard (1969).   However, others came to the realization that 
the theoretical road was going back to traits. House brought it back into vogue with his 
discussion of “charismatic leadership” (1992), as did Goleman (1997) with his latest 
work on emotional intelligence.  Zaccaro seems to tie everything back to traits in his 
recent article (2007).  He discusses the fact that researchers diverged from the trait-based 
approach when they only took the surface results of the original Stogdill studies.  He 
further pointed out that the studies did in fact show that traits were important in 
determining leadership once the groups were studied more closely.  
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 By comparing and analyzing the recollections of the veterans, a picture emerges 
of both the leadership exhibited by the key leaders, as well as by the men themselves.  
From this we can extrapolate what core traits of leadership were present at D-Day, 
though it should be noted that this does not exclude the presence of other traits or 
characteristics that may have been present as well.  Where do these current theories stack 
up against the D-Day Challenge?   
Clearly, not all theories support trait-based leadership.  Many are based on 
experience and development of the individual and training.  The current study does not 
seek to dispel the importance of these other theories.  Rather, it seeks to demonstrate that 
traits are at the foundation of all leadership.  This actually flows into some of the other 
theories, because it explains why people can learn and develop into leaders.   
 The emergence of schools of thought in different aspects of leadership theory 
such as a skills-based approach (Katz, 1955), style approach (Ohio State, Michigan 
Studies, Blake and Mouton, 1964), and situational approach all grew out of the rejection 
of the trait approach.  Nevertheless, trait-based leadership has once again re-emerged as a 
strong leader in the field, with some of the other theories, such as leader-member 
exchange (LMX) (Graen, 1995) and transactional versus transformational leadership 
(Bass, 1990) also an important part of the mix.   
 Charismatic leadership, as described by House (1992), seems to include many of 
the raw material descriptions of what is needed in the leader.  It acknowledges the roots 
of trait-based leadership as its foundation, while at the same time draws the critical 
distinction between personalized charismatic leadership (selfish and megalomaniacal) 
and socialized charismatic leadership (nurturing, positive, group oriented, benevolent). 
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Additionally, House cites empirical evidence which shows that from a physical point of 
view, some leaders are producing different levels of chemical activity than other people.  
Furthermore, in another study cited by House (1992), (conducted by Ross and 
Offerman,1990), cadets at a military academy were drawn to leaders who displayed the 
socialized charismatic leadership traits, although these are generally considered 
“feminine” traits, and thus contradict the popular notion of the strong overbearing 
military leader stereotype.  The same was found in the Roush and Atwater study (1992) 
with Naval Academy mid-shipmen.  They used Myers–Briggs results and correlated them 
with Bass’s MLQ inventory(1992), finding that leaders who are sensing as opposed to 
intuitive and feeling versus thinking types were rated higher on charisma and inspiration. 
 The high n-POW (need for power) (McClelland, 1985) of charismatic leaders 
demonstrates empirically what the other observations suggest, that leaders want to lead. 
(N-POW is the level of endocrinal action for those who hunger for power.)  Additionally, 
it is noted that those who are benevolent leaders differ in production of other endocrine 
levels than those who are, say, more autocratic in nature. So, a high N-POW 
(norepinephrine) does not mean one is a potential dictator, but if individuals have a high 
N-POW, a low affinity need, and a high activity inhibition then they have the make-up 
for being an  effective leader, at least according to McClelland (1985). 
 Traits may be the secret ingredient that made the leadership difference at D-Day. 
As already noted earlier, the 82nd Airborne soldier had to go through rigorous training, 
but he also benefited from the leadership of MG Ridgway.  However, before you can 
become Airborne, you have to go through Jump School.  As a graduate of both the U.S. 
Army Jump School and Officer Candidate Schools, it is my assessment that it takes more 
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determination, stamina, and self discipline than average to make it through the courses. 
There are many other courses in the military, such as Ranger School that are even more 
of a challenge to one’s leadership ability.  Graduates of these schools had to have a little 
more drive and pride to make it through, and the OCS candidates had to display at least a 
little more intelligence and have a little more courage.  Such traits may have been part of 
the characteristics that made up the 82nd Airborne soldiers.  
 The Ranger units that were in action at D-Day were even more selective.  These 
men were an elite group picked from across the Army. Their training was even more 
rigorous and demanding than that of the Airborne Soldiers, or of even the leaders who 
emerged from OCS.  Brinkley notes that of the original 2000 applicants, only 700 were 
accepted into the unit.  Out of that group, more than 180 did not make it through. The 
unit underwent a demanding training regimen that left only the toughest and most 
intelligent.  The Rangers had to be able to “follow orders and think for oneself” 
(Brinkley, 2005, p. 28).  They had to have extraordinary traits in order to accomplish the 
mission. Leonard Lommel, who became famous as a result of his exploits at Pointe du 
Hoc, recalled that the leader of the Regiment “talked to you softly, but firmly, like a big 
brother…he inspired you to do your best.  You just wanted to die for him” (Brinkley, 
2005, p. 38).  Ralph Goranson was another one of the leaders of the Rangers at Pointe du 
Hoc.  His history has been recalled in other publications, but the eight pages of oral 
history that he brings to this study provide an interesting picture of the Rangers and the 
leadership they experienced. 
 Another compelling factor in this analysis is the compactness of the battle space:  
time, events, and circumstances.  The soldiers fighting at D-day and the Normandy 
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Campaign were making incredibly important decisions, often life and death decisions, in 
the space of hours and days, and in some cases, minutes and seconds.  The men there may 
never have had to make so many important decisions again. 
 The results of the current study will examine trait theory in action, at one of the 
most critical junctures in history.  From this point, we narrow down the critical question 
and assess whether other theories are adequate or if they miss the mark when leaders are 
really put to the test.  It may show that what some theorists today describe as poor 
leadership may in fact be critical, even ideal, leadership under trait theory, and that while 
it is nice to try to be all things to all people, it is not really possible.  Followers have to 
decide, when they have a choice, who to follow, for better or worse, based on the 
circumstances.  The idea that so many people at once can all be a leader may also upset 
some of the paradigms in today’s thinking and the models that have been developed.   
 91 
 
CHAPTER 7 
THEORY ON EMERGENT LEADERSHIP DURING CRISIS (ELDC) 
 
The theory presented in this research will incorporate the perspectives of trait 
leadership (Zaccaro, 2007), skills leadership (Katz, 1955), and situational leadership 
(Hersey and Blanchard, 1969; Blanchard, Zigarmi & Nelson, 1993).   
 
Theory:  Most people carry a degree of leadership ability within themselves that will 
emerge and develop under a combination of circumstances and maturity of the leader. 
This emergence of traits is more likely to happen in a crisis where individuals are forced 
to move out of their comfort zones than under ordinary circumstances.   
 
To give an analogy, we can compare this growth to the tree bark theory.  The only 
way for the tree to grow is for the bark to crack.  Based on the theoretical foundations 
already discussed, as well as the cursory histories I have looked at so far, I believe this to 
be well-suited for introduction into the leadership theory discussion.  Though it is 
understood and makes sense that there is no one perfect theory, I believe the D-Day study 
results being examined may fit well under this model. 
 Here is an example of how this theory might practically work: 
Robert Dole was an average fellow who joined the Army during World War II.  He was 
somewhat reserved but capable.  He had a solid foundation and grew up in the Midwest. 
He shared a strong work ethic with others of his generation.  Once in the military, he 
received training and was offered the opportunity to lead soldiers in battle. He reluctantly 
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accepts but does so because his sense of duty overcame his natural introversion.  He 
made his soldiers follow orders and maintain the standards.  He was a quick study, so he 
got the chance like thousands of others to go to Officer Candidate School.  He proved a 
capable leader. Through a series of events, he found himself in combat multiple times.  
He survived them all.  On one last occasion, however, he was severely wounded and went 
back home with an arm that never worked again.  The years of leadership training, plus 
the innate abilities he carried inside emerged and he continued on his leadership path.  
Eventually, he became a Senator.  
 We see in Senator Dole how he used the traits (trait-based leadership) he had, 
along with the skills (skills-based leadership) he developed and applied them in various 
situations (situational leadership).  In “Army speak,” he filled up his rucksack with this 
knowledge and applied it as he grew into an effective leader.  There are several examples 
of leaders who have followed this pattern.  Could it be someone more recent?  How about 
Medal of Honor recipient and former Senator Bob Kerry, or perhaps former Senator Max 
Cleland?  There are countless other examples, including many former generals in the 
Army.  Some of them were charismatic, but most of these men were ordinary until 
something triggered their leadership mechanism receptors and catalyzed a series of long 
term changes in them.  How about Ronald Reagan?  Brinkley (2005) writes in The Boys 
of Pointe du Hoc that something clicked in Reagan during filming one of the movies he 
made during World War II.  This moment may have led to an impulse for more public 
service and value to his life than simply being an actor.   
These changes led all of these people over time to grow and embody the ideals of 
a leader.  Did they have the ingredients there all along?  I would say, “yes.”  Did they 
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also acquire skills?  “Yes.” Did the crisis they were in at the time require them to access 
and rapidly apply and further develop these skills? “Yes.”  So, Emergent Leadership 
During Crisis (ELDC) is a potential explanation for why people like Senator Bob Dole 
become leaders.  Did he become a Senator because he went into the Army?  Millions of 
men went into the Army.  Was it because of his injury?  There were a lot of other injured 
men as well.  I suggest that he carried the essence of his leadership with him. As events 
unfolded in his life, he had the opportunity to grow and refine his skills. Would he have 
been a leader nonetheless?  It is difficult to say.  But, without the experiences and 
crucible of fire that he had to pass through, he may never have had the strength to emerge 
from his cocoon. 
 The model below (Figure D) is another way to describe this theory.  It is not the 
diagram of an atomic structure, though it will help to think in terms of the nuclear 
structure of an atom to understand the theory.   It is the framework which holds the theory 
together.  Event meets Circumstance in an individual.  The individual is carrying a core 
of traits and skills which are integrated through experience. The combination leads to the 
emergence or germination of the leadership factor.   
 The Classical leadership theories of Plato and Aristotle play a part in here as well.  
Borrowing from both of them, it can be further developed by saying that each person 
carries a level of leadership ability that can be developed if the events and circumstances 
are right.  In practical terms it is up to the leaders around the various parts of society to 
recognize and develop leaders in order to produce a more wholesome, productive, and 
egalitarian society.   
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Philosophers say there are many ways of looking at the tree.  I agree that the tree 
of leadership is filled with great ideas and concepts ready for discussion:  
Transformational versus transactional leadership (Bass, 1990), charismatic leadership 
(House, 1992), Leader-Member Exchange (Graen, 1995), and many more theories are 
available to review. However, this study proposes that one should look at the events that 
set a person onto the path which could lead to further levels or tiers of leadership. 
Although it does not take a crisis to make a leader, it most assuredly takes a leader to get 
him, her or the group they are with out of a crisis.   
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CHAPTER 8 
THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
Value of the Current Study 
 There were many good reasons to do this study. First, I had the opportunity to 
look at a snapshot in time, through the eyes of those who were there, and explore today’s 
theories of leadership.  I had a fresh chance to review the historical record and get what 
may be some of the last input from survivors of the famed “longest day.”   
It is also important to note that D-Day has taken on additional significance 
beyond the historical arena.  The political impact of the battle was significant well after 
the event.  Former President Ronal Reagan used it as the key cornerstone in part of his 
political strategy in dealing with the Soviets in the Cold War.  According to Douglas 
Brinkley (2005) in The Boys of Pointe Du Hoc, Reagan used the epic battle of D-Day to 
help redefine the political lines and to solidify the Republicans and Reagan Democrats by 
drawing out two key points.  The first was the black and white line between freedom and 
totalitarianism: the U.S. and its Allies against the Evil Empire of the Soviets. The second 
point was to define the generation that came of age in the forties and who had played 
such an important role in making the country what it was versus those who followed 
them in the next generation.   
Brinkley (2005) says that this speech at the 40th Anniversary kicked off a whole 
resurgence of interest in the battle, as well as being the forerunner of the popularization 
of a Greatest Generation mythos into American culture.  Reagan’s event led to numerous 
follow-on events and helped to re-ground Americans and to remind them of their role in 
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the world (Brinkley, 2005).  The study of the battle and those who fought there helps us 
look into the leadership and values of those who were there at the time and also at the 
basis of its future political impact.  Had the Allies not won the battle, who knows when 
the world would have seen the liberation of Western Europe?  The invasion took fourteen 
months to plan; a second one might take longer, and a delay could very well have 
allowed the Germans or Japanese to leap ahead technologically, gaining a permanent 
edge.  Thus, the study of D-Day and its veterans also gives insight into American values 
and political views on both the individual and collective level at the time.  
This study also allowed us a chance to put today’s values and concerns about how 
to lead and manage against a scenario of something that was very important, to explore 
how well they fit into that picture.  Essentially, when the going gets rough, where do the 
leadership theories go?  Our goal was to determine what leadership approaches were 
prevalent while military members were landing on the beach, miles from where they were 
supposed to land, being fired at as they were sloshing through water with a hundred 
pounds of gear on their backs, having to make the choice of what needed to be done in a 
timely manner, all at the same time.  This study put real leadership under stress into its 
proper context and perspective. There are many books that have been published which 
describe business as war.  This study put that idea to the test.  
As mentioned earlier, I was fortunate to be in a position where I could have access 
to this primary source material.  I worked in close coordination with two published 
authors with Ph.D.’s themselves, one of whom was one of the most senior historians in 
the U.S. Army.  Additionally, through my own contacts and assignments I have been able 
to meet and speak with many of the veterans themselves, both American and foreign.  
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This gave me an insight into the battle for Normandy that allowed me to produce a 
unique work which will benefit all students of leadership. 
Applicability 
I recorded the collected interview data from the veterans in descriptive case 
studies of leadership, writing about the experiences of the veterans in the categories of 
first line leadership, senior leadership, training, teams, and long-term effects from the 
impact of the events at D-Day on their future success in life.  The measure of these 
comparisons was found in the descriptive narratives of the interviewees’ educational 
backgrounds, prior life experiences, and leadership experience prior to D-Day to 
determine if they had learned skills from the Army or whether they may have brought 
these skill sets with them. If the hypothesis was correct, these would have been from 
diverse areas of education, social standing, age, and representation of the data.  The more 
diverse the backgrounds, the more it would suggest the importance of trait-based 
leadership in a crisis. 
I did a content analysis of the interviews imbedded in the case study.  It was not 
an experimental instrument since the information gathered was subject to the 60 years of 
personal perspectives from the veterans themselves. A true experiment is research that 
has an independent variable, random assignment (exposing sample subjects to different 
variables so that the pre-treatment differences between groups examined are averaged), 
and a dependent variable (outcome variable).  The study of values and internal 
motivations requires a more in-depth examination than simply the numeric assignment of 
values to reach depth in understanding.  There were enough interviews from a broad  
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range to gather a very good picture of the kind of leadership style(s) which emerged at D-
Day.    
 Several groups were described in the selection of oral histories.  Officers, non-
commissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers were compared.  Leadership in elite 
organizations such as the Rangers and the 82nd Airborne was examined.  I also gained  
insight by studying the oral histories of the ordinary individuals who were not elite 
soldiers or members of specialty groups.  How the common soldier acted was of 
particular interest.  This is where a theory of trait-based leadership, particularly the one 
that I propose, could demonstrate its viability.  A retired General Officer recently said 
that, “today, in the NCO ranks, uncommon valor was becoming common” (Shadley, 
2008).  Certainly, such words are applicable to the heroes of Normandy.  By studying D-
Day, we are also studying the link between the soldiers of one generation, who were 
grandsons of the soldiers of another, who, in turn, were the descendants of the first 
generation of American soldiers, those who fought to make America free in the 
Revolutionary War.  Today, the grandsons of D-Day Veterans fight in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
Native Americans believe that the grandparents raise the young and pass the 
values of one generation to the next.  The current generation’s grandparents were the 
survivors of the Depression, a World War, and the Cold War. They saw the nation 
modernize and change with breathtaking speed.  Nearly every cultural, technical, and 
sociological aspect of American society was turned upside down throughout their lives.  
Yet, despite all of the change, questions, and even doubt of the Hip-Hop generation, the 
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“me” generation, the Boomers, and the X’ers, uncommon valor is still, somehow, 
becoming common again.  
 These data may have important uses.  The WWII Army was built of mostly non-
professional service members who in a short amount of time were able to fight and win a 
World War. However, it had a core cadre who knew what had to be done to ready their 
men for combat. The findings from this study suggest that the Army could focus on 
certain aspects of training and create more opportunities for leadership traits to emerge 
earlier and with more frequency. It also could demonstrate that some things naturally rise 
to the surface and that a baseline of values, principles and training should be made 
available and taught to all of our youth as they grow up.  Or, it may help demonstrate that 
despite what people say about youth today, if they were called upon in an intense 
situation, trait leadership theory suggests they would perform just as admirably as “the 
greatest generation” (Brinkley, 2006; Brokaw, 2001).  The study is comprised of mostly 
first line and junior leaders (leaders ranging from Corporal through Captain).  It focuses 
on how they functioned. It paints a picture of what they went through and how they 
reacted, thus giving a foundational understanding of where leaders initially emerge. 
Senior leaders develop beyond this point and are the subject of other studies.  More 
importantly, from a practical point of view, we can help answer what every business man 
or general would like to know: do some people have the “right stuff”? Will my people, 
army, stand and fight, or will it take flight?   
Learning and skills may be tools to help the leader, but this study shows that 
many survivors and leaders come equipped with similar tools, regardless of their 
background.  Indeed, this study leads us to pose another question which has direct impact 
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on where we are today:  How does trait leadership from D-Day compare to trait 
leadership in Baghdad?  There is plenty of material to explore all of these questions, and 
maybe even answer some of them. 
One product of this study is the resolution of the following question: 
Do individuals have a core set of trait based leadership ability that manifests itself 
in crisis situations.   
Other questions are answered here as well.  In particular, there seems to be ample 
evidence in the account analyses that supports the Emergent Leadership During Crisis 
theory proposed in the previous chapter, that is, 1) when circumstance and event meet, 
and a person has a level of leadership that is right for that situation, it will manifest itself, 
and, 2) once a person’s leadership ability has been catalyzed, it is contingent on similar 
factors as to whether it grows or expands in the future. 
Methodology 
The interviews of the D-Day veterans were the primary source of information for 
this study.  Other material included observations from historians and studies of the time, 
as well as perspectives from senior historians of today.  Additional theoretical foundation 
material was drawn from the works of contemporary leadership theorists.  The 
observations of the veterans were compared and contrasted against my review of 
leadership theory through the ages starting with the classical model presented by Plato’s 
Republic (Sherover, 1974) to the theories of Ralph Stogdill (1947, 1974), Hersey and 
Blanchard (1969), and many other theories described in the previous chapters.  This 
analysis sought to discover what kind of leadership was a dominant style among the D-
Day Veterans. 
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It is important to note that this was not simply another trait-based leadership 
study.  It examines the human side, the drama and the emotions involved.  It presents 
considerably more information than a determination of what leadership was present at the 
event.  This study presents what these theories about leadership mean, bringing theory 
into terms that illustrate the innate human leadership quality carried by us all, and how it 
can surface when circumstances and occasion meet up with one person, a group, and a 
challenge, often in unexpected, tragic, and sometimes even humorous ways. 
There are several critical foci in the current study:  
1) Where do today’s leadership theories stand in an evaluation of the events of D-
Day?   
2) What was the predominant form of leadership seen at D-Day?   
3) What theoretical model best explains what made these men survive in the test 
of battle? 
4) Is there an alternate explanation, an intangible which has yet to be discerned 
from the echoes of their memory? 
 5) Based on this study, can we conclude that most of these men had the traits to 
become the leader in one situation or another, regardless of rank, and therefore 
does that change how we should lead today both in the civilian and military 
worlds? 
What was the output from this study?  To determine the answer to that question, I 
had to isolate the areas which best fit the study.  Under the backdrop of many of today’s 
leadership theories, one finds a defining circumstance where leadership emerges: Task, 
Situation, and Problem.  This is seen in nearly every theory discussed regardless of the 
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approach.  Therefore, in this study I have used these consistent variables as requirements 
for each case to be a viable candidate.  I present a step by step discussion, built on all of 
these parallel experiences, with each one of these histories creating multiple snapshots of 
the training, of the invasion itself, and of the follow-on battles and actions of leaders.  
The presentation of the information starts with junior level first line leaders, then explores 
perceptions of senior leaders, spontaneous team leadership, training and its impact, and 
lastly, looks at long term effects of the experience. The sample group I used provided 
many excellent examples which met the criteria. 
As already mentioned, the main body of resource material was taken from the oral 
histories gathered at D-Day 60.  One concept was to divide the accounts between 25 
enlisted and 25 officers.  This breakdown was similar to how Civil War veterans studied 
by Michael Barton in Goodmen: The Character of Civil War Soldiers, (Barton, 1981) was 
divided.  Ultimately, however, the division between enlisted and officers was blurred 
because so many officers came from enlisted ranks, and many enlisted could be 
categorized as first line leaders as well, due to the circumstances of leading soldiers in 
combat. Likewise, many enlisted soldiers were also from a cross-section of society 
representing diverse backgrounds.   Therefore, the information is presented on a case by 
case basis, using excerpts from the accounts according to other criteria such as first line 
leader actions, senior leader actions, training effects, and team development and 
behavior. The interviews were analyzed using a qualitative research methodology, 
focusing on content analysis and coding main concepts through dissection of recurring 
variables such as key phrases, thoughts and ideas expressed in the interview.  This 
information was color-coded on a main collection document of the interviews and then 
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was further broken down according to the categories previously listed, establishing 
several other documents used to extract a far more refined product.   
The oral histories that were collected did not follow a specific interview format, 
as some were transcribed completely, and others were compiled by university students, as 
well as other members of the Military History Detachments of the U.S. Army.  They all 
have the basic unit information about the service member, but the questions vary as the 
narrative goes along.  In most cases the questions were about what got the service 
member into the Army, a little bit about their background, and then the narrative would 
take off.  Thus, we have excellent narratives with very little leading by the interviewer.   
Additional categories included looking at groups of soldiers from specific 
divisions or elite units and comparing their histories.  This is presented as sub-sections in 
the chapters.   
In addition to this, specific engagements or type of engagements provided insight 
to the understanding of the experiences and perceptions of leadership.  For example, 
those who parachuted in had different experiences than those who went through the 
beaches.  The soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division may have had a different perception 
of leadership and what was required to do the mission than the men who fished bodies 
out of the water after Slapton Sands, or who lived through the bombing at St. Lo. 
Different command climates and senior leaders were also considered in terms of the 
effect on the type of leaders and performance, as well as whether soldiers of other units 
performed differently than they did. 
 The categories of leadership traits, skills, and measures were selected and then 
each interview was examined using content analysis techniques such as those discussed 
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in Robert Philip Weber’s Basic Content Analysis (1990), and Bruce L. Berg’s Qualitative 
Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Berg, 2006). 
 The following examples show how content analysis and coding can give a picture 
of the type of detailed research that this study will involve:  
 
Example 1: 
A. Categorization Sheet 
Subject: World War II Veterans character and leadership trait indicator 
Source: 100 selected oral Histories from Veterans who returned to Normandy 60 years 
after the D-Day Invasion. 
Categories: 
Service member background: 
 Officer- 
 Enlisted-X 
 
Education:  
 High School-X 
 College- 
 
Socio-economic status:   
 Advantaged- 
 Neutral-X 
 Disadvantaged- 
 
Skills/Responsibilities: 
Basic- (example) Loader for artillery 
Complex-(example) Fire Direction Control Officer 
 
Upbringing: 
 Rural- Farm 
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 Suburban- Small towns 
 Urban - Cities 
 
Prior Civilian work: 
 Laborer- ditch digger 
 Clerical-officer worker 
 Manager- store, office 
 Businessman-executive in company office 
 Professional- doctor, lawyer 
 
Unit:  
 Elite- 
 Combat Arms-X 
 Combat Support- 
 
B. Core Character Leadership Values Categories: 
Case: Widener 
Individual Colleagues Leaders     Led  
1) Control 
2) Influence 
3) Experience     x   x 
4) Followership    x 
5) Integrity 
6) Competence    x   x 
7) Honesty 
8) Strength 
9) Endurance 
10) Honor 
11) Selfless Service    x 
12) Sacrifice     x 
13) Skill   x 
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14) Training   x 
15) Educated   x 
16) Loyalty   x 
17) Compassion  x 
 
C.  Observations from the interview text 
 
1.  Ralph Widener displayed loyalty and compassion when he remembered the acts of 
heroism that saved him.  He followed that up with a real act later on by personally going 
to the family home of the man who saved him and met with the mother. 
Loyalty, Compassion, Selfless Service, Sacrifice: 
 
W: I’ll tell you one interesting thing, when I did go ashore, the 
guy I was right next to, Paul Level, Paul Levelent. We were, 
we were going up the beach basically and I suddenly 
disappeared from view. I got into a ruttle. A ruttle is anything 
a depression in the sand from anywhere from a couple of 
inches up to six or eight feet. I fell inside that thing and I was 
completely covered. And he, he jerked me up. 
 
I:        Were you under water? 
 
W: Uh-huh. Completely. I had a rifle too, even though I was a 
linguist in the sense. And then I, he jerked me up and then I 
grabbed him and thanked him and two seconds later, three 
seconds later, he had his head taken off his body by German 
machine gun fire. And he died instantly. 
 
I:         He may have saved your life. 
 
W:        He saved my life, definitely!  
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I:        Have you ever met his family? 
 
W: Yes I did. I went to see them. Toughest thing in the world to 
go and talk to a family. 
 
I:         I bet you they were pretty moved by your, by your…. 
 
W: Well, I remember his mother put her arms around me and said 
I appreciate your coming by. 
 
I:                That must have been a tough, tough thing to do. 
 
 
2. Widener attested to the leadership, experience and competence of the leaders of 
his unit, particularly the NCOs.  Widener said that his unit benefited from the 
experienced men who had been in the North Africa Campaign and this was part of what 
made the difference to his unit at Omaha Beach. 
 
I:                     Talk to me a little bit about the leadership and officership 
that you had. I know there’s a lot of NCO leadership out 
there and we certainly know that they have made some 
huge sacrifices. Did they, were the officers well respected 
in the 16th Infantry? 
 
W: Yes sir, they were. We had good officers but we had better 
NCO’s. 
 
I:             That’s usually how it works. 
 
W:            They really knew what they were doing. 
 
I: Had any of your NCO’s been veterans of the campaign in 
North Africa? 
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W: Yes indeed. And they all had. They had all been called 
back for what would be the landing of Omaha Beach but 
they did not know at the time exactly where they were 
going. 
 
I:            So they came from different units? 
 
W: They came from basically the 16th Infantry regiment unit 
which (inaudible) North Africa at, where, where they 
suffered terrific casualties.  
 
 
W: I would say that the 16th Infantry Regiment made better 
progress than the 29th did, much better progress than the 
116th did. Right. We, we, they just had good NCO’s. 
 
I:            And that made a big difference. 
 
W:            Made a tremendous difference. Right. 
 
I:            A lot of lives probably were saved because of their… 
 
W:            I think so. Definitely. Right.  
 
 
Example 2:  
A. Categorization sheet 
 
Subject: World War II Veterans character and leadership trait indicator 
Source: 100 selected oral Histories from Veterans who returned to Normandy 60 years 
after the D-Day Invasion. 
Categories: 
Service member background: 
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 Officer- 
 Enlisted-X 
 
Education:  
 High School-X 
 College- 
 
Socio-economic status:   
 Advantaged- 
 Neutral-X 
 Disadvantaged- 
 
Skills/Responsibilities: 
 Basic- (example) Loader for artillery 
 Complex-(example) Fire Direction Control Officer 
 
Upbringing: 
 Rural- Farm 
 Suburban- Small towns 
 Urban - Cities 
 
Prior Civilian work: 
 Laborer- ditch digger 
 Clerical-officer worker 
 Manager- store  
 Businessman-executive in company office 
 Professional- doctor, lawyer 
 
Unit:  
 Elite-X 
 Combat Arms- 
 Combat Support-      
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B.  Core Character Leadership Values Categories: 
 
Sample Case 2: Widener 
       Individual      Colleagues         Leaders      
1) Control  x  x   x 
2) Influence       x 
3) Experience        
4) Followership x  x  
5) Integrity 
6) Competence   x     
7) Honesty 
8) Strength 
9) Endurance 
10) Honor 
11) Selfless Service x  x   x 
12) Sacrifice  x  x   x 
13) Skill    
14) Training  x  x   x   
15) Educated   
16) Loyalty   
17) Compassion   
 
 
1.  Ray Tolleson describes the landing at Omaha Beach.  In it he refers to the trained 
British sailors who operated the landing craft and the difficulties they experienced going 
ashore. Despite the difficulties, it was even more daunting as they moved forward, as 
their comrades were being killed as they were leaving the watercraft. Nevertheless, they 
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continued on, taking matters into their own hands, illustrating a fine line between 
training, self preservation, following orders, selfless service and sacrifice.  
 
Training, followership, sacrifice, selfless service, control: 
 
T:  But anyway the, the mood, it tightened up by the time we started to 
come off the rope ladders off the big ship into our little LCAS 
(Landing Craft Assault Ship) which were piloted by British LCA 
attachments… We had practiced on them for seven or eight months 
in England on landings and… 
 
I:  The British Commandos?  
 
T:  No, they weren’t commandos, they were ones that were handled the 
little LCA’s you know so they did that and they were trained 
regardless by the time we got in the range there we lost there were 
three of them and we lost them all they were hit by looking up and 
keeping track of things. So eventually we just bailed out of our 
LCA. 
 
I:  So you didn’t even make it all the way to the beach? 
 
T:  At that point well they dropped the ramp down, but the guys were 
just getting mowed down right away so you didn’t want to go that 
way, we just bailed out over the sides, when I bailed out I was still 
over my head I couldn’t touch ground, but the tide and the wind, it 
wasn’t too long before. 
 
 
2.  There are a couple of themes in this excerpt.  Tolleson relates how he was wounded 
coming ashore and a comrade saved him when he bandaged his wound, using his own 
bandages.  He did not know what happened to the man who saved him until he met him 
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again at a reunion 60 years later.  Tolleson relates leadership actions he saw firsthand.  
He notes how an officer just went into shock and could no longer function or lead.  He 
gives both positive and negative leadership trait examples: 
Control (negative), selfless service, sacrifice, loyalty, compassion: 
 
T: So that was kind of neat, but he told me then he said, I’m here but 
I’m not going to be active, and since I’ve tried to find him and 
haven’t been able to. And he gave me a shot of morphine and that 
also was comforting. So from that end I was able to make my way 
floating and so forth then with the tide and the waves and that 
eventually I reached the beach, and I ran into other men from my 
company, a Jim Slagel (Schlagel?), who had died a few years ago. 
He was there and he had been hit in the back and he was paralyzed, 
and there was another fellow by the name of Joe Daniels. He was 
just full of holes floating around there and he didn’t last. He died 
there, and there were others. An officer of mine that I don’t like to 
say it, but the shock of the things got to him, and he was out of it. I 
tried to--I don’t know how many hours I was out of it there. 
 
3.  In this section Tolleson talks about the reunions and leadership effects of having been 
a Ranger, especially in respect to how successful his comrades were after the war.  This 
point illustrates the effects of the training, experience, and values learned, and then 
applied over a lifetime. 
 
Experience, Training, Competence, Endurance: 
I:  So have you been to many reunions? 
 
T:  Yes I have. I have a lot of friends. And that’s the sad part of it 
now. Being that this is going to be it so far. We’ve had our, we get 
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together every two years, I don’t know if you’re aware of the 
Ranger Battalions of World War II. We have six Ranger 
Battalions, one was out in the Far East, 1st,  3rd and 4th were in 
Africa, Italy, Sicily and they were wiped out in Mansfield (Anzio?) 
three of them. And that they never reorganized. Most of them were 
taken prisoners and hit one way or another. Well we had formed in 
the states way before we had been training, but anyway, our 
association, we have been meeting every two years since the 
Forties and we had a couple rousing conventions there in the late 
Forties. You know all the guys were young, up and at’ em! at that 
time and they had survived and it was just, they tore up the town of 
Chicago. It was awful. But later on everyone cooled down and it’s 
been, we have tremendous amount of men that have been so 
successful. You could tell the grade of Ranger we had because they 
have been so successful in life, and here we are, our next reunion is 
going to be in Fort Wayne in the later part of August.  
 
The preceding examples illustrate ways that a critical analysis was made of the 
text while preserving the tone and essential idea of what the interviewee was discussing.  
Once the information from the interviews was collected, there was a review of the key 
ideas (values/traits) and a determination made of which ones seem to be the most 
commonly found.  This was assessed by looking at the number of times a specific core 
value appeared, and then comparing it to the others listed as among the most common 
leadership values or traits, determined from the earlier review of leadership theories.  
Most importantly, however, are the in-depth analysis and qualitative observations and 
conclusions drawn from the passages taken from the interviews.   
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CHAPTER 9  
HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND IMPACT OF THE STUDY 
 
The use of the D-Day 60 Oral Histories as the basis for this study on emergent 
leadership during crisis provided a rich resource for shaping the discussion of leadership 
theory from today and yesterday.  It provided a chance to look at firsthand accounts of 
leadership in action by those who observed and participated in one of the greatest events 
in human history, a time when winning or losing determined the fate of not only the men 
who fought there, but also the fate of many others because of its historical impact. 
The historical setting of D-Day discussed in the beginning of this work provides 
the drama and realism that make the study of leadership personal in a way that simply 
quantifying the data cannot do. When numbers become troops, and troops become 
individuals sharing critical moments of clarity, wisdom, pragmatism, bravery, fear, and 
tragedy, then there is something more that is added to the equation.  It is an intangible 
that the Alpha’s and standard deviations of an equation cannot portray.  It is something 
that the reader and researcher can both pick up, but only by way of gathering a sense of 
the total context of the events.  This proposition, more than any other gives the basis for 
why such a study adds so much to our understanding of leadership. 
The review of the different theoretical approaches to leadership gives the reader 
an opportunity to have a broad impression of the historical perspective of the subject that 
has emerged over the last 60 years.  Comparing theoretical perspectives with real life 
events that took place at D-Day brings theory into application and provides insight into 
the flexibility, depth, and suitability of those discussed.  Looking at the trends of the 
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groups identified, their similarities and differences, as well as their individual anecdotes 
make this study unique both historically and theoretically.   I have put a lot of emphasis 
into theoretical review. Not all theories are applicable here.  However, it is important to 
ensure sufficient academic rigor is applied to the process. This is not simply embarking 
on a pre-conceived notion of what would, at first glance, be the right leadership theory.  
In fact, the individuals spoke of so many different topics and aspects of leadership that it 
is reasonable to accept that leadership can be all over the graph.  Some veterans spoke of 
training, some spoke of esprit de corps, and others spoke of character.  Skills (Katz, 
1955), style ( Blake & Mouton, 1964), traits (Kouzes & Posner, 2003; Stogsdill,1948; 
Zaccaro, 2007), and even situational leadership (Blanchard, Zigarmy, & Nelson, 1993, 
Blanchard & Johnson, 2003) approaches showed up in the discussion. This gives the 
study a broad theoretical base and validates the approach taken to conduct it.  
 Finally, in an age where so many people find themselves removed from real 
leadership and outdoor activity, perhaps living in safe comfortable surroundings, never 
being pushed to their physical and mental limits as the soldier of World War II 
experienced, it is important to review where we have come from as a people, as a nation, 
in the context of leadership, so that we can re-focus our views, adjust our perspectives, 
and appreciate what we have, as well as take into account what we may have lost since 
the time of the Greatest Generation (Brinkley, 2005; Brokaw, 2001).  There may be many 
benefits to this study.  It adds to the body of knowledge in leadership.  The appreciable 
value of this study, and the role that traits played in the battle of D-Day might best be 
summed up by the words of the American President who kick-started the resurgence of 
remembrance and appreciation of the greatest generation: 
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Forty summers have passed since the battle that you fought here.  You 
were young the day you took those cliffs; some of you were hardly more 
than boys, with the deepest joys of life before you.  Yet, you risked 
everything here.  Why, why did you do it?  What compelled you to put 
aside the instinct for self-preservation and risk your lives to take these 
cliffs? What inspired all the men of the armies that met here? We look at 
you, and somehow we know the answer.  It was faith and belief; it was 
loyalty and love. 
     -Ronald Reagan, 6 June 1984  
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PART III 
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE STUDY 
CHAPTER 10 
FIRST LINE LEADERS: COMPANY AND BELOW 
 
Introduction to the First Line Leader 
 
 This chapter focuses on the accounts of first line leaders: Men who literally were 
in the front, leading their troops and actively participating in formal leadership roles.  The 
emergence of leadership in this group was noted in nearly every account.   These aspects 
of first line leadership will involve the following areas: 
 Composite picture: who were the first line leaders 
 Similarities of  first line leaders   
 Emerging leadership experiences  
 Compassionate leadership  
 Making use of rebel streaks among leaders 
 
A Composite Picture 
 
What sort of leadership was displayed at D-day among the first line of leaders, 
those who were on the ground directly impacting the motivation, mission objectives, and 
outcomes of the action?  First line leaders were involved in each part of the operation, 
from the squad leader with only a few soldiers, to the platoon sergeant or young 
lieutenant, to captains who led companies of soldiers. All of them were at the nexus of 
the fighting- slogging ashore through the water, jumping out of the  
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airplanes, landing in the gliders. They fought in the hedgerows and went house to house 
fighting the enemy.  They used innovative techniques to overcome obstacles and “outside 
the box” thinking to win on the beach, in the hedgerow country, and on the hills 
overlooking the beach.  Throughout the interviews, there were constant examples of this 
leader and what he did.  The first line leader was not always the same, but there were 
many examples which suggest a composite picture of who that leader was and what made 
him that way.  
Theoretical Perspectives on the First Line Leaders 
 Many of the First Line leadership observations from the study can be framed with 
leader-member exchange theory (LMX) (Dansereau, Graen and Haga ,1975; Graen and 
Cashman, 1975; Graen, 1976).  This theory presents a structure for explaining the process 
that occurs between leaders and followers.   It focuses on the interactions between the 
leader and the follower(s), with the key part of this being the dyadic relationship that 
occurs during the exchange (Northouse, 2004). 
 In LMX theory, the leader and follower form a negotiated bond to determine what 
the specific roles and responsibilities will be.  In the units at Normandy, there were 
several different layers of LMX that occurred at the squad, platoon, company, and 
battalion levels and higher.   In LMX, there are vertical dyads formed between the leader 
and the followers.  Those followers who conform to the leaders’ standards and 
expectations form an in-group.  Those followers who are not willing to meet these same 
standards and expectations comprise an out-group.   According to this theory, a leader 
may treat all followers equally under the terms of a standard social contract.  However, 
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the followers who work into the in-group look for more innovative ways to accomplish 
the group mission. In this way, they accomplish more for the leader’s goal, and the leader 
in turn reciprocates by spending more time and being more open to exchange of ideas 
with members of the in-group.  Northouse (2004) says that the impact of this is 
substantial. 
 In the case of first line leadership, the process between building a larger in-group 
and reducing the out-group occurred early in the team building (training) process.  The 
intense training, discipline and military structure, and the common need to come together 
as a functioning team helped facilitate this process and accelerated the change from out-
groups to in-groups.  LMX has three phases built on four factors (see table 8.1, taken 
from Northouse, 2004, pg 152). The leaders at D-Day had the challenge to develop a 
strong enough rapport with their men to get them from Phase 1, Stranger, to Phase 3, 
Partner in as little time as possible.   
 
 
Table 1.  The Three Phases of Leader Member Exchange Theory  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(From Northouse, 2004, originally published  in “Relationship-based Approach to 
Leadership: Development of Leader-Member Exchange  (LMX) Theory of Leadership 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
 STRANGER ACQUAINTANCE PARTNER 
Roles Scripted Tested Negotiated 
Influences One Way Mixed Reciprocal 
Exchanges Low 
Quality 
Medium 
Quality 
High 
Quality 
    
Interests Self Self/Other Group 
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Over 25 Years: Applying a Multi-level, Multi-Domain Perspective,”  by G.B. Graen and 
M. Uhl-Bien, 1995, Leadership Quarterly, 6(2), 231) 
 
 The first line leaders we studied demonstrated that under the circumstances at D-
Day, they generally were able to reach Phase 3. The accounts show a genuine regard by 
soldiers for leaders, and vice versa. The examples of the leader dealing with conflict in 
the group and negotiating through the challenges and asserting his will are present as 
well.   Lastly, the mutual willingness to sacrifice for the group shows that a tremendous 
amount of bonding occurred and emerged, even in cases where there was not a long 
period of time to develop this under ordinary circumstances.  However, because of the 
nature of the situation at D-Day and the great challenges and impending danger at that 
time, the emergence of leadership and followership traits appeared to be accelerated, 
especially when viewed in light of the accounts where spontaneous leadership and group 
formation occurred.  In these cases, the normal thawing procedures and basic exchanges 
were rapid, with leadership changing out perhaps as often as every few hours or days, 
depending on the type of combat situation.  This suggests that time may not be as great of 
a factor as the model suggests and lends weight to the idea that leadership traits will 
emerge under compressed events and circumstances.   
A good example of this is when one goes on an airplane ride and strikes up a 
conversation with the passenger sitting in the next seat.   There is a slight tension from 
traveling in the air and the possibility of danger, as well as the fact that someone traveling 
alone may not feel as sure of oneself as in familiar surroundings.   The result of this is 
often a very engaging and lively discussion that can make the trip go by faster.  Though 
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not everyone has such conversations, many of us do.  This is one example of how human 
traits surface as a self-protective mechanism, a natural inclination to develop a group or 
ally to turn to in the event something unexpected occurs.   At D-Day, this would have 
been a fairly common occurrence, especially among the paratroopers who were from 
different units as they were trying to re-group after being scattered across the Norman 
countryside.  Basically, the in-group became any allied forces member, the out-group was 
also pushed to the extreme - anyone who was not an ally was a potential target.  In this 
way, the men at Operation Overlord (D-Day) were fortunate.  They knew who the enemy 
were and had clarity in who was friendly and who was not. 
 The framework of LMX is helpful to provide a way to describe the processes that 
went on between leaders and followers, in both formal and formal groups at D-Day. 
However, it should be noted that in order for the LMX to function it required a degree of 
competency in leadership traits to be present or to emerge from both the leader and 
follower. 
 
Leadership Similarities among First Line Leaders 
 
As discussed in the introduction, the first line leader was in the front leading his 
troops. Most of the men in this study were first line leaders at one time or another during 
their wartime service.  The term “first line leader” will be broadly applied to those leaders 
who ranged in rank from Corporal through Captain.  Normally, the first line leader is the 
first leader in an individual soldier’s chain of command.  But for the purposes of this 
study, we are broadening the range because there was so much interaction between such a 
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wide range of ranks.  The first line leader saw to the successful training of his troops.   
The 82d Airborne’s Duke Boswell recalled that: 
We were staying in an airport hanger for a few days before D-Day, sitting 
around and getting exercise in now and then or play some cards. Then they 
told us where we were going. Each platoon was shown their objective. 
Then, the company commanders explained what was expected of us.  We 
were very well-briefed with what was coming and what we had to do. 
(Boswell, p. 5)  
 
Boswell was a member of an elite parachute unit that still has a renowned 
reputation for its esprit de corps and vigorous training.  The leadership he saw displayed 
around him on a daily basis allowed him to have confidence in the men who led him, 
while at the same time gave him the same level of assurance for his soldiers.  The training 
they received played an important role in this. 
Another first line leader was Corporal Harry Browne.  Browne was not in an elite 
unit, but he nonetheless observed solid leadership on many levels.  He relates this 
anecdote about a former platoon leader:  
It was, the leadership you’re talking about, yes it was good.  We had a Lt. 
we called him the goon.  I can see him today.  He built about like you are, 
about your size, and had a mustache, big mustache, he walked kind of like 
an old farmer.  Never in a hurry, nothing bothered him, and he was always 
right there when something was going on...  He was just a, you just didn’t 
get excited with him around.  Guys figured they had a lot of confidence in 
him, and he knew what he was doing, and we trusted him.  He proved to 
be very, very good, knowledgeable (Browne, H., p. 14).   
 
Browne served in the 2nd Infantry Division and said that the leadership, “could 
not be any better” (Browne, H., p. 14).  Thus, we have two first line leaders from 
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different units who observed and expressed similar confidence in their leaders.  This was 
a recurring theme in the study group.    
 29th Infantry Division’s Walter Condon talked about his impression of the hastily 
trained new lieutenants that were on the battlefield at D-Day.  Condon spoke of the “90 
day wonders” 9  with these words,  
 
In time of war, the most important man is a “90-day wonder.” This would 
be a new lieutenant as the casualties were high in that group. They would 
come in every week or two. They had to look brave, act brave and lead the 
rest of us who were tired all the time over the hedgerows. There ought to 
be a special memorial for them (Condon, p. 47). 
  
5th Infantry Division’s Peter Molinari also had positive words about his leaders, 
including the lieutenants: 
 
I had a great deal of respect for my immediate officers. We had a couple 
of great lieutenants. We called one by his first name because he didn’t 
want to be identified by the enemy during the battles (Molinari, p. 179). 
  
Henry French was a Sergeant in the 1st Infantry Division’s 16th Infantry Regiment.  
He echoed the sentiments of the others in his description of not only one, but two 
commanders.  His first Commander was Captain Joseph Dawson, who led him at 
Normandy.   He states here: 
 
                                                 
9
 The “90 day wonders” was the term applied to graduates of the Officer Candidate School Course that 
transitioned Enlisted and Non-commissioned Officers to 2nd Lieutenants in a much more rapid fashion than 
the traditional four year process to get commissioned such as through the Military Academy or Reserve 
Officer Training Corps. 
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F: But anyway we were the first ones to get on top of the hill. And 
(Inaudible) Captain Dawson said, “When the wind blow, let’s go!” So... 
 
I: Captain Dawson? 
 
F: Yea. 
 
I: Was he your Commander? 
 
F: Yea. He was Company Commander. Joseph P. Dawson. 
 
I: Joseph P. Dawson? 
 
F: Yea. 
 
I: Was he a good guy?  
 
F: Oh, he was excellent. He didn’t say “Okay, you men go here, go there 
and do this”. He said “C’mon, let’s go!” He was out front. One hundred 
percent, all of him. 
 
I: You’d probably follow him anywhere. (French, p. 81) 
 
French goes on to talk about his second Commander, CPT Crooks {Interviewer was 
unsure if it was Crooks or Crisp}:  
 
F: Yes, he (Dawson) was wounded and then… they sent him back to the 
States. Captain Crooks take his place. 
 
I: Was he a pretty good leader?       
 
F: Oh yea. Crooks was a real good guy too. I met him. 
 
I: Wow, you were blessed to have so many good officers! 
 
F: Oh yea. 
 
I: Usually they always tell us officers were not that good. 
 
F: Oh, we had good, excellent, first class in my book. 
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F: Yes. Dawson, he found the trails. You know, the German’s had their 
trails and he just helped me find one and there we went in (Inaudible) and 
knock out with a couple machine guns and rifle (French, p. 81). 
  
The fact that the interviewer expressed a level of surprise at French’s description 
of his officers illustrates that some perceptions of officer leadership may need to be re-
examined.  In all of these descriptions, there is a level of fondness and confidence in the 
leader. The leader was a trainer and a participant.  Leaders who led the way and shared in 
the perils of their soldiers were respected.  
 Perhaps the best example of what first line leadership at the company level could 
do is expressed in the words of Ralph Goranson, who was an OCS (Officer Candidate 
School) graduate at Normandy.  Goranson was a Ranger who commanded a company at 
D-Day.  Goranson went to Fort Benning to attend OCS, the same place that still 
graduates young Lieutenants today from the ranks of enlisted soldiers.   Goranson’s 
recollection of how he ended up going to OCS is similar to how many others related their 
experiences.  He had the combination of background and skills that were readily apparent 
to his leadership early on in his Army career:    
 
Because of my D.C.  (Author’s note: Drill Corps) training which {I} had 
in high school, and when I graduated there, I was set in command of the 
regiment. I found out much to my chagrin that I was classified as a cook. 
[laughs] But the Company Commander said, "Don't worry." He said, 
"We're promoting you as a supply sergeant. You will be the acting supply 
sergeant and go out on the firing range and things like that to qualify but 
in the meantime you're running the supply."   
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So… on the day we were graduating, within one or two hours the old man 
was chewing me out because I didn't have my stripes on. [laughs] 
 
Well I'd say there {I} was a Supply Sergeant and he called me in once or 
twice about applying for officer school- OCS. And I said, "Well maybe…"   
So one time I had a two day leave and I went down to L.A. to get a friend 
of mine and I came back and there wa 
s Pappy - a First Sergeant with two million years in the service, waiting 
for me at the bus stop, "Get off!  Get cleaned up!  Get your ass over to the 
board!" [Laughs]  So I did that and I was approved to go to Benning...  We 
graduated more applicants from that group I think than from any group 
that went through there… we were as goofy as hell but we had a good 
group. (Goranson, p. 100)  
 
Goranson reveals much of his training and the character of those around him, as 
well as those above him in this passage.  He was identified early on to have some 
important leadership skills, but then also proved to be capable in the duties assigned to 
him.   Eventually, his leadership was recognized to the point that his leaders practically 
made him go to OCS.  Once there, he found many others like himself who were all a cut 
above the rest, “goofy as hell, but we had a good group” (Goranson, p. 100). Goranson 
graduated with one of the largest OCS classes at Fort Benning.  His leadership was 
enhanced by his desire for more responsibility and challenges.  His Commanders saw this 
and not only encouraged him, but also rewarded his drive.  Goranson describes the 
experience: 
 
G: Our class, I don't know who were the people but we graduated more… 
 
I: Students.  
 128 
 
 
G: [More students] at that time than had ever graduated...it was a fun 
bunch. I don't know what happened to any of the guys because I went off 
to the - I went out for infantry Lieutenant, which I got sick and tired of and 
that's why I put in for Ranger School and I was taken in there. I went into 
the Ranger Regiment for a while that had a full eagle (Colonel) battalion 
commander {Interviewer comments: normally a Lieutenant Colonel leads 
a battalion.} … I applied for everything I could.  Well I was training there 
and the Colonel, uh, Major then, called me into his office and said, "I'd 
like you to take over the Charlie Company as the Commanding Officer.  
He said, "Nope. No questions, no answers. You want the job or you don't 
want the job.” He was a great big guy.  I said, "Well I want the job." And 
he said, "Well you got the job. Well, what are you sitting there for? Go get 
that company in shape (Goranson, pp. 100-102). 
 
Just the way that Goranson describes the vignette between himself and the Major 
who offers him the job shows the core of Goranson’s drive.  He made a decision, and he 
had no hesitation at that point to accept it.  He displayed some of the requisite traits that a 
Company Commander must have- maturity, judgment, and decisiveness. 
 Goranson led a Ranger Company at D-Day on Omaha Beach.  He lost 35 out of 
70 men within minutes of escaping their sinking vessel as it pulled in to shore.  
Throughout the event he maintained his bearing and his mission.  Not every Commander 
or Officer at D-Day did this; but throughout the accounts in the study group these leaders 
managed to do this.  An 82d Airborne soldier, Curt Hatcher recalled how this happened 
during the parachute jump into Sainte-Mère-Église: 
 
When you’re there, you don’t know all the workings. You’re really 
looking over your shoulder, and trying to protect yourself and get your job 
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done.  MAJ Krause10  was good at getting all of us organized while we 
were still scattered all over the place.  After we got control of the town, 
the Major had an American flag flown over the town hall building, which 
he carried since the units’ actions in Naples, Italy (Hatcher, p. 109). 
  
Hatcher recalls Krause as a Major, the Regimental Executive Officer, but others 
recall him as a Colonel, the Brigade Commander.  One referred to him as “Cannonball 
Krause” (Boswell, p. 5; Delaney, p. 57). Regardless of this difference in title, several 
soldiers recalled his actions and the flag he carried.  And, regardless of his rank, because 
of the circumstances of the event he still was a direct leader on the ground with the men 
who landed.  He immediately took charge, organized, and gave direction for the soldiers 
who soon started to form up and gather in groups.   
The Airborne troops were scattered all over the Norman countryside according to 
the accounts in the study.   Fifteen members of the Study Group were 82d Airborne 
veterans. Many others were from the 101st.   These veterans were from units with high 
standards and demanded more from their soldiers than other units. People did not just 
become Airborne. They had to earn entry into the organization, and they had to meet 
higher standards.   It is not exceptional that a Ranger or an Airborne Paratrooper would 
carry the requisite traits needed for leadership after such a vetting process.  However, not 
all first line leaders at company level were in elite units.  Nevertheless, their accounts are 
just as compelling, if not as exciting as jumping out of an airplane first.  One of these 
leaders was Irv Koplovitz.  He became a First Sergeant in a personnel company under 
                                                 
10
 As mentioned in the text there are several variations of the rank for Lieutenant Colonel Edward Krause, 
who was the Battalion Commander. Prior to this he was the Regimental XO (Executive Officer) as a Major. 
LTC Krause received the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions on 6-7 June 1944 at D-Day. 
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these circumstances prior to D-Day. Nearly all of Koplovitz’s squadron chain of 
command was killed in the flight from America to England. However, Koplovitz and 
others in the unit rose to the challenge. Koplovitz describes how he and his troops felt 
about being dealt such a loss, even before going into combat: 
It was certainly the lowest morale point we had. We quickly rallied and 
reminded ourselves that we were trained to do a job and that we had to do 
that job no matter what happens. So, with each assignment we got, we 
carried it out to the fullest (Koplovitz, p. 120). 
 
 
Koplovitz’ account was consistent with the accounts of many other first line leaders.  
They did not need Airborne Wings or a Ranger patch11  to demonstrate their leadership. 
They did what they had to do when called upon to do so.   One of these, William 
McNamara, was a reporter.  He led six men ashore at Omaha and on through Europe 
recording events of the War. McNamara was an officer in charge of a group of  
men who covered the news of troop movements and personnel experiences. His office 
was on a ship off of Omaha Beach until they came ashore with a radio and mimeograph 
machine in his jeep (McNamara, p. 161). 
 
McNamara may not have been the “tough” leader seen in other units, but his 
contributions and those of his men in recording the history of D-Day and the rest of the 
War were nonetheless critical, longstanding contributions. 
                                                 
11
 During World War II, the Ranger patch was a blue lengthwise diamond with the word Ranger 
embroidered in yellow. 
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 Others had less formal entry into leadership roles.  Francis Lamoureux of the 
508th PIR (Parachute Infantry Regiment), 82d Airborne became a leader simply by being 
a volunteer: 
 
So when I hear the word volunteer my ears perk up, so I went to Captain 
Bogath who was the commanding officer of our G Company.  I asked 
Captain Bogath I hear rumors that they need men for this special mission 
they’ve got going around for the invasion.  So I’d like to volunteer for it.  I 
did the same thing at Aberdeen, when I was there I went to the company 
commander and there’s a notice on the bulletin board that they’re looking 
for volunteers for the airborne.  I told them, hey, sign me up, I volunteer.  
He said, “Lamoureux are you crazy?  You want to be a paratrooper?”  I 
said. “sign me up.”  They put me in charge of a detail, at that time they 
still considered me a regular Army, so by serial number 0011888-0 
became all but 3’s with the draftees.  So I got put in charge of that detail 
and only five of us volunteered for that detail and we took the training 
down.  I just herd them - shepherd them down to Ft. Benning to get the 
jump schooling in.  So that was the first time I got put in charge of a detail 
of men, where I had to take care of those guys.  I was responsible for 
getting them there, and at that time I was only a Private (Lamoureux, p. 
124). 
  
Lamoureux’s spirit of volunteerism and desire for responsibility led him to be 
identified as a soldier who could be counted to take action when others were not 
watching.  He was a self-starter. His initiative led him to levels of responsibility others 
would never have.  
Many of the jobs did not involve fighting the enemy directly.  Many of the heroes 
of D-Day had to fulfill gruesome tasks that others would not have been capable of doing, 
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such as recovering bodies.  Samuel Lence of the 79th Infantry Division was one such 
leader. Lence not only had a tough job, but also had to take care of his men. It put him at 
odds with others at times and resulted in him losing rank three times. Lence felt he had to 
take up for his men even if it meant getting in trouble. He recalls the challenges that came 
with his job:   
One of my primary jobs was retrieving bodies from the landing craft, and 
bodies hung up on the pylons, and bodies ensconced in the propellers of 
the landing craft--Higgins boats, you name it. I had to dive for some of 
them, but I couldn’t dive deep enough without equipment.   
 
I:  You were busted down (in rank)?  You were a sergeant three times? 
 
L: I was a son-of-a-bitch.  My last break was on account of a fist fight 
with a mess sergeant.  He wouldn’t feed our crew because our charge-of-
quarters failed to wake us up (Lence, p. 141). 
 
 This small piece from Lence’s account shows the human tragedy of the fight. 
Throughout his account, he refers to the waste of it all. Certainly, someone who had this 
task had an eyewitness view of the carnage of war. Yet, he stuck to his mission and took 
care of his men.   The fist fight with the Mess Sergeant is a classic tale of the GI out in 
the field coming in to the confines of some camp, only to be told he is too late for chow.   
As the leader, Lence takes on the bureaucracy (in this case the Mess Sergeant), because 
rules or no rules, his men need to eat.    He may have lost rank, but he certainly 
maintained the loyalty of his men by his actions, and he later earned his rank back.  
Lence was not unique as a rebellious first line leader.  There were others in the group that 
had to use unconventional methods to accomplish the mission.  Harold McCauley had to 
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break the nose of one of his soldiers to get him to be a team player.  In today’s 
environment and its revised standards of leadership and conduct, this would be a 
problem, but when you are preparing for a critical event like D-Day, some of the civilities 
can be lost:  
 
I was in charge of three DUKWs. One guy had been in the engineers, and 
had been in every outfit in the Army. He ended up in our outfit because 
there was only one place worst than our unit, and that was the gliders. If 
we could not handle them they went to the gliders. We got into a fight. I 
was his corporal and he said something to me.  I broke his nose. He broke 
my nose.  Somehow, we ended up the best buddies that ever was. We got 
together at the reunions and cried every time (McCauley, p. 152). 
 
The fact that McCauley had to show the guy who was boss eliminated friction in 
the relationship.  McCauley acted in a consistent manner and fixed the problem, earned 
the man’s respect, and eventually they both benefited from a better relationship and 
performance because they were able to form a cohesive team with clear lines drawn. 
Many first line leaders did not have time to mince words or sugarcoat things. 
There was a war going on around them. When they encountered resistance that did not 
pass the common sense test, they dealt with it, regardless of the consequences they might 
face afterwards.  This was a trait that many of them had to have in order to survive.  Staff 
Sergeant Paul Merriman of the 736th Field Artillery Battalion witnessed an incredible 
series of events, reacted to them, and then went on to rejoin his unit, all in one night.  His 
unit Commander and First Sergeant were in a convoy of vehicles that blew up, killing 
several people including the Commander.  Merriman was the driver in a second vehicle 
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because another driver had poor night vision.  The lead vehicle hit a land mine, blowing 
the vehicle in to the air.  Men’s legs were crushed. Merriman describes the scene and his 
actions that saved the lives of several people:  
  
First thing we did was check out our people.  Their right legs in most 
cases were like mush...  I took a knife and sliced part of the boot off of 
them, slit the bottom of their trousers, and as carefully as I could put 
some sulfa powder into the wounds, covered parts of the legs that were 
hurt, and we administered sulfa pills to those who were wounded to 
prevent infection.  Then the medics came in, but there was only one. We 
rode with them, and Captain Blum took them to the rear echelon for their 
first treatment.  I stayed with them until about one or two o'clock as I 
recall and then I got a vehicle and caught up with my outfit (Merriman, p. 
170). 
  
The way he recalls the event and the steps he took when it occurred show that 
Merriman could handle pressure, danger, and think at the same time.  Despite the chaos 
of the landmine explosion, Merriman matter-of-factly recalls what they did. 
 Merriman also noted that the first line leaders were often killed because they were 
leading their troops in dangerous areas.  This is a statement of the obvious, but his point 
was that it forced younger, inexperienced soldiers to have to take on roles and 
responsibilities they may not have been ready for, and as Merriman said, “they had to 
grow up fast”:  
 
In the infantry, the officers and men go first. Unfortunately, this leaves 
things in a pretty bad state as we know from the stories of things that 
happened at D-Day.  When you lose all your officers and sergeants on 
down, because they follow, it is pretty hard to get organized and keep 
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things going; that’s the tough part.  You can’t expect a man who is a 
corporal or even a private; he grows up in a big hurry.  That was the 
unfortunate part of all that.  In our case, (inaudible) we saw what was 
happening to these guys on point.  It was always a sergeant or a corporal 
who would go out on point because somebody had to be in charge, the guy 
with the stripes (Merriman, p. 173). 
 
Eventually, Merriman, though only a Staff Sergeant, ended up commanding the 
battery he was in at one point, for a brief time at least, due to loss of the commander and 
other leaders. 
Norman Schein was a member of the 248th Engineer Battalion. He was a sergeant 
who was resilient and smart.  He knew how and when to act- and he saved lives because 
of it.  Here is one example from his account in how he saved a fellow soldier after the 
jeep they were riding in was hit by enemy fire: 
 
The jeep was hit so I ran.  Then I got up when they went for more ammo, 
and I had a .45 caliber submachine gun, which wasn't good for more than 
fifty yards, but it made a lot of noise, and I cut loose about sixty rounds at 
them, and they took off.  He was hurt so bad, and we carried sulfa in bags 
on our belts, and I cut his pants off and put sulfa on one side and the other 
pack on the other side. I put a tourniquet on his leg.  I didn't know exactly 
how I was going to get him out of there, but right behind those two French 
women ... laying there all shot up, were some fence posts.  I took his pants 
off and made strips out of them, and I tied them to the fence posts.  I 
grabbed him by the collar and … got him to the jeep, which was still 
running.  I … beat it back about nine miles to our lines.  They were just 
putting up a field hospital and they came running with their IVs and blood 
and they took his dog tags.  They never took him off the jeep...  He lost a 
lot of blood.  Then they took him inside.  The doctor was there, and I said, 
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"Can I see him?"  He said, “I want to talk to you about this.”  They 
stabilized him and put him in a wire basket.  They said, "We can't do much 
for this man except get him blood and stabilize him."  After they got him 
stabilized, he wanted his coat, so I went back to the jeep and got his coat, 
and it was full of shrapnel holes.  I said, "You don't want this any more do 
you?"  He said, "I want it more than ever."  So I put that beat-up old coat 
over him, and that's the last time I saw him.  He wrote me several times.  
The doctor came up to me and he said, “Are you responsible for this?"  I 
said "Yes sir."  He gave me a hug and he said. "You just saved a man's 
life."  If you hadn't gotten him here right away, he would have died.  I was 
proud about that.  He and I went through a lot. We got shot at.  We got 
howitzers (shells fired) on us.  I was wounded three times, and he got it 
once real bad.  But we went through it.  We made it (Schein, pp. 226-227). 
  
 Walter Raymond was another leader from the 79th ID.  He was a corporal whose 
job was to look after his soldiers – both on the job and off the job.  In one instance 
Raymond describes trying to keep his guys out of trouble and having to answer to “the 
old man” or CO (Commanding Officer): 
 
I would have still done the same thing.  Cause even when we went out … I 
know like when we was just training they'd get- these guys would get 
drunk and stuff.  I never drank.  I used to get them back and every time 
they got busted I got busted.  Captain would say, "Walter!" And I'd say, 
"Captain they're my guys and I got to take care of them."  So…ok” 
(Raymond, p. 192). 
 
In another passage, Raymond describes the chaos at the landing and how he urged 
his troops to move out, as well as his motivation as the first man out of the ramp: 
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R: ….  I just wanted to get out of this thing and get on land.  That's what I 
wanted to do. I said, "If I'm going to go, I want to go on land.  I don't want 
to go in the water."  As soon as that thing was down I went. 
 
I:  When you were at the beach, and obviously there's a lot going on, did 
you have an initial impression?  Or what were your actions? 
 
R:  No.  It just …the thing was to work your way in.  Get in after the 
Germans and just work your way in.  Work your way in.  Get away from 
the beach. Cause at the beach they were sawing everything up.  You had to 
get away from the beach. 
 
I:  When did you finally feel safe? 
 
R:  When we were in about a mile or so, and it was rough but you know, 
what the hell and everything.  A lot of guys were lost and different ones 
were out-of-it and everything. 
 
I:  … how many of your guys did you have with you when you felt safe a 
mile in? 
 
R:  Well I had about seven guys, seven or eight guys, and the guys were--
going. 
 
I:  You just kept your squad together? 
 
R:  You kept your squad together and tried to keep contact with the rest of 
the company.  That was the idea.  You don't want to lose everybody 
(Raymond, pp. 192-3). 
  
Walter Raymond never made it past Corporal.  But to the six to twelve men he 
was responsible for during the war, it did not matter.  What mattered was that he was 
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conscientious and watched out for his men.  Raymond noted that even a good leader 
cannot fix what is broken sometimes.  He also discussed soldiers who went berserk and 
who could  not be settled down: 
 
I:  Any instances of true leadership or cowardice for that matter coming up 
on that first day? 
 
R:  Oh we had guys that would go a little berserk and you'd see them, and 
then you wouldn't see them. I've seen guys. 
 
I:  What is the leadership response to that if you have a guy? 
 
R:  Well, you try and calm him down but you can't jeopardize a whole 
squad.  More or less…he's on his own. 
 
I:  What does that mean go berserk?  What do you mean by that? 
 
R:  Well you just…everything gets to him with the fighting and the killing 
and everything and that was it.  You didn't…you just didn't care about 
anything anymore.  You'd try and get a medic to get him and maybe give 
him a shot to calm him down or something, but you didn't (pause).  Your 
time was…like I said everything moves so fast, that you just don't have 
time to tinker with.  You try to do the best you can.  That's it (Raymond, p. 
194). 
 
 Raymond, though only a Corporal at the time, had to deal with highly complex 
challenges in a compressed, quick timeline.  “Everything moves so fast, you just don’t 
have time to tinker with {it}.”  To survive the landing, get off the beach, move inland and 
engage the enemy every step of the way required skills and abilities that were either there 
or were not.  Fortunately for Raymond’s men, he had those skills.  Raymond may not 
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have realized the impact of his leadership.  But the fact that he survived as a leader, “on 
point,” as SSG Merriman describes it, shows that he was more than adequate for the job. 
Like many other first line leaders, Raymond was wounded on more than one 
occasion. Yet despite that, all he could think of was to get back with his squad.  Though 
this is related to the team bonding and the need to share in the group, it also speaks of his 
own internal traits as a leader to want to be there with his men: 
 
I wanted to get well.  I wanted to get myself well enough because I didn't 
want to be in there.  I know the guys were out there and my outfit was 
there, and I just really wanted to go back, which I did.  I got wounded like 
two or three times… (Raymond, p. 196)  
 
It also was not uncommon for people to refuse care if it meant leaving their comrades.  
Though not a first line leader, one battalion commander kept going: 
Our 2nd battalion commander, Colonel Vandaborg (Author’s note: 
Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin H. Vandervoort was commander of the 2nd 
Battalion, 505th PIR [Parachute Infantry Regiment]) fractured his ankle 
and we put a gas mask around it to protect it. He stayed with us right until 
then end, and even when they tried to evacuate him he refused (Delaney, 
p. 57). 
 
Similarly, 2nd Lieutenant John F. Kennedy of Company K, 13th Infantry Regiment 
was wounded three times but still managed to get back to his platoon to be with his men 
(Kennedy, p. 118). The bonding, the training, and the sense of caring for one’s men seem 
to have all played a significant role in many of these veteran’s actions and inspired them 
to overcome wounds in order to carry out their duties and to keep going when they might 
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have opted out of their leadership roles once they had been wounded. It seems rather 
more likely that the wounding created greater resolve and determination in them, and 
added to their sense of resolute purpose to “keep going.” 
 Lt. John Landis of the 47th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, took over 
command of his Company when the Commander was killed.  His recollection included 
the American bombing at St. Lo, an event which cost hundreds of American lives 
including Lieutenant General Leslie McNair, demonstrates how this sense of duty and 
responsibility played out: 
 
One of the main things I remember was when one of our own airplanes 
bombed us and killed six hundred of our men. I know it was 
unintentionally, but we were trying to break out of the hedgerows and they 
pulled us back about a mile. At that time the 1800 bombers came over and 
started dropping bombs on the German lines. The wind blew the smoke 
back on us and the bombers behind them started dropping bombs on us 
and killed General McNair and I believe a Colonel from the Air Force 
who was in communications with the bombers. So they lost 
communications with them, and the following bombers had no idea of 
who they were bombing. They were just dropping bombs on the smoke 
and dust. Finally, somehow in about an hour they got it stopped. The men 
of course were wounded - a lot of them. The bombs had disoriented a lot 
of them so I just grabbed what men I could get a hold of and we had to 
advance. We got to our old position and I got about a hundred yards past 
that and I got hit with an airburst so….that's when I left the Company. 
(Landis, p. 136) 
 
 This passage is in line with historic accounts, such as those provided by other men 
and by historians such as Stephen Ambrose.   The St. Lo bombing was a devastating 
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event.  Allied forces were trying to break through the German’s defensive lines.  The plan 
was to soften the resistance by heavy bombing followed by a general attack by the Allies.  
Unfortunately, a heavy amount of smoke started drifting back into the American lines, 
even though they had pulled back to what was considered a safe distance.  The poor 
communications of the time, compounded by the drifting smoke, resulted in heavy 
American casualties.  To have survived the bombing and all of its drama, and then found 
the fortitude to not only move oneself out of the bomb-induced stupor but also to urge on 
fellow soldiers, was certainly a major act of bravery and leadership.    
 The recurrence of sergeants and lieutenants taking on additional responsibilities 
and successfully leading their men is interesting to note.   According to Studies in Social 
Psychology in World War II (Stouffer et al., 1949), there was significant disparity in the 
educational levels of officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men.   By late 
1944, the OCS program had churned out many thousands of officers, and the ranks of the 
Army were burgeoning with newly-commissioned lieutenants.  These men were selected 
from the enlisted and non-commissioned officer ranks.  Many were veterans and had 
several years of experience prior to being commissioned; others were more mature or had 
been educated prior to enlisting.  Their demographics represented a broad swath of 
Americans from all economic and social levels.  These contributing factors proved to be 
significant in the performance of these officers.  They show that many officers at D-Day 
had the same grit, determination, and discipline to do the hard jobs on the ground as the 
NCO’s whom they led.  Thomas Alley commented:  
 
We had excellent officers and commanders. They were hard as nails but 
great people to us. I had six different company commanders during the 
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war. We lost them to wounds from the actions we lived through (Alley, p. 
3). 
 
Likewise, the 82d’s Ed Asbury said this of his commanders: 
 
Through the entire war, my chain of command was great, and we got great 
training. We all did what we were trained to do (Asbury, p. 4). 
 
Fellow 82nd Airborne member SGT Zane Schlemmer recalled his fellow soldiers and 
commanders with this observation: 
 
From officer to private, we all jumped from the same planes.  If there were 
any misfits, they left very soon. Some people said we were like a pack of 
jackals, but I thought we were more like mongooses. Our officers were 
superb (Schlemmer, p. 228). 
  
This willingness to share in the hardships of the men was not without some 
humorous moments, even at the scariest of times.  Faced with a grounded vessel at 
Normandy British Naval Lieutenant Michael D’Alton recounted this event: 
 
So we, on our own, went pottering along the beach, looking for any sort of 
gap to get into…quite a distance from where we first anchored…we 
grounded, he then ordered the door lowered, and I, as junior officer, was 
in charge of the lowering of the door for it.  The door went down, but 
didn’t appear to go the full way down.  I thought that’s curious.  So we 
wound it up again...  There was immense resistance.  And the hands were 
toy, toiling as hard as they could on the handles.  And as I say, 
commissioned or not, I lent a hand, too.  And I wound as hard as any of 
them, until, suddenly, the two back buttons of my trousers burst.  So every 
turn of the handle the door came up a little more, my trousers went down a 
little more, too.  Ultimately, with great effort, we got the door up to sea 
level (D’Alton, p. 4). 
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Perhaps the greatest challenge was the losses of men in such numbers, often in 
minutes due to bombs or heavy fire.   The First Line leaders never really had the time to 
think about such things, but they noticed them. They detached themselves from the 
events around them and kept going.  Henry French, of G Co., 16th Infantry Regiment 
summed it up this way: 
 
F:  Oh yeah. There’s bullets and (Inaudible) all around but one way to go. 
(Inaudible). 
 
I:  Just keep moving forward? 
 
F: Keep moving forward then. 
 
I:  A lot of guys on your boat didn’t make it? 
 
F: Some didn’t make it, yes. (Inaudible) (French, pg 81). 
 
 This short exchange is stark in its presentation of what so many of these leaders 
ultimately had to carry with them from D-Day forward: the loss of the men they led. And, 
French’s reply says it all in a quiet, dignified and respectful way, “Some didn’t make it, 
yes.” Whether one was Company Commander Frank Goranson, or SSG Merriman, 
desperately trying to save the lives of his own Commander, the weight of these losses 
was a tremendous challenge to deal with and still continue the journey.   The larger scale 
of the details are not available on how every case was handled; but there are certainly 
examples of what may have occurred countless times, many miles away from the shores 
of Normandy.  The weight of this responsibility and how these first line leaders handled it 
is explained in the next section. 
 
Compassionate Leadership 
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Many of the soldiers who arrived on D-Day never made it past the beach, except 
when washed in by the waves, or when fished out of the water by men like Samuel 
Lence.  The compressed time and battle space of Normandy gave little time for men to 
pause and deal with their grief. Leaders who had the weight and responsibility for the 
lives of their men keenly felt this; but still had to drive on with the mission.  Act now, 
grieve later seemed to be the mantra they had to follow. 
 In the interview with SGT French, there is this exchange regarding the difficulties 
of dealing with the profound sense of loss one feels when comrades are lost in battle: 
 
I: Kind of messy isn’t it? 
 
F: It is. You can’t look back on those things. I don’t. 
 
I: No. 
 
F: Just can’t do it. 
 
I: No. And if you do, you can really make yourself pretty miserable if you 
dwell too long on those things (French, p. 81). 
 
For Lieutenant Landis, there was no time either: 
 
Well, I was an Executive Officer when I was assigned to the Company as 
a replacement officer and the Captain was killed and I took over command 
of the Company at the time” (Landis, p. 135). 
  
CPT Goranson also had no time to grieve during the fight, as he still had the other 
half of his troops to take care of.  Goranson’s account of scaling the ciffs and the loss of 
his men has already been presented, this critical part of his account is worth reviewing 
once again: 
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G: Everybody got off but the boat was destroyed and the crew got on 
another boat. But the boat was [pause]. 
 
I: So once those doors opened what happened immediately? 
 
G: What happened immediately was machine gun fire all over the place. 
And my instructions were you know: The rest is going to be fine. Get your 
fanny across the beach and get in a firing position and then go about our 
missions. And our mission was to clear the right flank of the beach but 
unfortunately, I lost thirty-five men out of seventy - almost eighty, before 
they got out of the boat. 
 
I: Before they even got out of the boat? 
 
  
Goranson lost 35 soldiers in a matter of minutes.  Nevertheless, he and C 
Company still had a job to do. There was no time to pause for each soldier or any 
opportunity to take a break until long after the men left behind had been collected for 
burial.  Thus, there were no formal good-byes, merely a sudden break in a line or 
connection between different individuals who had collectively made up a team. 
Corporal Howard Manoian of the 515th Parachute Infantry Regiment also had no choice  
but to keep going: 
Both my battalion commander and the executive officer were killed while 
we dropped from the heavens. Our 1st lieutenant then became battalion 
commander for awhile. A more senior officer was later brought in from 
the 508th and assumed that position (Manoian, p. 143). 
  
Leaders had to step up, take charge, and make decisions and they had no time to 
deal with the normal emotional challenges that accompany loss until much later.  For 
Walter Raymond and his troops, it was constant motion: 
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I:  After a firefight, how long before your squad would calm down and the 
adrenaline slows down? 
 
R:  Well we just kept moving, moving, moving you know.  The only time 
your adrenaline went down was when there was nobody shooting back at 
you.  Have time to take a drink of water and to get something to eat if you 
had it.  I went hungry up there an awful lot--quite a bit (Raymond, p. 196). 
  
There was no time to eat, adrenaline was working overtime, and they were always 
moving- this was what the combat soldier at D-Day was experiencing.  How could one 
expect to keep track of who was lost and when? Raymond further narrows down what 
was going through most soldiers’ minds here: 
I:  Either happiness or sadness?  The emotions?  Through the interview 
you've been relatively matter-of-fact, this is the way it was, but it must 
have been…? 
 
R:  Well you want to know?  I'll tell you the truth.  Me, myself, I didn't 
have time to think of anything like that.  I done my job and I was just 
trying to save my skin.  I was looking out and I was looking out for the 
guys.  I tried to teach them everything I know.  To keep yourself straight 
and sane…would I get wounded or anything.  So I done the best I could.  
Cause there were young guys like me.  Yeah you get some old guys in but 
they're just so reclusive. So… (Raymond, p. 198) 
 
And yet, many of these leaders did keep track, and with poignant words they recall events 
of lost comrades and reactions both at the time and afterwards.  Major General (Ret.) 
Milnor James Roberts was the Aide de Camp to the V Corps Commander, Major General 
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Leonard Gerow, during the landing. He recalls this memory, one that is like many others 
that occurred during the Battle: 
 
On the way across, I was chatting with another fellow who was my age, 
same rank, both captains, and both training in the military and civilian 
background.  We were like two peas in a pod, really.  I had known him 
before.  We had a nice conversation.  On D-Day Plus One, I had to go 
back to the beach, I don't recall what for.  They had not policed up the 
bodies.  I accomplished whatever mission it was, but then I ran across the 
corpse of this officer I was telling you about.  I just happened to see him.  
He was lying down dead, a hole in the middle of his head.  His crossed 
rifles were still on the shirt, his captain’s bars were still on there.  He's 
there, and I'm here, and I really got shaken up over that one.  Five years 
later, I got in touch with, this guy’s family. He had gone through ROTC at 
the University of Maryland.  I was able to then identify his family, so I got 
in touch with them.  I had been with their son (inaudible).  That was an 
instant I’ll never forget (Roberts, p. 207). 
 
 Major General Roberts carried the memories of his friend for five years until he 
was able to discharge his duty to his friend by locating his family and perhaps giving 
them a small amount of peace by saying he had been there with him, he knew him, and 
most importantly, remembered him. It is no small wonder that this man became a General 
Officer.  He had the attributes of loyalty and duty, and he felt the compelling need to do 
this unrequested task, to somehow bring peace to the man and his family.  MG Roberts 
also shows a level of humility, acknowledging the debt he felt, and the responsibility to 
keep a self- imposed contract with a friend. MG Roberts went on to become Chief of 
Staff of the Army Reserve from 1971to 1975.  Certainly, it is no surprise that a man with 
attributes such as these would have gone on to such an important position.  
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 Ray Tolleson of Company A, 2nd Ranger Battalion was introduced in an earlier 
section.  He was wounded on the way in to the beach. Fortunately for him, he was saved 
due to the fast thinking of a comrade.  This part of the account continues his recollection 
of that event.  Here, he describes how forty years later, the two met up again.  Tolleson, 
had been injured about150 yards from the shore, and his friend Bill Dounows patched 
him up while still on the beach, but he then had to continue on, never knowing whether 
Tolleson had survived or not. Tolleson recalls:  
A great thing happened to me, and we had a reunion in San Diego in the 
1980’s and we registered for each of the Companies… anyway, here I am 
at this reunion and he was so excited because when he left me there he 
never dreamt that I would survive and the shock was such that I didn’t 
know that it was even him that did it (Tolleson, p. 268). 
 
Somewhere in their minds, the information was being categorized at an incredible 
rate while the action was going on around them:   
Well my pathfinder team, there was only 9 of us, actually assembled, 2 of 
those guys were 504 men, that means only 7 were actually together on hill 
30.  The other guys where Nickleson was, the other half of the stick most 
of those guys were all killed, one of them wasn’t killed until a few days 
later. He was shot, {and} he fell in the water and drowned before they 
could pull him out.  That was Walter Harrelson, he was on our pathfinder 
team from H company.  He drowned.12  (Lamoureux, p. 131). 
 
 These kinds of details were present in nearly every lengthy account in the group 
studied:  A quick recollection of those who were present, the circumstances, and then the 
                                                 
12
 Although the Airborne units landed inland there were a number of drowning because the Germans had 
taken the pre-caution to flood the flatlands in and around various potential drop zones.  The Merderet River 
was close to Ste. Mere Eglise, and many 82nd Airborne troopers, loaded down with gear perished there. 
(Zabecki, 2009) 
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actions of the individual himself.  Sixty years after the fact, the memories of the men they 
fought with were still as vivid in their minds as they were the day the events occurred.   
 Others carried their responsibilities for their comrades for many years until other 
pieces of information became available.  Once receiving such information, they acted, 
just as Francis Lamoureux, from the 82d Airborne did: 
 
One of the guys, he was probably number 12 on the stick, he was from I 
company, his name was Ralph Nickleson, from Nasheville, Iowa.  He was 
only about 20 years old, young fellow, I was 24 when I jumped into 
Normandy.  He was carrying a land mine, and as soon as his chute popped 
open, and when mine opened I went through about 2 or 3 oscillations and I 
was on the ground, that’s how low we were.  We were really low, and we 
practiced 500 feet in England, but I think this was a little less than 500 
feet.  But Nickleson got hit by small arms fire, mine went off and he was 
dead before he hit the ground.  In 1987 I was in Texas, El Paso, we had a 
reunion, and there was a letter handed to me, his sister had written a letter 
to the 82nd airborne, and from the 82nd went to about 3 or 4 or 5 hands, 
and asking if anyone knew, and she had heard that the 82nd was having a 
reunion in El Paso, Texas and she thought she could find someone who 
knew her brother, and who could tell her how he died, what happened to 
him, how he got killed.  His body was brought back to the states and 
buried in the family plot in Nashville Iowa, but they never knew what 
happened.  Of course the military escort came with the body, but they 
couldn’t tell them anything.  So the letter reached me, because I was the 
only guy who knew him, knew he was a pathfinder.  So when I got home, 
I called her and told her the whole story, and a lot more.  She came to see 
me that Christmas and she stayed the weekend with me, and she still likes 
me because I told her all the good things about her brother.  I told her he 
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was killed instantly before he knew it.  They never knew, but they were 
glad to know it (Lamoureux, p. 128). 
  
This happened many years after the War, yet his duty was clear to Lamoureux.  
Out of the multitude of events and experiences from D-day onwards, Lamoureux 
remembered his friend and the circumstances of his death.   He found the man’s sister 
and was able to provide closure to the chapter of his life that had not been there.  His act 
of compassion was another dimension of his overall composition as a leader.  An 
observation can be made here that this came from within; it was part of his character, just 
as it was part of the character of many of the other leaders and survivors who made 
similar efforts to close chapters for other comrades.  
 Sixty years after the fact, the memories of the men they fought with were still as 
vivid in their minds as they were the day the events occurred.  Ralph “Doc” Widener still 
remembered Peter Weitkus, a medic from Texas who saved countless lives: 
 
I: I was asking Doc here about the, some of the casualties that took place. I 
wanted to know, were there significant amount of medics available and 
triage available there on the beach area? 
 
W: Peter Weitk, W-E-I-T-K US was {a medic who}was with the parts 
company. He was killed that day but he saved a lot of lives. 
 
I: Do you know if he was ever put in for an award or anything? 
 
W: Uhhh, I don’t know. I really don’t know. 
 
I: Okay, well that’s something I can check on. 
 
W: Yea, you sure can. W-E-I-T-K US Peter. 
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I: Peter. Do you know maybe where he was from? United States? 
 
W: He was from, I believe, Fort Worth, Texas. 
 
I: So, Peter probably did a lot of triage bandaging, bullet holes. 
 
W: I remember him attending to a lot of soldiers who had been wounded 
pretty seriously. And he himself was killed later in the day. 
 
I: So he was exposed to fire. 
 
W: Right. 
 
I: On numerous occasions probably. 
 
W: Right. Correct. 
 
I: They lost a lot of medics here on D-Day.  
 
 
Widener was never able to track down Weitkus’ family, but he never forgot the 
heroism and actions of the man.  As a fellow medic and leader, he carried a bit of Peter 
Weitkus with him and still rendered him honor, sixty years later.  The action of 
remembering someone may not be so unusual, but with all of the other people, events and 
actions of the previous sixty years to have passed by and to still remember is a credit to 
the actions of Weitkus, as well as to Widener, who speaks so highly of him.  Widener13 
cements the presence of this trait of loyalty and duty by relating this anecdote: 
 
W: I’ll tell you one interesting thing, when I did go ashore, the guy I was 
right next to, Paul Level, Paul Levelent. We were, we were going up 
the beach basically and I suddenly disappeared from view. I got into a 
                                                 
13
 Both Widener’s and Tolleson’s accounts were used as examples in the methodology chapter.  However, 
their accounts were not integrated into the work. They were simply examples of how the process was 
conducted to collect the data used in our analysis. Their accounts are integrated here, along with the rest of 
the study samples. I chose to keep their accounts here because they are compelling and add to the chapter 
analysis. 
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ruttle. A ruttle is anything a depression in the sand from anywhere 
from a couple of inches up to six or eight feet. I fell inside that thing 
and I was completely covered. And he, he jerked me up. 
 
I: Were you under water? 
 
W: Uh-huh. Completely. I had a rifle too, even though I was a linguist in 
the sense. And then I, he jerked me up and then I grabbed him and 
thanked him and two seconds later, three seconds later, he had his head 
taken off his body by German machine gun fire. And he died instantly. 
 
I: He may have saved your life. 
 
W: He saved my life, definitely!  
 
I: Have you ever met his family? 
 
W: Yes I did. I went to see them. Toughest thing in the world to go and 
talk to a family. 
 
I: I bet you they were pretty moved by your, by your…. 
 
W: Well, I remember his mother put her arms around me and said I 
appreciate your coming by. 
 
I: That must have been a tough, tough thing to do (Widener, p. 286). 
  
Ralph Widener was a leader at D-Day, and he continued to be a leader afterwards.  
An additional footnote to add about him here is that he actually went through basic 
training again at Fort Benning in the 1980’s and became a regular fixture to the training 
companies there.  He had been involved in 66 consecutive training cycles inspiring young 
soldiers with his dramatic accounts on leadership in battle, at the time of the interview.  
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Not every leader was able to rise to the occasion. Some were overcome by the 
events.  Ray Tolleson mentions what happened to one officer from his unit: 
 
An officer of mine that I don’t like to say it, but the shock of the things got 
to him, and he was out of it. I tried to--I don’t know how many hours I 
was out of it there (Tolleson, p. 265). 
 
Tolleson himself was overwhelmed by the combination of morphine, wounds and battle: 
 
And he gave me a shot of morphine and that also was comforting. So from 
that end I was able to make my way floating and so forth then with the tide 
and the waves and that eventually I reached the beach, and I ran into to 
other men from my company, a Jim Slagel (Schlagel?), who had died a 
few years ago. He was there and he had been hit in the back and he was 
paralyzed, and there was another fellow by the name of Joe Daniels. He 
was just full of holes floating around there and he didn’t last. He died 
there, and there were others (Tolleson, p. 265). 
 
Tolleson continues his account, illustrating the whole experience of being wounded in the 
middle of the fight on the beach and making his way to an aid station: 
I: So you eventually passed out? 
 
T: Yes, that morphine and whatever happens, eventually I woke up and 
someone said there was a medical station up a ways and I was going to try 
and walk up the beach but I didn’t have any strength. That sand was too 
much for me. And what was the weird thing, a tank was around there, and 
we sure didn’t have tanks before, but there was one and the guy tried to 
drag me up onto the tank he was going up there, but by that time he had 
attracted too much attention from the Eighty-Eights and mortars and all 
that, so he told me to get out, and so I slid off. And so from there I walked 
up I couldn’t stand in the sand on the middle of the road, feeling that 
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nobody would waste a round on me anyway and I got up to the medical 
station and I was there for the rest of the day. Sometime during the 
evening I got out. They took me out to a ship and I was on an LST 
(Landing Ship Tank) and in bad shape (Tolleson, p. 265). 
 
 
Rebels Make Good Leaders 
 
One of the recurring themes in many of the accounts is the emergence of the rebel 
streak in many leaders.  A rebel streak is not attained in a classroom.  In all of the 
accounts discussed, it surfaced when no other option was available.  For example, the 
earlier account of Samuel Lence is not an isolated event. While not every dispute resulted 
in a fist fight, these leaders were willing to risk even court martial when it came to doing 
what they felt was necessary. In the following section we describe incidents of 
disobeying orders from officers, improperly obtaining and using equipment, or using 
personnel in ways that were not strictly by the book.   
Medic Tom Scanlon got into trouble on a couple of occasions and was nearly 
court marshaled for ignoring orders, interfering with a mortar attack and feeding German 
prisoners.  Scanlon is an outstanding example of so many of the heroes in the group 
studied. He is candid and frank, and does what he has to do to discharge his duties.  
Scanlon explains: 
During the time I got the Bronze Star, the enemy had a mortar set up in a 
house.  It was set up in a door way.  We put one shell in there. If you did 
hit them, all you could do was hit them in the arm with fallout from the 
walls.  They had machine guns covering the one gate to get in there. They 
had crossfire coming in there, and that is why we had so many wounded.  
The guys trying to get over the hedge rows were getting hit.  The 
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lieutenant that was there comes over on the radio and says he’ll direct fire 
into that house.  He then calls in and drops that artillery right on top of us.  
I was screaming cease fire on the radio because we were right next to the 
house. They stopped and then another lieutenant come over, a mortar 
lieutenant, who was the guy that ran the mortars, and he said he’ll call it 
in. He called for fire.  They wouldn’t fire and said to him “you goofed.”  
He said he was on target, and that he was the mortar lieutenant and he 
finally got them to fire.  He took me back to Major O’Malley and he said 
I’m going to Court Martial you.  The major asked what I had done. I 
began telling what happened and I was loud. The lieutenant said “I’m 
going to do submit this soldier for Courts Martial. Major O’Malley told 
him, “Stay alive as long as this man has, doing what he is doing, and you 
will be fine.  Now get out of here, you’re not going to Court Martial 
anybody!”  Then he said to me, “Scanlon, stay away from him.”  I replied 
to the major “He nearly killed us, Sir” (Scanlon, p. 221). 
 
Scanlon showed incredible courage and strength of character in taking on the 
lieutenant and pushing the issue to get the mortar attacks stopped right in the middle of 
the fight.  If he had been wrong, he would have faced severe consequences, and even if 
he was right, would the senior officer take his word over the lieutenant’s? Scanlon 
continued to ride that rebellious streak when he was taking care of wounded soldiers: 
It took us 24 days to get to Schoenberg.    The lieutenant was going to dig 
in his mortars.  We got in a lot of shell fire there.  We had a bunch of 
wounded there and we had about 10 enemy soldier prisoners.  I told him 
they were mine and I was using them and he asked why.  I told him it was 
to carry our wounded guys out, and they did.  When we got back, when we 
got them all out, those guys had on over coats. They were soaked through 
them. I didn’t stop because I couldn’t stop. I told the lieutenant to give 
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them K rations and some water.  He said “We don’t feed the enemy.”  
Regardless of his position, we did give them food and water, otherwise 
they wouldn’t have eaten at all (Scanlon, p. 222). 
 
 Scanlon overrode what his lieutenant said and did the right thing by taking care of 
the prisoners. He also was practical by putting the prisoners to work to help with the 
wounded.  His pragmatism and dedication to his mission over rode the conventions of 
rank or place. Tom Scanlon performed as a leader should- he did what was required to do 
his job and take care of his soldiers.  Scanlon often had a very broad way of interpreting 
instructions and permission while he was out doing his job as a medic: 
I had a real run in with a Colonel once while trying to save soldiers who 
were wounded. It was in Germany.  We had 10 litter bearers and we had to 
go and get the wounded out.  He was down in a gully in a jeep and he told 
me to stay down there with him.  He asked where my litter bearers were.  I 
said they were down by the river water. He told me to go get them so I can 
count them. I replied that I will leave them where they are. He said that I 
could take any vehicle I needed to get the wounded out, and his jeep driver 
heard him make that statement.  He kept on telling me to bring them over 
to our position.  Finally I got teed at him and called him every name in the 
book.  The artillery observer, CPT Rosen told me you are going to get 
twenty years in Leavenworth.  I took his jeep that had a big radio in it. I 
told the radio guy to get out.  He refused.  I reminded him what the colonel 
said about getting the wounded out and took the jeep anyway.  When the 
colonel came back for his jeep, the radio man was sitting there with his 
radio.  He asked where his jeep was and his radioman replied that the 
medic took it.  They had one other jeep there that got stuck in the mud, 
and a tank went to pull him out and the mud came right over the jeep and 
the driver. 
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Later on, I saw that colonel in the Huertgen Forest when he cracked up. I 
asked him if he remembered me.  He said “I will never forget you.”  But 
you know, he never said a word about our first encounter.  All that cussing 
at him before, and I never heard a word about it. He could have sent me to 
Courts Martial, but he didn’t (Scanlon, p. 232). 
 
 Other situations brought out something akin to a rebellious streak, but it was more 
of a commentary on the leadership at the time.  One disgusted junior officer, Raymond 
Mason, had this to say about poor leadership during the Battle of the Bulge. He did not 
mince his words when he spoke to his battalion commander: 
Coming back down, we are all heroes, but we are not always heroes. We 
found an entire battalion of 155 mil howitzers abandoned in a field with its 
prime movers. The soldiers, the artillery men were all down the road 
gathered together in a field.  I had our people drag some of the guns loose 
that were stuck. It was a sickening thing for an artilleryman to see.  
 
When the battalion commander came out on the road and asked how the 
fire fight was going up the road where we had just come from, I told him, 
with all the sarcasm that I could muster that there was no fire fight. To get 
back there and recover his guns and they were all loose and ready to go. 
He left ammunition, sights, firing locks. They just abandoned everything, 
and bugged out. It was a “bad news” thing. As an artillery man I hate to 
report that but it happened (Mason, p. 150). 
  
The way that Mason makes the phrase, “We are all heroes, but we are not always 
heroes,” is a striking self-admission and revelation of the soldier and leader. Such times 
required leaders to be rebels occasionally, not necessarily to be heroes, but to get the 
mission done. 
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 Sometimes it was not only the NCO’s and Junior Officers who were rebels.  
Although senior leaders will be discussed in a later section, it is appropriate to recall the 
anecdote from the accounts of Louis Happle and Gordon Howell, (first introduced in 
Chapter 3, Part V.) who served together in the Navy and were present to take in wounded 
soldiers.  The example of when the Colonel pulled up to a gangway with a wounded 
soldier whom he was putting in for a Medal of Honor left a permanent impression on the 
men of a truly caring leader. His words, at the gangway, recalled by Gordon Howell, sum 
up how this leader felt about his soldier and to what lengths he would go to take care of 
him, “And the colonel replies, “Young man, let me tell you something -I have a wounded 
man here that I am putting in for the Medal of Honor, and I don’t want to hear anything 
about gang weighs, and I want him brought up there right now! (Happle, L. & Howell, 
G., p. 111)”” 
 
 This exchange shows that even the highest ranking officers had to sometimes 
fight the system in order for the right thing to get done.  In this case, the leader went to 
extraordinary lengths to see that the soldier he was putting in for the Medal of Honor 
would receive the quickest available care. 
  
 
First Line Leader Observations- Summary 
Although many leaders acted with courage and decisiveness, as well as other 
important leadership skills necessary in battle, there were some who did not.  Overall, 
however, the weight of the accounts demonstrates that first line leaders at D-Day 
possessed a composite personality with many attributes: ability to stay calm under 
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pressure, ability to empathize with others, ability to stand up for their men, loyalty to 
their men and their duties, ability to take in and process information and make sound 
decisions.  They did not forget those who went into battle with them nor did they forget 
their families, often delaying their own peace of mind to bring peace of mind to those 
who had lost their loved ones, even if it was years later.   
Throughout this chapter, we have examined many examples of leadership that 
emerged among first line leaders during the D-Day Invasion, as well as afterwards.   The 
composite picture that emerges is a leader who was diligent to his duties, loyal to his 
troops, compassionate, and at times rebellious when the mission called for it.  We have 
seen that leadership at the first line level is not necessarily the realm of either the enlisted 
soldier or the officer.   
There were many examples of lieutenants showing maturity and leadership that 
contrasts to some thinking and stereotyping of today’s lieutenants.  Looking back on my 
own lieutenant days and up to the present, the lieutenants have been perhaps underrated 
and put down, often being the butt of jokes, and typically being viewed as lost and 
clueless.  The examination of these accounts shows that the lieutenants of WWII carried 
themselves with honor and courage and demonstrated exceptional leadership.  There is a 
lesson in this observation: we need to re-examine how lieutenants and junior leaders are 
treated and empowered.  Likewise, the majority of accounts speak positively of the 
captains and company commanders who led these men. This was not quite so 
unexpected, but their fascinating accounts of leadership painted a fuller picture of what 
leadership on the battlefield is.  The observations of how the non-commissioned officers 
who made up the squad leaders and platoon sergeants went to incredible lengths to get 
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the mission done also brought a depth to what the study of emergent leadership involves.  
The question of why they did what they did has been partially answered in this chapter. 
They acted because they felt an intrinsic need to look out for those who followed them.  
They felt an obligation to see the mission through because they knew there was no other 
choice once they hit the beach or jumped from the plane. They acted out of loyalty, duty, 
and self-resolve for their cause, their country, but mostly for their soldiers. 
  This chapter focused on how first line leaders led their troops in direct roles.  In 
the next two chapters we will look at the impact of officers senior leaders and how their 
pattern of leadership at D-Day and beyond inspired their soldiers to perform and win 
under harsh conditions, difficult odds, and sometimes at any cost.  
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CHAPTER 11 
PERCEPTIONS OF OFFICERS BY ENLISTED SOLDIERS 
  
We discussed observations of first line leaders in the previous chapter.  These 
leaders were primarily at the Company Grade (rank of lieutenant and captain) and below.  
Among the observations made was that contrary to many perceptions, even one 
interviewer for example, soldiers’ perceptions of officers were generally very favorable.  
We noted there were some exceptions to this, but overall the group was solidly positive in 
their views of their officers.  Additional empirical research showed that this qualitative 
analysis is in line with the quantitative analysis done by the Army, published in the 
Stouffer (1949) study. 
 The examples given in our study portrayed caring leaders who were on point with 
their soldiers.  Most of the group studied was in the combat arms, and all soldiers of front 
line deployed units.  The data from the Military studies shows that soldiers who were in 
units that were not deployed or whose leaders did not serve alongside them, were less 
likely to display these same traits, and were less respected by their men (Stouffer et al., 
1949).   
According  to Studies in Social Psychology in World War II,  (Stouffer et al., 
1949, Chap.5, pp. 363-429) attitudes about leaders in World War II had several phases 
and parallels.  In the initial phase of the war, there was a generally favorable attitude 
about the Army.  As the length of time in the Army service increased, there was a 
generally decreasing percentage among all ranks in positive attitudes held towards the 
organization.  Correspondingly, there was a similar trend among enlisted and non-
 162 
 
commissioned officers towards officers as the war progressed.  Although the authors 
stressed it was not a causal relationship, it does show that a level of disillusionment about 
the organization and its policies as whole increased over time.  The attitudinal trend 
among soldiers who were nearer the fighting action generally reflected more favorable 
attitudes towards officers than among those who were in units away from the fighting.  
This was most strongly reflected among combat arms soldiers surveyed (see Table 2), 
who showed up to a 20% higher  rating for officers being willing to go through anything 
they had to go through, as well as for the level of personal interest in the soldiers 
themselves.   The table below reflects this observation: 
 
Table  2. Attitudes toward Officers among Troops in the European Theater (percentages 
Responding “All or Most”)  
 
 
(From Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Stouffer et al., 1949, Chap. 5, 
p.366) 
 
The fact that the men at D-Day were certainly in the front lines and were led by 
officers who had  to share the same burdens, hardships, and dangers as they did validates 
 
How many of the officers in your 
present outfit are the kind who are 
willing to go through anything they 
make their men go through? 
 
How many of the officers in your 
present outfit take a personal interest 
in the welfare of the men? 
 Noncoms Privates Noncoms Privates 
Infantry rifle and 
heavy weapons 
companies 
 
 
63% 
 
70% 
 
60% 
 
61% 
Other field force 
units 
 
 
52% 
 
58% 
 
56% 
 
 
52% 
Communications 
Zone troops 
 
 
43% 
 
51% 
 
51% 
 
 
44% 
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the observations of both the survey conducted in April of 1945 and those of the accounts 
in our study.  This also gives further validity to what the men have to say about their 
leaders as well as lessens the likelihood that they may have embellished or softened their 
opinions over time since it correlates closely to the quantitative study results. 
The military study by Stouffer showed that, overall, the opinion of enlisted and 
NCOs who viewed officers unfavorably outnumbered that of those who viewed them 
favorably.  But among combat units this was not the case.  Indeed, in our study, most 
comments indicate the opposite. The data indicates that a good reason for this may be that 
of the men who were on the front lines, most were combat arms and were members of 
units with high esprit de corps.  These factors played into their favorable attitudes about 
their leadership. The discipline, training and challenge of many of the units, coupled with 
the tone set by the leaders of such units, added to the favorable attitudes.   
The Stouffer survey points out that those who were not in front line units as well 
as those who were not combat arms had a less favorable attitude in general about their 
officers.  These soldiers made up the majority of the army, as there was a long trail of 
jobs that had to be done to provide for the infantryman, tanker, and artilleryman who 
made up the bulk of the front line units in the fight. Thus, despite the hardship and rigors 
faced by units in combat, there seems to be a bonding effect towards leaders, who had to 
rise to the occasion and perform more efficiently as leaders, most likely due to the austere 
and challenging circumstances. 
 A good example of this more favorable attitude towards their officers was given 
by Harry Brown of 2nd ID.  Brown was in the engineers, not the infantry, but they were 
 164 
 
on the front lines.  His unit had fewer NCOs, and he was inspired by the leadership of his 
lieutenant: 
 
B:  I’d say not counting the 3rd replacement depot, with the 2nd infantry 
division the leadership could not be any better…Well, I’m a private, and 
I’ve been a private and I went into the 2nd infantry and there were four 
privates.  And engineers are not by organization are not prone to be loaded 
too heavy with noncoms there are usually a lot of privates and PFCs a lot 
of tech T’s not too many line infantry type (Brown, pg. 14). 
  
Signalman 2nd Class Clifford Goodall of the U.S. Navy gave his impression of 
one officer from the Engineer Branch. During this time he was with the 29th Infantry 
Division.  Soon after D-Day there was a major storm that caused significant damage to 
the beach landing area. He describes the storm and the amount of energy the captain put 
into his job working to clear the harbor so ships could come in: 
That was the most awful thing I think I have seen, the piling (up) of ships 
was just, you can’t believe the mess that thing (storm) had left.  So that 
particular period I was working with a captain, I believe he was with the 
149th Combat Engineers his name was Capt. Hanen (Hannen?--ARK).  He 
was a real dynamo.  What we would do sometimes is blow up just to get 
an area open so you could bring in the ships, but during that whole period 
we really couldn’t do much.  The storm was just too bad (Goodall, pg 95). 
  
  
Tom “Doc” Scanlon, whose exploits were discussed in the earlier section on first 
line leaders, related how his commander would not support him for a pass to see his 
brother, who had been wounded over the skies of France.  Scanlon, who had a reputation 
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for being a rebel when necessary, was given the pass through the efforts of the chaplain. 
Scanlon’s brother was on a B-17 and was shot down over Paris.  He was rescued by a 
young French girl who helped him get to a hospital for surgery. Scanlon describes his 
brother’s wound as “being a hole so big he could see his heart beat (Scanlon, p. 224).”  
Scanlon told his commander he needed a three day pass to London.  His commander was 
a doctor in the aid station where he worked. He turned down his request:   
So I went back in the hut and cut my stripes off and went back in there and 
threw them on the floor.  I respectfully declared that I was going to go 
around you and I want you to reduce me to the rank of PVT of my own 
volition.  I told him I am going to see my brother anyway. A military 
Chaplain finally got me that pass.  He said I had better be back by six 
o’clock in the morning of the third morning.  I assured him I will find out 
what I needed to know, and then I’ll be right back.  Looking back, it seems 
I was a rebel all the time I was in the Army. Sometimes I really had to be 
to save lives (Scanlon, p. 224). 
 
 As a leader, Scanlon was willing to give up his position so he could go to see his 
brother.  He showed guts and determination, as well as a combination of stubbornness 
and rebelliousness.  His commander may have had reason to deny the pass, but perhaps a 
more compassionate decision would have been better.  In the end, the chaplain played the 
key leadership role for helping Scanlon to get the pass.  
  
 These examples from different branches of service show that many officers who 
were on the front lines understood what was important in leading their soldier, airman, or 
sailor.  Each example was different, but each provides a snapshot of a certain quality 
brought out by the realities of war.  In Brown’s case, his leader was competent, confident 
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and provided a reassurance to his men, most of whom were privates and PFCs.  In 
Goodall’s case, the Engineer Captain he remembered was a real dynamo, someone who 
clearly had drive and the ability to get the mission done in very difficult circumstances.  
Finally, we see Doc Scanlon, whose commander did not see the need for a pass. 
However, his chaplain did see it and demonstrated effective and compassionate 
leadership, using his moral authority as chaplain to get the pass for him to visit his 
wounded brother. 
 This compassion and understanding was a trademark trait that showed up several 
times in the accounts.  It must be said that the officers were not clairvoyant, but once they 
saw an issue, they often did the right thing for the soldier, even if it was a little bit outside 
regulations. 
The 82nd’s Daryle Whitfield’s father was busy setting up a Post Office for the 
Navy in Casablanca during the North Africa Campaign.  He took matters into his own 
hands to go and see his father, and instead of ending up in the stockade, a wise, caring 
and understanding leader let him officially go visit: 
{my}calling to duty began when my dad sailed overseas on U.S.S. George 
Washington.  He was at Casablanca in the Navy setting up a Post Office in 
that area.   Early on during my time overseas, I jumped the fence to try and 
visit my father as I didn’t believe I would have been allowed to otherwise.  
He put me in a jeep and I returned to my company. I later on got a 3-day 
pass to have a good visit with dad (Whitfield, pg 274).   
 
 Whitfield’s commander must have made the right choice in how he dealt with 
him, because Daryl Whitfield went on to be wounded three times in one battle, and 
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served in other campaigns beyond Normandy, including Market Garden and the Battle of 
the Bulge. 
 
 
Further Perceptions of Officers in Action 
 
 Another aspect of officers in action is seen from the following extracts of data 
from the Stouffer study (1949).  In Table 3, 188 enlisted soldiers were asked to recall 
their experiences with officers who they thought did a particularly good job.  The group 
was from soldiers who had served in the Mediterranean theater.  One hundred forty-four 
soldiers answered the question. Comments about officers who displayed courage, 
encouraged men, and showed concern for them were among the most frequently 
mentioned of the group. 
 
Table 3.  Characteristics Displayed by Officers Reported by Veteran Infantrymen in 
Mediterranean, April 1944 (reported as percentages of comments in each 
category)   
(From Stouffer et al., 1949, VOL 2, Chapter 3, p.125) 
 
In Table 4, interviews of soldiers of all ranks were conducted in three groups 
numbering 260 for enlisted, 414 for noncommissioned officers, and 75 for officers.  Their 
 Percentage 
Led by example; did dangerous things himself, displayed personal 
courage and coolness 
 
 
31% 
Encouraged men; gave pep talks, joked, passed on information 
 
26% 
Showed active concern for welfare and safety of men 
 
23% 
Showed informal, friendly attitude; worked along with me 
 
5% 
Miscellaneous or unclassifiable  
 
15% 
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answers and comments relate an interesting picture of the differences between junior, 
inexperienced soldiers and older, more seasoned NCOs and officers.  It is important to 
note that while younger inexperienced soldiers regarded courage and aggressiveness as 
premium skills, the more experienced soldiers and officers placed other attributes, such as 
knowledge and job performance, and leadership ability and practices at a much higher 
level of importance.  The first set of attributes mentioned - courage and aggressiveness - 
correlates with the same level of importance as in Table 3, but that table does not disclose 
information on leadership and practices, whereas this one does.  The more diverse group 
brought out this aspect of leadership, and suggests that more developed leaders recognize 
the importance of leadership ability and practices over both courage and knowledge and 
job performance. 
Table 4 is an expanded breakdown of Table 3.  It provides more information on 
what comprised the statements that were combined to form the generalized observations 
in Table 3.  This is included to show the broad aspects of the variance within the general 
leadership attributes identified.   Due to the quantitative nature of the Stouffer studies, it 
is helpful to include this portion to show more texture to the interpretation of the data. 
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Table 4.  Characteristics Displayed by Officers Reported by Rank of Veteran 
Infantrymen in Mediterranean, April 1944 (reported as percentages of 
comments in each category)  
 
 Percentage of Comments Mentioning 
Each Characteristic 
 
 PVT/PFC NONCOM OFFICER 
 
Courage and aggressiveness 59% 42% 30% 
Fearless, brave, cool, “had guts,”      
disregarded personal safety 
 
46% 35% 21% 
Displayed aggressiveness and initiative 13% 7% 9% 
Knowledge/adequate performance of 
job 
28% 19% 13% 
Knew what to do and did job 
well 
19% 9% 3% 
Observant; alert; excellent on 
scouting and patrol work 
6% -  - 
Carried out orders to the letter     3% - - 
Used good judgment, common 
sense; good planner 
- 10% 10% 
    
Leadership ability and practices 8% 33% 56% 
Leadership ability and 
miscellaneous leadership 
practices 
2% 13% 14% 
Helped other men; took personal 
interest in them and their 
problems 
3% 10% 24% 
Led by personal example; 
always with men in combat 
- 9% 18% 
Cheered men by humorous 
remarks 
 
3% 1% - 
Miscellaneous or irrelevant 
 
5% 6% 1% 
Number of comments  
    
N=260 N=414 N=75 
       (From Stouffer et al., 1949, VOL 2, Chapter 3, p.125) 
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Summary 
The data from the Official Government Surveys from the Stouffer volumes 
showed that highly thought of leaders led by example, faced danger, led the way through 
personal courage and acts.  Additionally, the leader was someone who encouraged his 
men, gave pep talks, and passed information. The third most frequent actions of leaders 
that enhanced their standing were when they showed active concern for the welfare and 
safety of the men. The study data clearly shows that the higher level of maturity and 
experience in both NCOs and officers correlated to a change in the perceived importance 
of various aspects of leadership.   This study was only one of many that were conducted 
in the multi volume work of the Stouffer group.  However, it adds an additional 
validation of many of the observations discussed in the current study, particularly in 
relation to the perceptions of the first line and senior leaders. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE SENIOR LEADERS 
  
Introduction 
 
 There were many leaders who were both famous and infamous during the war.  
Countless articles, movies and books have been written about many of the well known 
ones. It does not take a student of history to be familiar with names like Patton, 
Eisenhower, Bradley, Montgomery, and De Gaulle.  Other well known leaders from D-
Day specifically included men like Lieutenant Colonel James E.  Rudder, Commander of 
the 2nd Ranger Regiment, and Brigadier General Teddy Roosevelt, Jr., son of a President 
and Medal of Honor recipient.  In this chapter we will look at some of these men and 
their leadership through the lenses of the men who followed them, observed them, and 
saw firsthand how they handled the leadership challenge of D-Day and beyond.  Their 
insight brings a new side to the story of these people made famous by their actions and 
participation at D-Day.  The composite archetypes we can draw about them shows that 
senior leadership is not in fact limited to a specific quadrant on a chart.  Each of the 
officers presented in this section measures up differently in the descriptions of them. No 
one of them is alike.  This short, cursory look at these leaders who have been studied in 
depth by many others provides a basis of reflection when we consider the leadership traits 
of the first line leaders of D-Day.  
More importantly, the anecdotes from the accounts of the men who knew them 
and who interacted with them on a regular basis show important leadership dynamics.  
We will get the opportunity to look at the leadership traits that emerged among these 
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leaders during the heat of battle, under the strain of the grueling responsibility of the 
Campaign itself vice the experiences of the first line leaders.  When we look at these 
senior leaders, we may see some archetypical characteristics that may have been 
displayed in our review of the more junior, first line leaders.  When we look at the 
profiles of them painted by the men who were there, we are not simply looking at the 
regurgitated words of historians. We are looking at them from the perspective of the men 
who marched side by side with them, who experience their fears, pains, and triumphs. 
1. The other Roosevelt- Archetype 1 
FDR may have been the President, but to the men of the 4th Infantry Division, 
Teddy Roosevelt, Jr. held a special place in their heart.  Roosevelt was one of the last of 
his kind: A gentleman officer who hailed from another generation that seemed to feel a 
certain level of noblesse oblige that has become somewhat absent in our society today.  
The book AWOL: The unexcused absence of America’s upper classes from military 
service (Roth-Douquet, 2006) goes into detail about a precipitous drop in participation by 
the privileged of America in military life since the end of World War II.  Whether it has 
been due to ridding campuses such as Princeton and Harvard of ROTC, or an aversion to 
service, men like T.R, as those familiar with history have referred to him, are fewer and 
farther between today than at D-Day. 
One soldier from the 47th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, PVT John 
Roman recalls seeing Roosevelt at the beach and spoke of him in this way: 
I:  How did you feel about the leadership? 
 
R: Very good.  The man we always looked up to was Roosevelt, with his 
little cane. And we had a good commanding officer...there were many 
times this man was seen up in the front leading his men.  That’s what I 
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was always talking about with the soldiers, I seen him up there many a 
times. (Roman, p. 213). 
 
Roman speaks well of both Roosevelt and his commanding officer.  Both men 
were up front leading the way with their soldiers.   He looked up to them and felt 
confidence from them, and consequently managed to perform his mission and thus 
survive the fight. How much that re-assurance and confidence played a role in his own 
performance is not known, but the fact that he remembered both men and talked about 
them in this way suggests that there was an impact.  
Carl Cannon served in the 4th Infantry Division. He was there as the invasion 
unfolded and the troops began landing at Utah Beach.  When they arrived, this is what 
they experienced under the leadership of Brigadier General Roosevelt: 
I was still in the 4th Infantry Division on D-Day at Utah Beach. The 
landing was to the south and the stiff winds and the high waves pushed us 
1000 yards too far south. We knew from the briefings how our landing 
looked. General Roosevelt came in and the first thing he said was “This is 
the wrong place.”  
 
General Roosevelt talked to Colonel Johnson, Colonel Howell{and 
Colonel Van Fleet}, and suggested we withdraw, reload, and try and get to 
our designated landing point. Well, we ended up making our way in right 
where we landed. General Roosevelt had a walking stick in his right hand, 
and a 45 pistol in his left. He was directing all of us to get in to Sainte-
Mère-Église and we all thought he was the best. 14 
 
                                                 
14
 COL James Van Fleet was also in attendance. The meeting was held in a small crater on Utah Beach 
(Zabecki, 2009). 
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If anyone tells you they weren’t afraid, they were a damn liar or a damn 
fool. When we hit the beach with machine gun nests, pillboxes, and 
artillery facing us, and soldiers all around us were getting blown in half 
with body parts landing in the foxholes we took up positions in, we were 
all terrified (Cannon, p. 27).  
 
 Cannon portrays Roosevelt as a pragmatic man who understood the situation and 
who was willing to listen to the counsel of his advisors.  He does not say Roosevelt 
immediately made an order to do something.  His account shows a man who thought first, 
consulted, and then acted.  Cannon describes for us a leader given a curve ball who used 
a measured, mature response.  He did not panic, and he did not let the soldiers know if he 
was worried. He simply continued on with what had to be done.  After discussing the 
options, the unit proceeded and rather than being back on board some troop ship safely 
away from the action, General Roosevelt was in the thick of the action, walking stick in 
one hand, due to near crippling arthritic pain, and a .45 caliber pistol in the other.  His 
father, former President Theodore Roosevelt, would have been proud of him if he could 
have been there to observe him bridge the gap between common enlisted soldiers and 
himself as he inspired them to perform their missions.   Cannon gives a riveting picture of 
what they all faced with his description of the beach.  The fact that he describes 
Roosevelt as being in the thick of things and the impression he left in this particular 
anecdote speak to Roosevelt’s personal charisma and leadership under such conditions. 
 As mentioned earlier, Roosevelt was not a professional military man.  He had 
served in World War I, but his coolness under fire and leading soldiers reflected on what 
the ideals of his time called for in a gentleman warrior. He was almost a mythical figure 
come to life, representing the American gentry.  Even by World War II, such a breed was 
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vanishing, being supplanted by the incredible rate of accessions of ROTC and OCS 
graduates (Stouffer et al., 1949).  According to Stouffer, World War II saw a change in 
the attitudes about officership in general, especially in terms of the stratification and 
separation between officers and enlisted.  This two-volume study was published in 1949 
and taken from studies done throughout and immediately after the war.  It marks the 
changes that were realized by the time that I entered the military in 1992, and which are 
certainly evident in 2008.  Thus, Roosevelt was a man and a leader who worked with 
consideration for others and used empowering techniques before the buzzwords of 
situational leadership and other terms appeared in the lexicon of leadership.  Another 
example of this is given by 4th Infantry Division medic Tom Scanlon, whom we have 
already discussed and profiled.  In it, he references Roosevelt singing a ditty from the 
First World War, where he served in the 1st Infantry Division: 
 
 I saw Roosevelt in Val, he was with a soldier from H Company who was 
a WWI Veteran, and they were both drunk as skunks.  They were arm in 
arm singing “Madam Mazel” from Armatures.  Right after that he died of 
that heart attack.  I know where they said he was killed but they told us he 
died of a heart attack.  He was a good ole boy, walking with that stick cane 
and singing that “Madam Mazel” from Armatures. The soldiers would 
wave to him and talk with him.  They liked him.  He was a hell of a soldier 
(Scanlon, p. 223). 
 
Another of Roosevelt’s men of the 4th Infantry Division, Armand Torre, 
described the landing with Roosevelt: 
 
We stayed out on the water for a long time before we finally hit the beach. 
We really didn’t know what we were getting into. When the word came, 
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we just went over the side and got into the water. My regiment, the 12th 
Infantry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division went in third on the 6th of 
June 1944.  
 
Fellows were getting hit. General Roosevelt was our Division 
Commander15  and he was down there on the beach directing things and I 
admired him. We all did. When he died, it didn’t really effect what we had 
to do but we felt our loss of him (Torre, p. 267). 
 
He was a “hell of a soldier” and leader.  He had the ability to transcend rank and 
class and be one of the men; but at the same time he also had the other requisite traits 
needed by men who made the tough decisions. Not least important is the everlasting 
testimony to this remarkable that he had exactly the same number of military decorations 
as America 
Roosevelt’s inclusion here is not simply because he was mentioned, nor because 
he was the son of a famous President.  It was because he was a senior leader whose 
leadership traits emerged on the battlefield at the critical time and place and added to the 
momentum necessary to carry the day at Normandy. 
 
Roosevelt –Perceived Leadership Composite- Archetype 1 
 Thoughtful 
 Measured 
 Collaborative 
 Accessible 
 Respected 
                                                 
15
 Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. was in fact the Assistant Division Commander.  The 4th 
Infantry Division Commander was Major General Raymond Barton. 
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 Courageous 
 Human 
 
 
2.  Patton - The Rebel General- Archetype 2  
 
 There are many stereotypes and images of the American military leader; but few 
are more familiar than General George S. Patton.  Patton’s leadership style left an 
indelible mark on the military as well as wherever he went.  Patton is important to this 
study not only because his soldiers admired him and spoke of him, but also because he 
represents a prime example of one of the observations of emergent leadership- the rebel.  
While there are a lot of people today who use the phrase, “outside the box thinking,” the 
fact is that Patton and those like him did not simply think outside of the box, they took it 
to a new level and changed the box into a new form.  Many leaders thought outside the 
box and were successful. Many of them thought and acted within the box and were 
successful, as well.  Patton was like our first line leaders who pushed their parameters to 
the limit, sometimes crossing the line, but doing so in a way that made sense and 
ultimately was forgivable. Patton’s well known history is not perfect, and his men do not 
recall him through a rose-colored glass. However, ultimately they admired him for his 
flash, dash and desire to accomplish the mission, as well as his willingness to do what 
had to be done.  The theme of “we did what we had to do, we just kept going, someone 
had to do it, you just kept going,” all phrases found throughout the accounts, shows a 
dogged determination to get things done.   
 Patton was at the extreme end of that scale.  His leadership earned him great 
respect on the battlefield, and more importantly, his victories occurred through personal 
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presence and force of will.  Just as Teddy Roosevelt, Jr.’s, presence cheered and 
encouraged the men at Utah, so too did General Patton’s presence have an effect as a 
force multiplier for his men.  The contrast to this is that the Germans were absent their 
key general, Field Marshal Rommel, and so they were missing their own leader around 
whom to rally.  The breakout in Normandy occurred once the Allies finally let Patton 
loose.  His troops along with other American and Allied forces successfully battered their 
way through Northern France, successfully pushing the enemy back.  As a leader, he was 
willing to take the chances he felt were necessary to get the job done.  This resulted in 
overextending his lines and running out of fuel, but he somehow managed to get enough 
done to drive the German War machine further back and out of France.  Based on the 
accounts of the men who were there, Patton still came out of it all larger than life. 
         The tiny town of Dysina in the Czech Republic celebrates his final victory 
campaign each year. They commemorate the end of World War II with a day of speeches 
and remarks at the school named in his honor, under a statue of Patton that is as 
controversial as the man was himself.   I personally attended the dedication of the statue.  
It was originally commissioned by the Lord Mayor of the much larger and famous city of 
Pilzen, home of the original Pilsner brand of beer.  In the excitement of the post-cold war 
Czech Republic, it seems the Mayor forgot that the artist commissioned to do the statue 
was alleged to have been a former communist informer. Whether true or not, it created 
enough of an issue that the Mayor of the small town of Dysina, Madame Bousova, was 
able to get the statue moved to her little village, which was the furthest east that Patton 
and his Third Army were allowed to go.  Dysina boasts a second monument, one to 
Major General Ernest Harmon, who was also an area commander there.  But it was 
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General Patton who everyone came to see for the 60th Anniversary of the end of World 
War II in May 2005.  Third Army sent a color guard of soldiers.  At least two busloads of 
octogenarian veterans and their wives came to pay their respects.  The May weather had 
taken a turn for the worse, and a stiff breeze and light rain fell as the speeches from 
Czech dignitaries went on and on.  The small color guard stood firm and proud as the 
colors blew in the wind.  The representative from Third Army was COL William Kane, 
who was missing his daughter’s college graduation to represent the unit that Patton led.  
The most stirring thing of all was seeing the veterans all standing at attention at that 
moment. The sun managed to finally peek through the clouds just at the conclusion of the 
words of George Patton Waters and the unveiling of the statue.  It shone down for a few 
minutes on a gleaming bronze statue, larger than the larger than life Patton himself, and 
then was covered over by the clouds again.  Patton gazes longingly to the east to Prague, 
the city he was not allowed to take.  The Russians got that opportunity, and more than 60 
years later the inhabitants are still bitter, at least the many Czechs that I have met in my 
four trips to the region since then.   
          If it seems a bit too prosaic in this discussion of Patton, it is because one cannot 
discuss him in simple language.  I have had the good fortune to meet some of the men 
who were there with him and hear them tell their stories first hand.  I was privileged to 
meet his grandson as well.  Not surprisingly, the Veterans at D-Day mentioned him quite 
often, though he did not show until several weeks after the start of the Invasion.  He was 
part of the diversion that made the attack on Normandy so successful and added to the 
confusion of the Nazi High Command, as they expected him to lead the invasion.   
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          The accounts show that Patton was as real as the stories portrayed him.  The rebel 
first line leaders had a kindred spirit in Patton - he was one of them, except he was a 
General! It did not matter whether one was an infantryman or a pilot. Patton was present 
in the recollections of many of the veterans interviewed for this research. 
          Take, for example, Naval 2nd Lieutenant Frederick Crispin’s and Corporal Harry L. 
Browne’s experiences.  Their Normandy Campaign experiences involved ferrying troops 
to D-Day and afterwards providing supplies for Patton and his Army on the move: 
 
Crispin:  No, we left England. We started using the airstrip over here at 
Sainte-Mère-Église.  We were making missions to that temporary airfield 
for about two weeks, and then we were moved out of England about July 
to Allenthal.  Then we conducted missions resupplying Patton's 3rd Army 
with gears, socks, and K-rations (Crispin, p. 53). 
 
Browne added more detail with his remarks: 
 
Troop carriers did more than carry paratroopers and pull gliders. We 
hauled 55 gallon cans of gasoline and all kinds of supplies. We chased 
Patton’s Army with a lot of gasoline. We would land in cow pastures and 
Patton moved too fast for us to catch him at times, and our C-47 would 
have to get back in the air with all the gas still on board. Landing and 
taking off between those hedgerows was always a tough one.   
 
Patton would stop from time to time because he kept running out of gas 
and bullets. We would eventually catch up to him and he would give us 
wounded as we offloaded the things he needed. We lost two planes 
because they failed to clear a hedgerow and they went down with all their 
men and cargo (Browne, H., p. 20). 
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The 439th’s Phil Hecker and Alfred Lilja both described the demanding Patton as 
someone who also recognized his men for their hard work and efforts.  In one 
instance, they had been transporting hundreds of cans of gasoline to grass landing 
strips. This is Hecker’s vivid recollection: 
 
One day we returned to the base, and the crew chief opened the back door 
as I swung the airplane to park it. A 6X6 backed up and unloaded a case of 
Piper Heit champagne for each member of the crew and there were four of 
us. All that the driver said was “courtesy of General Patton.” The man had 
flash and dash. He may have had a bad reputation, but I think he was 
great. He did what had to be done (Hecker, p. 110). 
 
One would add to Hecker’s words that Patton not only was admired for his flash and 
dash; but also, and more importantly, he was admired for his skill and competence.   
Alfred Lilja was also the recipient of Patton’s gratitude:   
 
As the invasion grew into full swing during July, we would haul supplies 
and even gasoline for General Patton. General Patton was grateful in that 
he left us champagne and cognac (Lilja, p. 143). 
 
 Patton was anxious to move because he was trying to beat the German Army and 
cut it off before it could retreat to the next line of defense along the Rhine frontier.  
According to MG (Retired) Raymond Mason, the 4th Armored Division played a major 
role in the breakout at Perrier. The unit was re-directed to attack at Vanes, where a 
submarine base was located. The action was protested by the commanding officer, 
General Wood, but mason says that the famous slapping incident in Italy was still recent, 
and the general was unable to get the order changed: 
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We were ordered to attack toward Vanes and the submarine pens. No job 
at all for an armored division. General Wood protested to General Patton, 
and Patton agreed with him. But I read in history that Patton was worried 
about General Bradley because of that slapping incident in Italy. He didn’t 
want to argue with Bradley too much. Bradley would not let him change 
because the plan called for the armor division to attack toward the “pig 
pens.”  The U boats were behind all sorts of concrete and embankments 
and rapidly could shoot us up.  That didn’t make sense. We stopped and 
finally got turned around and chased the Germans across France.  
 
The 4th Armored Division led the Third Army in the middle and on the 
flanks. Patton was asked if he was worried about his flanks, but he was not 
worried about his flanks. He could take care of that and the fighter 
bombers helped him out (Mason, p. 149). 
 
Some of his men were aware of some of what was going on.  Others were surprised to 
later find out that they were also diversions in the plan, just as Patton himself had been a 
diversion prior to the invasion.  One example of this was recounted by T4 Sergeant 
Norman Schein of the 248th Engineer Battalion. He was set was one of thirty-sic recon 
teams that Patton had sent out to gather information for a move to the South. The only 
problem was, there was not going t be a move to the South, it was a deliberate ploy to 
mislead the enemy.  Schein, however, overcame the odds and actually made it back to his 
own lines: 
 
Patton came up with an idea.  He called in thirty-six recon teams of the 
Army.  My partner and I were selected to go.  A major general told us: 
"You men are going to do a vital bit of recon for us.  You are going to 
recon the southern part of France {along} the Brest peninsula.  We want to 
go down there and knock out that submarine base…” and they divided us 
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into thirty-six sectors and my partner and I got a sector.  When we left our 
company, we were told to bring water, gas, and food for at least ten days 
to two weeks... (Schein, p.225-226) 
 
Only fourteen of the recon teams made it back. The teams that were 
caught had information that the Germans used to make the decision to move their 
troops to the South. Instead, Patton took his forces and proceeded to move in 
another direction, along with other Allied units as they proceeded to close a pincer 
movement that surrounded the German Seventh Army at Falaise-Argenten 
(Zabecki, 1999). However, Schein was unaware of the plan, and may never have 
understood the role he played in it.  He was upset at how his life and that of his 
comrades had been endangered: 
 
…  Well we found out we were expendable…  I was pretty mad for quite 
awhile.  I understood his strategy, but we were smart enough to get out of 
it (Schein, pp. 226). 
 
 The results of Patton’s and the rest of the Allies’ efforts were to successfully 
liberate Normandy and Paris. 1st Lieutenant Robert Landis, of the 47th Infantry Regiment, 
recalls the event: 
 
 I very well remember the march…the 79th Division marched 130 miles by 
foot and rode 50 miles by truck in 72 hours. It was never done before and 
hasn’t been done since… they did it to put us in an area down there 
because we were supposed to be help liberate Paris… many of us believed 
then and still believe, that it was political, then De Gaulle went in and 
liberated Paris along with Patton and some of his tanks (Landis, p. 139). 
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Historians such as Ambrose debate whether Patton was right and should have 
been allowed to go forward with plans he had to cut off the German forces and punch 
through into Germany before they could re-group.  But General Eisenhower would not 
allow it to happen. Army GI Robert Tate of the 9th Infantry Division said that they went 
to St. Lo and from there they made a hole in the enemy line so that Patton’s tanks could 
get through and race across France. They did so until they ran short of fuel16: 
General Patton got his tanks through and raced across France. At times we 
would catch up with him but eventually he had to quit because he was 
short on gas (Tate, p. 262). 
 
Patton’s leadership showed up on the battlefield in ways that were different than 
leadership actions of other leaders are described. There was sense of urgency and 
competitiveness, combined with the rebelliousness that was part of his persona.  The 
soldiers recognized this, and were part of his machine that carried out operations- for 
better or for worse. He displayed gratitude towards those who helped to sustain his 
efforts, but he was not afraid to put men out as bait, for the good of the cause.   Such 
actions today might endure more scrutiny from the press and might have more 
ramifications, but during World War II, there was a lot at stake and decisions made then 
might not be made today. 
Perceived Leadership Composite of General Patton – Archetype 2 
 Competitive 
 Outside the box thinker 
                                                 
16
 Author’s note: Although lack of fuel was one of the ways that he was held back, and why the men in the 
accounts kept referring back to it, there were many other factors that went into Eisenhower’s planning for 
the overall strategic victory, that the men at this level were unaware. 
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 Rebel 
 Risk Taker->Reckless 
 Grateful/Appreciative 
 Larger than life 
 Stubborn  
 
3. General Bradley- Leadership on the beach under fire- Archetype 3 
 
 General Omar Bradley was an important presence at D-Day and throughout the 
entire European Campaign.  Many of the men who related their personal recollections of 
the event also recall Bradley and impact on them.  General Bradley was a more measured 
leader than General Patton, and at the same time he was accessible to the troops, just as 
BG Roosevelt had been.  He was senior in rank to both of them and was closer to the 
flagpole, (that is Eisenhower), since he was the senior American General in the invasion 
force.  Roosevelt came from an American family institution.  He was a gentleman 
warrior.  On the other hand, Patton was a professional military man who came from a line 
of military men. Roosevelt represented the old family wealth of New York; Patton hailed 
from a Southern Gentry Tradition and attended Virginia Military Institute.   Enter Omar 
Bradley, a common man who was known as the G.I.’s General.  Bradley was charged 
with incredible responsibilities, but he was nonetheless still almost a “regular Joe” to the 
soldiers who knew him. 
General Bradley was at Omaha Beach at 1030 hours on June 7th, 1944 when a 
German Spitfire strafed the beach. 17  If Bradley had been hit and killed, who knows what 
                                                 
17
 As incredulous as it sounds, German Forces had captured British Spitfire Airplanes (Mk.I AZ-H) during 
the course of the War.  We cannot be entirely sure that Paulson’s account refers to one of these, but there is 
evidence of some of these planes being captured by the Germans near Cherbourg, prior to the Invasion.  
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would have happened in the following weeks. Fortunately he was not hit and he went on 
to his place in history.  Private John Paulson of the 9th Infantry recalls the event in this 
interview. Paulson had always remembered Bradley and the event, but he was never sure.  
It was not until 60 years later that his thoughts on that day were confirmed: 
 
I saw a Spitfire coming right at us... He let go and he strafed the beach and 
as he went by me - by that time I was laying on the ground. I looked up 
and was probably not more than a hundred yards from the plane and it had 
swastikas all over it. So apparently, it was a captured English Spitfire. 
When I got up at the top of the hill there, I looked over and I thought I 
recognized Omar Bradley. I'd never met the man, naturally, you know 
being just a Private First-Class and they were by a command car. There 
were half a dozen people there but I recognized him. I don't know why but 
it just struck me because I always thought he was such a good officer… 
So that was sixty years ago, approximately, and I never really knew for 
sure if it was Bradley. Then I got this magazine and it showed a picture of 
Bradley at Omaha Beach at ten-thirty in the morning on June 7th. So I 
carried this memory sixty years and I often wondered if I was right or 
wrong until I saw the photo in Time Magazine and that proved I was 
correct (Paulson, p. 182). 
 
As a young private, Paulson observed Bradley on the beach as a respected high-
ranking leader and said in his words, that he “always thought he was such a good 
officer.” And it was the elder veteran, John Paulson, who sixty years later still looked at 
him with great admiration.  He kept that memory with him for so many years.  And, of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Specific examples are shown at http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=310. See 
also APPENDIX C: ii Photos. 
 187 
 
the memories and recollections of Paulson, Bradley stood out as the senior leader who 
impacted him the most. 
 What made Bradley so well liked and respected by his soldiers seems to have 
been the way he personally dealt with them.  One example of this is from William 
McNamara, the War Correspondent: 
A big high point for us was when General Bradley gave personal thanks to 
my team for raising the morale of the American forces and keeping 
everyone informed. This was the job we were there to do, and when we 
got his thanks - that told us that we made a difference (McNamara, p. 
162). 
 
 Bradley was also a leader with incredible responsibilities.   Though initially the 
Invasion on D-Day was a success, the campaign had stalled after weeks of stubborn 
fighting with Germans. The St. Lo breakout was critical to the success of the campaign.  
General Bradley had the responsibility to execute the plan that he had developed for the 
breakout.  It got off to a shaky start.  In a later section we will look at how soldiers 
perceived and demonstrated leadership in two key events. Irving Smolens of the 29th 
Field Artillery Battalion, 4th Infantry Division experienced events at Slapton Sands and 
St. Lo.  He recalls setting up his 155 mm guns (Smolens called these Long Toms) to 
support the infantry as it attacked St. Lo: 
I set up my gun position to support the infantry attack. The P-47’s were 
dropping smoke bombs to mark the target. They called the road that was 
getting the smoke bombs the “St Lo Terrier Highway” which was very 
narrow, and when the smoke cleared we were supposed to be on one side 
of the highway and the Germans were supposed to be on the other.  
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When the smoke began drifting back towards our own lines, the Air Force 
didn’t read the roads correctly as another road had appeared. We all were 
hit pretty bad by our own bombers that day. A three-star general, General 
Lesley MacNiele {Author’s note: LTG Lesley J. McNair}was killed there. 
The battalion commander called General Bradley’s headquarters and said 
we had been decimated by the bombing and couldn’t break out (Smolens, 
p. 237).  
 
Despite the call from the battalion commander, Bradley ordered them to attack 
and the unit went forward into what has become known as the “St Lo 
breakthrough”. 
 
 Bradley had to make the tough call to try an un-doctrinal attack tactic using 
infantry divisions in front instead of going with armored divisions first.  According to 
Smolens, he did this because of the hilly terrain that was around them (Smolens, p. 237).  
This was compounded by the pressure of having had hundreds of his soldiers, including 
senior officers, killed in the pre-attack bombing.  He had to be flexible in his thinking, 
and at the same time he had to be resolute and continue with the attack, despite the self-
inflicted losses caused by the confusion from the smoke drifting into the allied lines.   
Robert Landis recalled the experience of being one of those men who Bradley 
ordered forward at St. Lo: 
I remember was when one of our own airplanes bombed us and killed six 
hundred of our men. I know it was unintentionally, but we were trying to 
break out of the hedgerows and they pulled us back about a mile. At that 
time the 1800 bombers came over and started dropping bombs on the 
German lines. The wind blew the smoke back on us and the bombers 
behind them started dropping bombs on us and killed General McNair and 
I believe a colonel from the Air Force who was in communications with 
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the bombers. So they lost communications with them, and the following 
bombers had no idea of who they were bombing. They were just dropping 
bombs on the smoke and dust. Finally, somehow in about an hour they got 
it stopped. The men of course were wounded - a lot of them. The bombs 
had disoriented a lot of them so I just grabbed what men I could get a hold 
of and we had to advance. We got to our old position and I got about a 
hundred yards past that and I got hit with an airburst so….that's when I left 
the Company (Landis, p. 136). 
 
 
 The Landis and Smolens accounts show the direct on the ground results of what 
men like Bradley planned and ordered to occur.  From the accounts, one can imagine that 
Bradley was hit with tremendous pressure, possible guilt, and the need to keep going 
despite what had happened.  The situation was more a reflection of the early tactical 
integration problems than bad planning on Bradley’s part.  Nevertheless, as the leader he 
took the only steps he could - he ordered the attack to continue.  This was, on a grander 
scale, similar to the same experiences of the soldiers themselves - they just kept going. 
They did what they had to do.  In Bradley’s case he was ordering thousands of men into 
battle, knowing full well that many had already been killed; but he also was aware that all 
of the effort and preparation that had gotten them all to that point might have been wasted 
if the Germans were able to contain them any longer.  A failed invasion would have 
resulted in delaying victory in the West, perhaps allowing the Germans to fare better 
against the Soviets, and resulting in even more deaths.  Bradley’s breakout, while not an 
absolute necessity for the success of this invasion, was a crucial part of it.  It is interesting 
that Bradley, who was not known for flash and dash like Patton, was referred to almost as 
a governor on Patton’s motor during his mad dash through France.  But, at the critical 
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time and place Bradley acted, and he did so without hesitation acting decisively and 
deliberately.   
 General Bradley ultimately appears to be in his own mold.  He was a man with a 
more humble beginning than many of his contemporaries. He often had to make difficult 
choices on the battlefield; but he still maintained a level of connectedness to his men and 
his roots. 
Perceived Leadership Composite of General Bradley– Archetype 3 
 Conservative 
 Personable 
 Responsible 
 Grateful/Appreciative 
 Firm  
 Decisive  
 Resolute  
 
 
 
 
Summary of the Senior Leaders 
 
 The accounts of the D-Day 60 veterans included references to senior leaders, 
many of whom were famous outside of the event.  The composites of the accounts we 
have reviewed show that these three leaders possess many of the same traits displayed by 
the first line leaders.   We see such varied traits as personal accessibility, decisiveness, 
resolve, courage, risk-taking and outside the box thinking.  Doc Scanlon and General 
Patton would have been able to exchange more than a few stories.  We also saw that there 
were differences among them and that successful senior leaders were not all cut from the 
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same cloth - that is, they approached their men and missions differently.  Their men 
looked at them differently.  Some people might say that, of course, there are going to be 
differences among the leaders; but that may be news to some educational, military, and 
corporate thinkers who put such stock in personality testing, standardized review forms 
and other placement tools that size people up based on the results.  Our look at the senior 
leaders has shown that they had many visible differences.  Thus, one conclusion that can 
be drawn from this is that there are many variances in personality, background, and 
experience that can come together to shape successful senior leaders.  Another is that 
when the big decisions had to be made, these men made them and faced the consequences 
with the same confidence, whether it was on the beach waving a cane, at St. Lo in the 
breakout, or on the country roads of France running out of gas. 
 
5. Other Leaders:  Majors and Above 
After looking at the first line leaders, and then at the senior leaders they admired 
from afar or with whom they had occasional meetings, we will now look at the field 
grade officers (majors, lieutenant colonels), and higher, and see what leadership patterns 
were observed among them. 
The examples of officers who were not as well publicized as men like Patton, 
Bradley or Roosevelt are just as important from the standpoint of the junior soldiers.  The 
colonel, or the old man as he is often called, sets a tone and influence within a unit that 
goes all the way to the company level.  Such applications are true today whether it is a 
male or female commander.  One should keep this in mind when discussing leadership 
from the World War II, which was pre-dominantly male, but not exclusively so.  In this 
study, however the leadership was nearly exclusively male dominated. 
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 In this section we will look at the examples of these leaders and see if they also 
displayed or were perceived to have displayed similar traits.  Among the leadership traits 
we have discussed already, we have seen leaders who were diligent to their duties, loyal 
to their troops, compassionate, at times rebellious when the situation called for it, and that 
also includes men who held different perspectives, thought in different ways, and seized 
the opportunity to make a change when the situation called for it.  The same traits are 
evident in other leaders.  Take for example, Major General Elwood “Pete” Quesada, 
whose innovativeness helped bring the Land and Air fight in synch for the American 
troops.  Airman Arnold Franco was in the 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile, Ninth Air Force, 
during World War II.  He was a code breaker attached to a secret unit that was listening 
to enemy coded broadcasts during the invasion.  He presented his views on the impact of 
such leadership in his interview with MAJ Douglas Hendy in 2004: 
I: Is there anything else that you would like to add before we end quotes?  
Something for the soldiers if this is published?  The purpose of the 
publication would be to allow current soldiers to prepare themselves for 
the next war, as well as our current war. 
 
F: Yes, I have to say, Sir…18  One of the crutches (?) of the military has 
always been they are always fighting the new war with the tactics of the 
old.  But there are exceptions.  We were part of a superb air-ground team.  
A general by the name of Quesada, I don’t know if you have heard of him, 
Pete Quesada.  He had developed this, kind of that which we are using 
now; he put Air Force fighter pilots in tanks.  And, he developed 
communications, radio communications, so they could communicate 
directly with the squadron leaders above.  So an Air Force guy in the tank 
                                                 
18
 Arnold C. Franco spent ten years researching use of codes during World War II and wrote Code to 
Victory, by Arnold C. Franco, as told to Paula Aselin Spellman Manhattan, Kan.: Sunflower University 
Press, c1998. 
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was talking to his own guys up there, which was…it sounds simple…it 
was unique.  It was unique.  And that created this fantastic ability that the 
forward Army had.  The dash thru France, but forget about strikes.  
Because there were guys driving in tanks, who are passengers, Air Force 
men, who had squadrons of fighters, fighter-bombers on-call all the time.  
It took them years to recapitulate that fantastic type of communications 
(Franco, p. 72). 
 
Quesada was an outside the box thinker who applied his ideas to the battlefield 
with great results. As a senior leader, he broke new ground that substantially aided the 
Allied success. Another innovation was seen in the Hedgerow fight.  While General 
Quesada made his impact in the communications between tank and plane, other GIs were 
making their impact on the ground unit by unit with their ideas. 
 This same dynamic was seen in first line leaders as well.  Take for example the 
recollection by the 101st’Airborne’s Cletus Sellner.  Sellner worked in the rigging 
department, the place where they were responsible for packing parachutes. The work was 
done in a big packing shed.  The work was tedious, with each chute being packed to fit 
the shoulder harness for each jumper. Sellner recalls that there were injuries because the 
equipment weighed so much:  
There were a lot of soldiers who ended up with broken legs, broken 
ankles, broken shoulders - everything because the equipment weighed 65 
pounds, plus the parachute with the musette bag on top made it a bit more.  
A lot of people broke legs and all kinds of different injuries.  
 
So as a result of these mishaps…our sergeant that was in charge of the 
rigger department … his name was Sergeant Lancey … designed this unit 
so that when the parachute opened the cord would drop using the snap 
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release and the bag would dangle ten feet below the feet of the 
paratroopers. So that saved all kinds of broken legs and you name it. That 
was a lifesaving device that we developed over there (Sellner, p. 231). 
 
   It is no accident that leadership dynamics at the senior level have parallels at the 
first line leader level.  Perhaps it has to do with the span of control within one’s own 
direct situation, but the end result is that innovative thinking was not something that was 
taught in the classroom. Both situations required action to be taken in order to 
successfully solve a problem.  It did not matter whether it was in the fighter plane or on 
the way down in the parachute or in the tank beside the driver. The necessity for action 
was the catalyst that set things in motion for the ideas to come forward. 
  One important aspect of the senior leader is the tone that he set.   In the thick of 
the fight, Royal British Navy LT. Michael D’Alton recalled, “And we stayed there for a 
few hours, waiting further orders.  And suddenly my English captain declared to hell with 
this bloody nonsense, I’m going in.  And, he ordered up anchor” (D’Alton, p. 4).  This 
officer was a man of action.  He was not content to sit and watch the action transpire 
without doing his part, regardless of the consequences.   D’Alton picked up on that and 
jumped into the work down below as they were working on un-jamming the door of the 
landing craft when it was making its way toward the beach.   
Harry Browne, or the 439th Troop Carrier Group (TCG) was a pilot on a C47 who 
flew missions over Normandy throughout the Campaign. He had this to say about his 
senior leader and the tone he set: 
I was always satisfied with my chain of command. Our commanding 
General was a good guy, too. His leadership helped us to keep our minds 
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on what we needed to do and even though we would lose planes and their 
crews from time to time - we still kept our resolve for the job we had to 
do. We never had anybody that made life miserable for us. .. 
Yet, we were still all very close during those times. If we knew we did a 
good days work for the war effort, which was most of the time, we all got 
together back at the barracks and found time for a beer and celebrate our 
successes, and praise those who did not return home (Browne, p. 20). 
 
 Browne’s memories of the War were shaped by the attitude of his chain of 
command.  The focused leadership of his General made him confident in his mission, and 
he did not worry about less important things and distractions that might have weakened 
his resolve or taken his mind off of what had to be done.  This positive leadership 
example stayed with him throughout the war and lent a strong esprit de corps to the unit 
and a bond that kept the men together in friendship long afterwards. 
 Robert Martin Piper had memories of the exceptional leadership he experienced 
while in the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division.  This unit has a 
storied history. But, this was because of the tone of leadership set by men like Major 
General Matthew B. Ridgway and Brigadier General James M. Gavin.  The effect of 
outstanding leadership created an environment where others who had the desire, 
discipline, and traits to endure the rigorous training and standards of the Airborne unit 
were able to form a strong and cohesive bond that served to motivate and pull them 
through the challenges they faced - both individually and collectively.  Piper recalls one 
critical test for this leadership when he and the 505th went into action on D-Day. The unit 
was drop zone was Sainte-Mère-Église.  Once there, Piper was given the task of 
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organizing the defense of the CP (command post) by his commander, Colonel William 
Eckman in one of the typical Normandy apple orchards.  He recalls Colonel Eckman as 
being one of the best things to happen to his unit, the 505th PIR (Parachute Infantry 
Regiment). Piper landed in a farm west of Sainte-Mère-Église.  He recalled the peaceful 
night, the dog barking n the background, and the moonlight. In his words, “Other than the 
war, it was a very peaceful night (Piper, p. 188).”  Piper’s opinion of his chain of 
command was high. The small Division CP was bordered by hedge rows. The Division 
was using the Regimental CP since it was the only established CP at the time on the 
ground.  Manned by 25 soldiers, Piper said they were constantly tired, but that the 
defense was, “like a hornets nest” against enemy probes, “Everyone in our outfit knew 
what they were doing, and the troops performed their jobs outstandingly (Piper, p. 188).”  
It was the tone and standards set by men like Ridgway, Gavin, and their immediate 
subordinate leaders, like COL Eckman and LTC Kraus and others that made the unit 
what it was. 
 In this chapter, we provided examples of how the traits of senior leaders played a 
role in the performance and tone of a unit.  It is important to note that although the first 
line leaders who made up the bulk of the Veterans in the survey and were important in 
carrying out and executing missions on the ground, it was the higher rung of officers who 
set the tone, set the stage for training, as well as who provided the guidance and fine 
tuning through personal presence to lead the troops successfully in the fight.  
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CHAPTER 13 
SPONTANEOUS EMERGENCE OF GROUP LEADERSHIP  
 
Introduction 
In the preceding sections we discussed the presence of leadership traits in first 
line leaders, famous senior leaders, and unit senior leaders identified in the accounts of 
our group of veterans. These leadership examples were under the formal organizational 
structure at various levels.  The impact of the first line leader was shaped by many 
factors.  One factor was the leadership examples set by those in command at the highest 
level. Another was that of the tone set in an organization, such as in the 101st Airborne 
Division and the 82nd Airborne Division.  The examples, tone and expectations affected 
how the organizations as whole conducted business.   
The next section discusses leadership traits that emerged as a result of 
circumstances at the small group level rather than the unit level.  What leadership 
occurred when it was small groups of men, sometimes from various units, as they came 
together to overcome challenges before them?  The distinction between this and first line 
leadership is that in first line leaders, we looked at junior level and company grade formal 
authority structures.  In this section, we will look at ad hoc structures and clusters that 
emerged out of the chaos of D-Day and other events, and how an almost natural sequence 
of leadership assumption occurred as a result of the combination of events, 
circumstances, training and traits of the leaders involved.  In some instances, people acted 
because of training; in others they acted in their formal roles.  But, what happened most 
often was that one member of the group on impulse decided to act, take charge, or direct 
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his fellow soldiers when an event presented itself.  Many times, this occurred in the most 
unlikely circumstances, and the veteran presenting the account describes himself as 
surprised that he did it or asked himself “what was I thinking?” afterwards. 
Spontaneous Leadership 
 What is spontaneous leadership? One definition could be the emergence of 
leadership actions in the moment of crisis when action must be taken, often being the 
difference between death and survival for those who suddenly come together to form a 
group, no matter the length of time.  Another might be the sudden emergence of someone 
who is the instigator or troublemaker in a group, and may at times be in benign, although 
reckless situations.    
The 82nd Airborne’s Will Delaney describes this process in his account of the D-
Day jump he and his fellow soldiers made.  They flew in at 700 feet, leaving early on the 
the 5th of June, but their flight was delayed 24 hours. Delaney describes a chaotic scene 
on the ground. Men were caught in trees, and a couple in church steeples:  
 
We were the lead aircraft, the “pathfinder” and we finally jumped at 1:30 
in the morning of the 6th. I was in 2nd Battalion, F Company 505th 
Parachute Infantry Regiment. John Steel and SGT Brown ended up 
landing on top of a church steeple. SGT Brown got away but John Steel 
stayed up there (Delaney, p.57). 
 
Once on the ground, Delaney linked up with his friend Francis Meeks from 
Alabama and the two soon realized they were in the wrong town.   They used 
their “cricket” (the device designed for the invasion force to establish contact with 
each other via clicks and counter clicks) and met another soldier, a SGT Hill, who 
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hailed from California.  Hill had been caught in a tree by his harness.  Hill had 
been shot; but the bullets had not gone through his reserve shoot, thus saving his 
life.  Soon afterwards they met up with Lieutenant Carol and the party was soon 
under fire from the tree line nearby.  As Delaney says “we realized we were 
definitely not in a good place (Delaney, p. 57).”  
 After another 100 yards, they were met by Lieutenant Colonel Kraus, who 
told them they were in the wrong place. The lieutenant told Kraus that they were 
heading for high ground.  The group slowly grew to over 20 personnel making 
their way undercover, walking most of the night. Delaney recalls what happened 
next: 
 
As daylight broke, we came to “Monaberg Station” and we knew that 
there was no way we were supposed to be there. We turned around and 
made our way back in the other direction, and picked up 20 more men 
along the way… when we finally arrived back into Sainte-Mère-Église 
during the afternoon of June 6th, our company had formed up right next to 
the graveyard in the spot I had landed on in the dark (Delaney, p. 57). 
 
Delaney does not give specific details on where the men who joined the group 
came from. He notes that the Battalion commander was focused on his mission and they 
were focused on theirs.  When they got to town they broke into small groups and did 
house to house fighting. Thus at one point or another throughout the process, nearly every 
soldier was both a leader and a follower.  
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Thomas Alley, who came from the 101st Airborne Division describes his 
encounter with German soldiers and members of an informal group that came together 
after landing in Normandy.   Alley and two other men with him heard the squeaking 
wheels of cart being pulled by a donkey being led by five German soldiers.  One sergeant 
took an automatic weapon from the lead German soldier. A second German fought back, 
hit the sergeant with a leather donkey whip and from a few feet away Alley shot him with 
his M-1 carbine.  The Sergeant from the 82nd fired on the other soldiers and killed them. 
Alley and his comrades quickly moved on and met another group of seven men. The men 
had heard the shooting and wondered what had happened since they could tell it was a 
German weapon by the rate of fire.  The small group moved on. Alley sums up the 
anecdote this way: 
 
  The guy from the 82nd who was timely with that automatic weapon went 
another direction with more 82nd guys that appeared from a field and I 
never saw him again (Alley, p. 2). 
 
 
 The group came together out of necessity, formed for a few hours, forever bonded 
by a incident and then dispersed with little more information directly passed perhaps than 
the exchange of names.  Another account of the spontaneous team forming and coming 
together for a short time and then breaking off and forming up with other groups is given 
by Alley’s fellow member of the  101st,  Eugene Cook.  After his parachute landing Cook 
met up with a soldier from the 502nd PIR, later on they met seven or eight others and 
headed down the road nearby to Ravenoville. 
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We had two point-men, but when we got up to them they were both gone.  
One had been captured, and we don't know what the hell happened to the 
other … We got to the town and surveyed it a bit.  I think there were 
twenty-two of us actually in the town.  That was early in the morning. It 
took about two hours to capture it.  I don’t know, but I think there were 
about two hundred Germans in that town … It was more house-to-house 
fighting; it was a small town.  You would throw a grenade in this window, 
then walk in.  We had twenty-two guys who went house to house and the 
town.  We were fighting individually, or in groups of two or three.  That 
took about two hours and then we took some prisoners and took them back 
to the church.  This was at about seven o'clock in the morning… that 
lasted all of D-Day, into the night.  The next morning we headed for our 
drop zone, where we were supposed to be.  So that was D-Day (Cook, 
p.48). 
 
 Cook’s group of men came together, and they were able to form a squad and 
move as a unit and then went on to attack a town.  Following that, they went on to link up 
with the rest of the units.  As noted by Cook, he did not know what happened to the 
original point men that joined the group, yet for a short period of time they were an 
integral part of the group.   
Rollo Worden talks about the difficulties of holding his squad together, and gives  
this anecdote about events he experienced during the Battle of the Bulge: 
 
After Bastogne, we were trapped in an old mill for several days until we 
snuck out one night. There were 18 of us left out of three Companies. 
There would be forty of us at times from ten different outfits. We didn’t 
know where we were most of the time or what we were doing, but 
eventually we finally ended up in Bavaria... We rode tanks with Patton’s 
tanks for four or five weeks. When they got fired on, we jumped off those 
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tanks and lost a lot of men along this trail with them. We still made a good 
35 miles a day with Patton’s tanks (Worden, p. 298).  
 
The kinetic team membership was spontaneous. They did not know what they 
were doing, where they were going and probably had no idea who was really in charge 
beyond the man at the top and the one leading them at any given moment.  They 
proceeded and continued to fight. Their group seems to have developed the ability to 
rapidly integrate and get focused on what needed to be done in order to survive. 
The accelerated pace of decision-making, socialization and fighting for one’s life 
gave rise to many exceptions to normal group behavior.  Outsiders were German soldiers.  
Unit and membership in a specific part of the organization did not matter, so much as 
being another soldier to join in the fight.  Time could sort out the details, but for the 
moment, survival was paramount.   
We can take this observation as an important point from the study because it 
illustrates that group leadership and individual leadership emerges in a crisis.  In effect, 
unit cohesion is a by-product of the crisis. And, the leader who emerges in the crisis and 
takes control of the group successfully in such circumstances of spontaneity may do so 
for a brief time, as long as the crisis demands, and then due to the fluidity of the situation 
may fade back into the follower role.  This is somewhat contrary to many views of 
military leaders, especially at the first line leader level, but these type of situations 
happened on several occasions throughout the accounts.  Soldiers just rose to the 
occasion in certain circumstances, and when the situation called for an individual with a 
particular skill set, they simply acted without thinking of it in advance. 
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Spontaneous Group Actions in War 
Theoretical Perspective 
Northouse (2004) compares conditions of group effectiveness and characteristics 
of team excellence. The key aspects of the theories of Hackman & Walton (Conditions of 
Group Effectiveness, 1986), and Larson & La Fasto (Characteristics of  Team 
Excellence, 1989) are shown in the table below (Table 5).   The spontaneous group 
leadership that appeared at D-Day and similar situations discussed in the accounts of the 
D-Day veterans show many parallels to both of these theories.  Though the teams that we 
discuss were ad hoc in nature due to the fluidity of the battlefield, there existed the basic 
structural integrity, value system and hierarchical chain of command systems that aided 
in their formation and function.  Larson & La Fasto’s work focused on “what 
characterizes effectively functioning teams” (Larson & La Fasto, 1989, p. 20).  They 
found eight characteristics common to team excellence.  Though arrived at in a different 
way, Hackman & Walton (1986) suggested a theory of what criteria might be needed for 
goal accomplishment for teams. These criteria were condition- based.  One can apply 
both models to interpret the observations from the D-Day Study.  Table 5 presents a 
comparison of these two approaches. 
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Table 5.  Comparison of Key Aspects of Two Group and Team Performance Theories 
 
 
CONDITIONS OF GROUP 
EFFECTIVENESS 
(Hackman & Walton, 1986) 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TEAM 
EXCELLENCE 
(Larson & La Fasto, 1989) 
       Clear, engaging direction 
 
       Clear, elevating goal 
       Enabling structure 
 
       Results-driven structure 
 
       Competent team members 
 
 
       Unified commitment 
 
 
       Collaborative climate 
 
       Enabling content        Standards of excellence   
 
       Expert Coaching        Principled leadership 
 
       Adequate material        External Support 
 
 
(From Northouse, 2004) 
 
In the case of the veterans from D-Day we can incorporate this model as part of 
the way to frame the spontaneous leadership that enabled teams to form and coalesce 
under varied circumstances during the campaign.  An example of how these two models 
can be used based on the circumstances of the men in our study is shown below in Table 
6. 
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Table 6.  Application of  Hackman and Walton Conditions and Larson and Le Fasto 
Characteristics to D-Day 60 Study Group 
 
 
The D-Day group we studied had all of the key components listed in both the 
group effectiveness model presented by Hackman and Walton (1986) and the team 
excellence model of Larson and LaFasto (1989).  The participants had a clear over 
arching goal, as well as an immediate one to assault the beaches or towns held by the 
Germans.   They had a clear command structure and support system in place consisting of 
both officers who planned, and non-commissioned officers who were responsible for the 
training.  They shared in a unified endeavor to free Europe, as well as common national 
 
CONDITIONS OF 
GROUP 
EFFECTIVENESS 
(Hackman & Walton, 1986) 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS 
OF TEAM 
EXCELLENCE 
(Larson & La Fasto, 1989) 
 
D-Day 60 
STUDY 
GROUP 
              Clear, engaging direction 
 
       Clear, elevating goal Assault Beaches 
       Enabling structure 
 
       Results-driven structure Squad/PLT/CO 
Structure 
 
 
       Competent team members 
 
Officers/NCOs 
 
       Unified commitment 
 
Cause to free 
Europe 
 
 
       Collaborative climate 
 
 
       Enabling content        Standards of excellence   
 
Military/national 
values 
 
       Expert Coaching        Principled leadership 
 
Formal 
leadership/Informal 
leaders 
 
       Adequate material        External Support 
 
Initial/extensive 
organizational 
support of Allied 
Forces 
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values.  These commonalities parallel the requirements of both group effectiveness and 
team excellence.  Adequate material and external support were provided through the 
extensive organizational support of the Allied Forces.  So, on a macro scale, the 
conditions had been established for success of the military. But the critical 
implementation of that success became a micro-scale event, where leadership and teams 
had to be effective at the squad, platoon and company levels as well. 
The formal backdrop of the organization allowed informal teams to develop 
because the pre-existing values, command structure, and mutually supportive goals and 
jobs, allowed quick integration and synchronization. 
 
Study Observations of Spontaneous Leadership 
Several subjects talk about how the soldier or group of men with them acted in 
spontaneous ways that had nothing to do with the mission.  C.K. Harris relates an 
occasion when his fellow soldiers were in Germany on patrol, and one of them had this 
idea: 
Somebody said “Let’s go see if we can get a beer.” A woman led us 
through to a special room in this place we were at. It turns out that it was 
the recently departed German commandant’s lunchroom (Harris, p. 107). 
 
 Harold McCauley and his fellow GIs took it a couple steps further after a few 
days of tough fighting on Omaha Beach. McCauley and his men rustled up some cattle, 
took over a German field kitchen and, just as typical of the American soldiers I serve 
with in Iraq today, held a barbeque: 
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Maybe I shouldn’t tell this but it was our first invasion, and we knew there 
was cattle so this guy Lester Limbough from Winchester, Tennessee …   
Well, we captured the German kitchen... We got it brought up to the beach 
here and about the third night we had a heckle I mean there was cattle all 
over. We butchered out the hindquarters. Put on some English Channel 
salt water for seasoning. And they had some onions with them, so we got 
some onions out of the gardens and maybe a few potatoes, they were 
small, and sea radishes, just loaded it. I mean you could have smelled it 
back in the United States. People kept coming in, engineers and such, 
different outfits… it lasted for about three days (McCauley, p. 160). 
 
 Charles Shearer from the 439th TCG (Troop Carrier Group) was a glider pilot at 
Normandy.  Once he had discharged his cargo of paratroopers and had landed, the logical 
thing to do would be to evade the enemy and stay under cover, or head back to a rally 
point.  However, he and his fellow crew members had a different idea: 
 
We found a jeep and grouped up with some other guys but the jeep was 
damaged so we couldn’t use it. We made our way back towards the beach 
and hooked up with some more guys, near to St. Mere Eglise. We made 
our way up a road and were invited into a bakery cafe for food and drinks. 
The family that ran the place was very glad to see us though they did not 
speak much English. There were many of us from my group at the table 
that night, and we ate a lot and drank even better! The wine was good 
enough to give me a terrific hang-over the next day. We took that moment 
to get know some of the folks we had come to liberate. The bakery owner 
kept bringing out that wine, and we kept toasting the liberation (Shearer, 
p. 233). 
 
 208 
 
Another account, showed how spontaneous leadership can occur in less 
threatening circumstances and can lead to high adventure. This recollection by Harry 
Brown, discusses how the opportunity to go on a quick reconnaissance adventure in 
Paris, despite a war going on around him, proved to be too much to resist for him and his 
companions. Brown was a replacement at the time assigned to the 2nd Engineer Combat 
Battalion. He and the mail handler, a man named Denwitty , and another soldier went 
AWOL to Paris during  a lull in the fighting. They arrived there in advance of the other 
troops and joined in with French troops marching in the city on Bastille Day, before 
General De Gaulle arrived to liberate the city.  Brown and his companions found time to 
visit the Arche de Triomphe and visit the place de Pigalle:  
 
We went AWOL to Paris, 3 of us.  That was my big memory of WW2, 
one day in Paris.  24 hour day.  I did all the usual things, almost, now 
don’t get any ideas.  (Laughter).  I’m not going to tell you the truth.  
(Laughter) I got drunk.  Marched in a parade.  Kissed a bunch of girls, and 
got kissed by a bunch of girls.  I think I did everything I was supposed to 
do.  I survived.   
 
…make a note of this, this was before De Gaulle got here, we beat him, 
we beat him by a few weeks, there were still Germans around.  Most of 
them were patients, recuperating, rehabs, not too many of them were, I did 
not see or hear or know of anyone firing a shot at me or anyone else, 
though they say they did.  I wasn’t listening for them.  I was busy.  There 
was no lights, and everything was dark.  The subways were shut down, it 
was almost a dead town.  We found a little restaurant that had some food 
yet, and we managed to eat while we weren’t that hungry to tell you the 
truth.  The next day… we went back to our outfits, by St. Lo and Paris, 
and we started moving again …  See what happened was they were out of 
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gas, there was no gas, so we had to wait there, and no one knows when it’s 
going to get there and you know the army, you might be there for six 
months (Laughter).  Well you know, anyway, we took the gamble, but we 
knew we’d better not try and stretch it (Brown, pp. 10-12). 
 
Corporal Brown’s account of high adventure is not isolated. Many veterans 
related similar tales.  It is not surprising that such events occurred.  Based on the earlier 
discussion of some of the rebellious tendencies of many leaders, this is typical.  In 
Brown’s instance, his unit was part of the Allied forces that had run out of gas and were 
waiting for supplies.  In typical pragmatic American soldier fashion, he and his buddies 
engaged in the most logical thing that came to their minds- a road trip to Paris. The 
emergence of such traits of rebellion within a group are not necessarily indicative of a 
lack of discipline but were more the product of pragmatism by the soldier who finds 
himself caught in a strange paradox of danger and safety, in an ethereal holding pattern 
between violent savagery and boredom. Under such circumstances, not knowing what lay 
in front of them but knowing what they had already experienced, such behavior seems 
almost rational.  Such accounts of soldiers spontaneously acting as a group and 
establishing such parenthetical adventures in the middle of the anarchy of war have been 
the stuff of novels and tales as long as there have been wars. It is a part of the warrior 
ethos and culture, that even today, soldiers’ experience.  There are the official rules and 
regulations on what should be done, and most soldiers will follow these.  But there are 
plenty of occasions when circumstances take on an entirely new dimension, and 
individuals or groups of soldiers will set up their own foxhole or sub-culture wherever 
they find themselves, whether for a day, a week or a year.  
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Other Aspects of Spontaneous Team Leadership  
Several of the following accounts did not occur as part of the action at D-Day.  
However, as part of the general discussion on spontaneous leadership, I felt it appropriate 
to include several accounts of anecdotes from veterans describing events that occurred 
after D-Day or in some cases accounts of veterans who were not even at D-Day. The 
accounts taken by the World War II 60 Committee during the course of the many events 
held throughout Europe provided many examples that lend themselves well to the study 
that has been conducted.   
For example, SGT Frederick Carter of the British Royal Air Force was not at D-
Day. But his accounts provided an outstanding example of spontaneous leadership that 
occurred in a different way.  He was a prisoner of war in a camp where there were 
soldiers of many different nations, including Americans. In this recollection, Carter 
illustrates how even the difficult circumstances of being in a prison camp can have light 
moments, even while at the same time a group consciousness emerged.  In their free time 
the men in the camp would play softball with American troops, and sometimes they 
played soccer or rugby.  There were men in the camp who tried to escape as well.  A 
Greek captain made wire cutters from ice skates.  Others dug tunnels but were 
unsuccessful in escaping. Carter recalls some of the attempts and challenges faced by 
those who did.  When asked if many people tried to escape, he responded: 
 
Oh yes. They had big tunnels and nobody got…we were on a peninsula 
and as soon as somebody escaped they just cut the peninsula. There were 
Americans there that spoke fluent German because they came from 
German families. They went out as Germans, but they didn't get very far. 
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It was very difficult. I think in the whole war only two ever got out and 
got back to England. If you got caught you got put in solitary. And I think 
the Greek captain was put in for about nine months because I think he was 
Jewish. He looked Jewish and they left him in there. They wouldn't let him 
out. Apart from that… (pause). Oh there were quite a few tunnels. They 
tried all sorts of things to get out (Carter, p. 34). 
 
Their sports matches were a pleasant diversion from the difficulties of 
being prisoners of war.  Carter mentions this humorous anecdote: 
 
We played cricket but we enjoyed softball. We used to pull the legs of 
Americans. Now you know what pulling a leg is. We played softball and 
suddenly someone would say, "Tea break!"  And all the Brits would go sit 
off on a tea break. It infuriated the Americans. Here they are waiting in the 
field (laughs)…But they all took it in good fun. You had to do things 
otherwise life was a bit heartless…the only other thing that was really 
funny was once a month everyone had to go outside for their photographs 
and the Germans checked out. We were sort of next to the headquarters. 
And they put the boxes on the table when they finished. Well, we had an 
Irish squadron leader who was in charge of escape and that. When they 
weren't looking he {grabbed} a whole box of them, went indoors and put 
them in the fire you see. When they got back to their headquarters and 
they checked, there was a whole box missing. So everybody had to turn 
out. They had fifteen thousand people out in the field looking for them and 
we were pretending to dig up the sand and put them in. The Germans were 
shouting and pointing and they wrecked the whole field over it. But of 
course they were burnt, they weren't there (Carter, p. 34). 
 
 Carter’s recollection of various people taking on different leadership roles, even if 
it was small acts of defiance such as the Irish Squadron leader in this excerpt, or the 
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Greek captain’s escape attempts, shows how informal group structures can bring out 
leadership.  The dynamics that are at work in such examples can take place over a short 
or long period of time. Additionally, this type of leadership is hinted at in the account 
given by a member of the French resistance, Pierre Collard.  The resistance, or Maquis, 
had to work in small informal group structures scattered throughout France. They 
operated an informal network that combined former military and local citizens, who were 
mentioned in several accounts, particularly those of paratroopers who had landed off 
course.   
Another example of spontaneous team leadership comes from the recollections of 
a former member of the French Resistance. Collard said he was in the Maquis, and as was 
noted earlier in the chronological review, the Maquis were not operating in D-Day, but 
operated further south.  Nonetheless, Collard was a veteran, and his group’s activity, as 
he so candidly points out, had an effect on the outcome of the Allied campaign. Collard’s 
is the only resistance account in our study group, but shows a glimpse of the make-up and 
personality of such leaders. Collard was 93 years old at the time of his recollection.  He 
said that the Maquis, who were a part of the French Resistance, was formed by former 
French soldiers when the Germans disbanded the Army.  They sabotaged trains, roads, 
bridges, and conducted ambushes. They had regular contact from London through an 
American OSS (Office of Strategic Services) officer, as well as a couple of British 
officers and an Irish woman.  Collard was proud of the role he and the resistance played 
in the War: 
I:   So their activities helped the Americans here by delaying the 
Germans? 
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C: Yes, our role in resistance was to either obligate them to deploy forces 
around us while we sought to regain the cities and regain control, or to 
disrupt and deplete the forces before they got to Normandy.  General 
Eisenhower, in his book, My Crusade in Europe wrote that the work of the 
Maquis was equivalent to fifteen divisions. 
 
I:  Did the American special team teach you about explosives? 
 
C: Yes, the French troops responded to a call to show up but they had 
nothing.  They were trained and equipped by the American units.  They 
had nothing but “balls” (courage) (Collard, p. 43). 
 
   The French resistance movement was certainly an organization that had to 
function in strict trust and discipline, but also in extraordinarily informal ways.  As 
Collard reports, the Resistance was made up of many former soldiers.  These men had 
formal military training and could follow orders.  Still, as Collard describes his unit’s 
activities, it is clear that the type of leadership that emerged in this type of scenario did 
not follow the standard hierarchical organization chart. A large unit would have been 
discovered and its members killed by the German Army.   
Other aspects of spontaneous leadership had a more negative side.  This could be 
described as spontaneous lack of leadership. The following are two examples of this 
occurring. In one case, CPL Walter Raymond discusses prisoner of war treatment and 
how a loss of accountability is suggested for some actions that may have taken place, the 
second is a tragic example of complete absence of leadership and its consequences, when 
a group of soldiers were nearing the end of their tour in Europe.  
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CPL Raymond was with the 79th INF Division.  This was his account of how 
spontaneous leadership may have taken a different direction by the group setting aside its 
normal ethics code due to the circumstances of the fight. When asked how prisoners were 
treated by his squad, he replied: 
 
We didn't get too many prisoners, but when we got prisoners they went 
back.  I'm not going to say (pause).  I'm sure things happened because I've 
heard shots out there, you know.  I don't know, but I'm sure (inaudible) 
you can almost (chuckles) take a gun and shoot.  I'm sure it was done but 
like I say, what could you do (Raymond, p. 197)? 
 
 Raymond all but says prisoners were shot with his knowledge. One cannot judge 
him or his fellow soldiers for what may have been done in today’s lens.  However, it 
suggests that such things were common and that the ethical values may have emanated 
from the group and been more fluid when the presence of stronger, more ethical 
leadership was not present.   
One tragic case of what can occur when leadership is absent took place well after 
D-Day, when the War was nearly over.   Though this did not happen at D-Day, it could 
just as well have occurred there as at any other time when a leader was absent.  Similar to 
an earlier account of men playing football on the beach immediately after the invasion 
and a man was blown up by a piece of unexploded ordinance, in this account men were 
playing with a real bomb. Unfortunately, the group as whole seemed to have lost its 
common sense, perhaps due to the boredom of waiting for the end of their tour or perhaps 
because they had gone through so much that they had become numbed to the dangers that 
were still around them. Whatever the cause, there was a spontaneous lack of leadership 
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that emerged, as their former Company Commander, Richard Burwash recalls one tragic 
incident that occurred after the war in Europe was over and his men were staying in one 
of the cigarette camps. The camps were in France and were named after brands of 
cigarettes: 
 
How we lost two men was very tragic. While we were hanging around 
waiting for something to happen, we’d go up to the range and do a little 
shooting to get our qualifications up. I had set up a wire fence around this 
ammunition dump with bomb warning signs all around. We weren’t that 
far from the range. We were just a bunch of kids and the war was over 
there. We got in a couple of trucks and one of my guys went over to the 
fence and because he had spotted a small canister on the fence line. He 
picked it up, and sure enough, it was a butterfly bomb with an 
instantaneous fuse.  
 
Well, this wasn’t the bad part. He brings this thing back, and they start 
playing catch with the damn thing in a circle – 11 guys in all. I would have 
blown my stack if I knew what they were doing.  The guy who brought it 
from the fence ended up with it and put it between his legs for a moment. 
And this was not the bad part, either! This thing finally goes off, and kills 
two guys about five feet away, standing right in front of the guy who had 
it between his legs and to really seal the deal – he was not injured at all!  
 
The Germans dropped these things by the thousands all over the 
countryside. It was one of my jobs to find them and take them out of 
action. Losing two men on our way home was too hard to accept 
(Burwash, pp. 20-21). 
 
 Burwash’s account has an especially tragic twist since they had not lost anyone 
during the actual fighting that went on during the war.  It shows that leaders must remain 
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vigilant and responsible until the job is completely done and everyone has made it home.  
It is indicative of what bored men who are used to danger and challenging situations can 
do once the pressure has let up.   In the previous examples, we saw spontaneous group 
leadership taking hold in a crisis as recorded among our veterans’ accounts.  Many times 
this spontaneity, often unspoken but felt, was what made the critical difference in the 
many life and death situations they faced.  But, it also had its negative side and shows 
how soldiers allowed mistakes to occur when they allowed the group to take over and 
lower itself to a lesser degree of thinking, as in this tragic case. 
Comrades in Arms 
 Some of the most frequent examples of spontaneous leadership occurred among 
small groups of two or three.  These accounts are particularly noteworthy, because 
leadership must surface when the pressure is on and there is no one else to make the 
decisions.  Loyalty for a cause or unit is superseded by loyalty to one’s battle buddy.   
The accounts that displayed these examples give pictures of when men were up against 
the wall, odds against them and somehow managed to survive as a team.  Earlier, we 
presented an example of a reconnaissance team that had been sent by General Patton, one 
of several decoys that were deliberately sent to mislead the enemy.  However, Norman 
Schein had another idea in mind: 
 
 So we went out.  At night we were to look around, and during the day 
time, we were to hide.  Then one night we were driving, and… coming 
down a hill.  I heard a terrible roar.  There were no lights, of course, and I 
looked closely.  It was a German convoy coming come up with Tiger 
tanks in it.  My partner got excited: "What are we going to do?"  We can’t 
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get out of here."  When the tanks went by, they were going slow.  They 
were about 40 yards apart, so I drove between two Tiger tanks.  Then 
when I saw a road I could see clear enough, I drove out.  That's how we 
got away from them, but they never knew we were there.  My partner just 
about went crazy: “You know what you just did?”  I said, “Yeah, but we 
made it” (Schein, p. 226). 
 
 “Yeah, but we made it.”  Schein said to his buddy.  It was a situation that 
demanded an intrepid spirit, cool, calm nerve, courage and leadership or it would all be 
over.  Another example of this type of leadership occurred in an account given by SSG 
Paul Merriman. Although this happened six months after D-Day, it is similar to Schein’s 
account, as the men were well ahead of their own lines and had to hide from the enemy.  It 
was later in the War, during the Battle of the Bulge.  Merriman, along with two other men, 
was on forward observer duty.  The weather made flying impossible in the Piper Cubs 
used at that time. The men were in their jeep with a radio and were caught in a snow 
storm, away from their unit, surrounded by the enemy and with dusk approaching they 
took shelter in some hidden pine trees. They radioed to their headquarters and received this 
sage advice, “Find someplace to hide!”  The men looked for a foxhole and fortunately 
found one that could accommodate three of them.  Eight inches of snow fell, according to 
Merriman, and in the morning their jeep, affectionately called “Daisy Mae” {probably 
named for an attractive female character in the “L’il Abner” comic strip about hillbillies} 
was buried in snow and hidden in the pines, helping to preventing their discovery by the 
Germans.  The men kept radio silence and waited.  Merriman recalls that many American 
prisoners were taken during this time, so he and his comrades stayed hidden in their 
foxhole: 
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Our feet were a little cold, but it was better to have two guys around you 
than to be off by yourself.  The next morning when we woke up, it had 
cleared and the Germans had gone, at least that's what we heard.  We 
didn't see anyone at all. Lying on the ground were leaflets, and they were 
safe conduct leaflets.  On one side it showed a picture of Lifesaver 
candies, which would get our attention, and on the other side was the safe 
conduct pass.  It said to give yourself up, and you'll be accorded safe 
passage to the rear according to the articles of war and you will be well 
taken care of, and so on.  Underneath in German it gave instructions to the 
captors (Merriman, p. 175). 
  
Certainly, the men were lucky to be alive, but they were also smart enough to stay 
put and must have worked together to get themselves hidden away from the Germans as 
they came through during the offensive that occurred around them.  Fortune favors those 
who are smart enough to seize opportunities presented, and these men wasted little time 
in hiding.  The snow provided an additional layer of cover for them.  But ultimately, the 
small trio knew that if one of them was to break silence, run, or make any move that it 
would have been a death sentence for all of them. In short, they had their own group 
leadership surface in order to protect them and see them through the crisis. 
 
Summary of Spontaneous Leadership Actions 
Cases of spontaneous leadership occurring appear regularly throughout the 
accounts.  We have presented examples of pairs and small groups of men almost 
automatically assuming or following both leadership and behavioral cues that were 
reactive to the environment around them.  Much of this was informal and by many 
definitions might not have been classified as leadership because it resulted in tragic 
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consequences or ignoring ethical norms.  Yet, this behavior occurred and was practiced 
by the groups in much the same way as if they had been trained to know how to do it or 
follow such patterns. So, for better or worse, spontaneous leadership brought out 
something in the men that was not instilled there from training or directive.  It was a 
bubbling to the surface of traits, good or bad, that were drawn out because of the 
circumstances of the events that were happening. 
 Throughout this chapter we have observed several different manifestations of 
spontaneous leadership traits in groups.  They are categorized below: 
Immediate and fluid group roles:  Scattered men coming together to form ad hoc 
groups to react to situations, followed by different leaders surfacing and role 
changing 
Long term informal and inter-group roles: Prisoners of war interacting among their 
own groups and between groups (British/British, British-American) at the camp, all 
while individually being free to follow their conscience with regards to escape 
attempts. 
Sudden informal leadership abdication:  Soldiers fooling around with a deadly bomb, 
or soldiers on patrol or in the fight ignoring ethical norms as a result of the stresses, 
group think, and overwhelming feelings of violence around them. 
Camaraderie leadership: Groups of two or three where one member naturally asserted 
himself and took charge in an instance motivated to take care of his comrade and self, 
as in small recon teams sent out away from the main force. 
Instantaneous small group self-preservation: When a group takes immediate action, 
with no dissent and little or no discussion in order to save itself. 
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The inference that can be drawn from these accounts is clear - leadership traits 
come to the surface when conditions require that to happen.  Were it not for emergence of 
this leadership trait response or mechanism, many of the men, in these accounts and those 
with them would have faced a much greater challenge to survive, and in many cases may 
not have survived. The factors which cause this phenomenon to happen are more than 
simply bravery or self-preservation. The added dimension and synergy of the group, and 
the dynamics brought out in this environment calls for leadership, in one form or another, 
for better or for worse. 
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CHAPTER 14 
TRAINING FOR D-DAY 
 
Introduction 
The preparation of the troops for D-Day was a monumental task.   Nearly every 
account referred to the training that was received in one form or another prior to the 
invasion.  Most accounts presented the training in a positive manner, with few 
exceptions.  The link between performance, training, leadership, and traits will be 
examined in this chapter. We will look at how leaders trained soldiers, how formal 
training impacted leadership, and finally we will discuss whether training brought out 
latent leadership traits, waiting for circumstance and event to cause them to germinate 
and grow, or whether training was the foundation upon which their leadership was built. 
Types of Soldier Training for D-Day 
D-Day training was given high marks by most accounts in a multitude of areas.  
The training given varied for each specialty, it was not simply drill and ceremony, 
marching, and marksmanship.  The accounts give a vivid and realistic portrayal of what 
that training was like and how the men felt about it, both at the time, as well as years 
later.  Although some accounts include some mistakes in place names, they certainly 
were more than adequate to give a geographic location and description of what the 
experience was like.  
 Most soldiers went through basic training, military occupational specialty 
training, and then were shipped over to England, mostly, for further training and 
exercises prior to the invasion.  On the other hand, a good number of soldiers in our 
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accounts received additional training or were in elite units such as the 101st and 82nd 
Airborne Divisions.  At least 26 of the men interviewed were Airborne and two others 
were Rangers.  Additionally, 16 of the 108 accounts used were from officers, many of 
them being former enlisted soldiers. Others had training that varied from linguistics 
training to high tech communications and avionics.  
 In addition to the training they received from the military, the men brought their 
own sets of skills with them.  Jobs included boatbuilding, farming, lithography, clerical 
work, and trucking. Several were students who quit high school, others were in college. 
Their civilian work was not a large factor in their military jobs, but their life experiences 
did seem to play a role, particularly when discussing leadership experience preparation. 
One example of this was provided by David Roderick who joined the Army in 1940 at 
age 16. Roderick’s parents were both dead.  The circumstances of the Depression made 
for tough times. Roderick decided it would be better for the family if he went into the 
world and joined the Army. He was a natural athlete, and played all the typical sports of 
young American s of his day: football, basketball, and baseball. He continued playing 
sports in both the military and later on in college.  Roderick was in the 4th Infantry 
Division and he recalled his company commander this way:  
 
I was with the 22nd Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division when we 
landed on Utah Beach on D-Day.  My training was good, and my 
company commander was a West Point graduate, and a strict 
disciplinarian. He followed through with his West Point training to be sure 
that we were the best-trained as possible (Roderick, p. 210). 
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We see in Roderick a way where his talents in team sports enabled him to adapt to 
the military, perhaps better than others of his generation who were drafted.  The tough 
life of the Depression gave him few options, but he was fit and he had drive, so he went 
into the military, and after successfully completing his service, he even went on to 
college.  He did not do too badly for a depression era kid who was on his own at 16.  
Roderick’s military training was provided by the military, but by the time he reached 
Normandy, for him, and many others, life had already hardened and steeled his resolve 
for success. Roderick’s leadership and drive seem to have emerged early because he was 
a team-player and was able to handle military life at a young age.  While training 
certainly helped him, he must have had a lot of personal drive to have gotten as far as he 
had on his own. A trait such as this was not learned at D-Day, it was already inside him 
back in 1940.  He had the raw material inside of him.  However, he also notes the 
leadership of his commander, whose discipline also had an effect on him and helped him, 
either through example or task, to think beyond the present situation and look forward to 
college and graduation.  
Before proceeding into more of the accounts, it would be helpful to point some of 
the background empirical data of the typical soldier of World War II, specifically in 
regards to the indoctrination and integration of the huge influx of “citizen soldiers” who 
almost overnight transformed the small professional pre-World War II Army into the one 
that showed up on the beaches of Normandy less than three years later.  It was a 
remarkable transformation. The problem that faced the Army was how to train thousands 
of young recruits and turn them in to soldiers in as little a time as possible: 
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To return to the Army’s problem of indoctrinating its leaders and its “led,” 
we repeat that the critical problem was to mobilize informal pressures of 
the soldiers  in support of their fellows who conformed and against the 
nonconformist, and to maximize the internalization of the controls through 
habituation.  Moreover, unlike society at large, which has the entire period 
of childhood to mold the plastic youth into the image of a citizen, the 
Army had to move very fast indeed (Stouffer et al., 1949, p. 411). 
 
 
 The above paragraph summarizes the problem and showed the need to develop 
internalization of Army values and ways of doing business rapidly.  The findings of the 
basic training experience study summed up what the typical recruit experienced.  It said 
that it was more than simply molding the soldiers from external pressure of the formal 
training- it was a combination of many factors that came together and worked towards 
making the individual function as part of the larger organization.  The purpose was not to 
create a mindless automaton, but a soldier who could in a short time function as a critical 
part of the team.   The internal values of being a man, American, and peer pressure all 
played into this: 
 
The basic training period was, therefore, not one of gradual inculcation of 
the Army mores, but one of intensive shock treatment.  The new recruit, a 
lone individual, is helplessly insecure in the bewildering newness and 
complexity of his environment.  Also he is a man; he must show that he is 
tough enough to “take it.” He is an American; the Army is a means to 
winning the War; he must do his best or lose face at home.  With personal 
insecurity on the one hand, and the motivation to “see it through” on the 
other, he is malleable to the “discipline,” which consists of a fatiguing 
physical ordeal and a continued repletion o facts until the y become semi-
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automatic, in an atmosphere dominated by fear.  As one recruit put it, 
perhaps with exaggeration, “The recruit is warned and threatened, shouted 
at and sworn at, punished and promised further punishments with such 
frequency and from so many sides that he gets to gets to be like the rat in 
the neurosis production experiment.  He soon comes to fear the Army and 
his superiors who represent it.”  The individual recruit is powerless.  He 
finds solace in the company of his fellows, who are new and bewildered 
like himself, but who now, with all escapes blocked by fear of formal 
punishment, further each other’s adjustment to the inevitable by applying 
sanctions of their own to those who “can’t take it.”  The fear of being 
thought less than a man by one’s buddies can be as powerful control factor 
as the fear of the guardhouse.  When the former is socially directed to 
reinforce the latter, the Army has begun to succeed in building a soldier- a 
process which continues until as much as possible is internalized and 
automatized in the form of “conscience” (Stouffer et al., 1949, p. 412). 
 
 Basic training was only one part of the challenge. The rest of the job was getting 
these men to fit into the units they were joining, often as fresh recruits who knew nothing 
of the informal rules and ways of doing business within the unit. For the leaders of these 
units, this was a significant problem.  General Gavin’s earlier mentioned strategy of 
keeping a strong cadre behind in England paid big dividends once the invasion started, as 
it helped keep a level of continuity in the organization.  Overall, the problem of getting 
all of these men integrated into the ever expanding Army was a significant challenge, and 
the Stouffer study summed up what the empirical data showed: 
The learning process was complicated by the fact that the formal rules, detailed 
and elaborate as they were, and embodying the past experience and long traditions of the 
regular Army, were progressively inundated by a flood of new and rapidly modified 
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enactments required to meet the ever-changing situation presented by the rapid growth of 
the civilian Army and by the new demands of World War II.   
Simultaneously, ever larger and larger  proportions of both commissioned and 
non-commissioned officers comprised hastily trained civilians who could hardly  have 
mastered all the old Regular Army rules and regulations, much less the new ones.  Little 
wonder , under these circumstances, that the rules and regulations  with which the 
bewildered recruit frequently  found himself confronted were those improvised, 
remembered, or looked up for the occasion  by the current commander, sometimes in 
support of his personal predilections or purposes (Stouffer et al., 1949,  p. 412).  Irv 
Koplovitz gives an account that was typical of the training many of the soldiers who went 
to Normandy experienced in their preparation for the invasion.  Koplovitz went to basic 
training, and then more specialized training, that was to ready him for his role in the 
invasion: 
 
I was drafted into the service in July, 1942. After basic training at Atlantic 
City, New Jersey, I went to Ft. Logan, Colorado mainly to be trained for 
engineering and operations.  I was then assigned to a troop carrier 
command and I went to Louisville, Kentucky for more training, then I was 
sent to Texas. I was a private during this training period. I worked in an 
office that was mostly orderly procedure stuff. Once guys got in, and made 
it through basic training – and it didn’t matter if they were drafted of 
volunteered – they were all the same. They knew what to expect.  
 
In the 30 days I had all this training, I learned more during that time than 
four years of college when it came to handling the paperwork needs of the 
troops. My biggest effort came when soldiers got their pay and letters 
from home. Having both of these things done on time was a big morale 
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booster for the troops. I was always taught that if you have a group of men 
that are happy and content with their jobs, you will have a good outfit, and 
that’s exactly what we were (Koplovitz, p. 120). 
  
Another example of how the training prior to D-Day was conducted is given by 
the 9th ID’s John Johnson, a former boat builder turned infantry soldier: 
 
I: What sort of training did you get? 
 
J: Infantry training 
 
I: Did that prepare you for what you needed to do later? 
 
J: It certainly did.  For ten weeks of hard training.  Infantry training. 
We landed first in Glasgow and de-boated in Balfran (?) and trained (took 
a train) to England to a tent camp. 
 
I: So you were then in a tent camp in England? 
 
J: That’s right… I don’t know the name of the town.  It was a small place.   
 
I: What sort of training did you do in England then? 
 
J: We did briefings and that sort of thing to keep us busy.  We had dry 
runs…at camp. 
 
I: What did they consist of? 
 
J: On D-day we were ready to go.  It’s a dry run, don’t go back to get the 
tents … and finally one day it happened. (Johnson, p. 114). 
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 Johnson’s account does not refer much to the appearance of traits, but it 
nonetheless describes the process the soldiers went through.  This process added a level 
of confidence and competency in the tasks they would be called upon to perform when 
they hit combat.  The relationship to leadership and traits drawn from this and other 
similar accounts is that the training served as a way to unlock the traits that were in the 
solider, to get him comfortable with leading actions, and to spur development of leaders 
who were already in place.  In Johnson’s case, this training paid big dividends, not in his 
own actions, but in the actions of those who saved him after he was wounded: 
 
 I: Sir, what would be your most vivid memory of the war? 
 
J: I think that the thing that impressed me the most was the way I was 
evacuated after I was wounded.  The medics got to me right away and two 
of them took me out on my rifle just like we were trained to and the 
medics and the hospital staff at the field hospital made me so comfortable. 
That stood out (Johnson, p. 117). 
 
 Another perspective comes from Lieutenant Frederick Crispin, was a navigator in 
a C47 that carried troops over to the drop zone on D-Day.  When asked about any parting 
comments on the overall experience, he stated: 
 
We were so well-trained and so well provided for that after the war I 
realized the support we had. During the war I didn't realize it, but all of 
those tires, and brakes, and gears, and gliders had to come from 
somewhere.  [laughs]  I didn't realize it at the time.  The only thing I knew 
was that we had brought our own plane over (Crispin, p. 54). 
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The training was all part of a larger effort, an effort that went far beyond the 
training he had received.  The British Navy’s Henry Roy Chilton described his training 
this way: 
 
There was a lot involved with the training for us in 1943. We were trained 
with rifles and basic seamanship. It was hard training. I went from basic 
training to another base where the Royal Marines were trained near the 
coast by the River Thames. I was put into combined operations.  
 
We trained right up to the time of D-Day. I felt there was something 
important on the cards as we were moved around the country to various 
places. I think we all knew that this training was all about something big 
(Chilton, p. 36). 
 
Nearly all the men in the study reported they felt a sense of importance in the 
training prior to the invasion. Chilton’s comments reflect this.  This may have added to 
their focus as they got closer to the actual event.    
Carl Cannon was a soldier from the 4th Infantry Division.  He was not drafted, but 
instead enlisted in 1940 and was a seasoned veteran by June, 1944: 
 
I enlisted in March of 1940. We didn’t have basic training in a traditional 
sense then – we had individual unit training. I was in the 8th Infantry 
Division when we went to maneuvers in Louisiana {Editor’s note: The 
Louisiana Maneuvers was a massive field exercise in Louisiana involving 
thousands of soldiers (Perry, 2007).}, then back to Fort Benning when we 
joined the 4th Infantry Division, which was forming at the time.  
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I was still at Fort Benning when Pearl Harbor happened. I would say the 
training was “good exercise” and after North Africa we developed more 
special training to adapt to the way the war was going. Anyways, we 
moved to Camp Gordon Georgia for more training before we went to 
Europe. The way we trained depended on which enemy we were going to 
Face. We trained in Florida on the West coast near Tampa for our beach 
training.  We trained on LCD’s on the east coast of Florida and trained on 
shore landings.  
 
We went to New Jersey, and took an old British ship to Liverpool, 
England, and began intense training near Exeter. We were training three 
times a week, sometimes overnight. They would move us to camps where 
they kept us under wraps and none of us could go anywhere (Cannon, p. 
26). 
 
 Richard Harrison was a member of the 82nd Airborne Division. He summed up 
the impact of his training experience and what it brought out in him with this statement: 
 
After awhile, we felt like our ‘number’ was up, but I think I did a fairly 
good job while I was there. All the hardships made me much better as a 
man, and I must add that my training at Fort Benning was excellent. It 
prepared me for the job I had to do in Europe, to never “quit” at anything, 
and that stayed with me all my life (Harrison, p. 107).  
 
 Harrison’s take away from the experience was to “never ‘quit’ at anything”, 
something that he felt was directly related to the tough training he received at Fort 
Benning.  This helped him and many others succeed in the Army and the challenges they 
faced at Normandy. The training was varied, and opportunities to emerge as a leader 
presented themselves in many ways to all the men in the accounts. More training may 
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have added to their focus as they got closer to the actual invasion itself.   Additionally, 
because of all of the additional interest and effort placed on the units, soldiers, and new 
systems, it is likely that they also experienced what is described as the Hawthorne Effect 
(Landsberger, 1955): a higher output in performance because of the type of environment 
and feelings of competence to do their work (mission) (Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson, 
2001, pp. 57-59).  These men received a lot of interest and special training. They believed 
in what they were doing, especially those in elite units, in terms of the training.  As we 
transition to that aspect of training, we will see that the attention and challenge of such 
units brought together a tougher, smarter, group of men, whose commitment and bravery 
were tested long before they ever got on board a transport to England.  
 
 “I wanna be an Airborne Soldier…” 
  
The title of this section is part of the refrain from a typical airborne cadence sung 
for the last sixty-plus years.  Many of the men at D-day were sky soldiers, and their 
accounts from Sainte-Mère-Église and Sainte Marie du Mont have been listed throughout 
this discussion.  These men were in units that were elite for their time, and that continue 
to be elite today.   For those soldiers who had the drive to excel and the courage to do so, 
there was Airborne, Ranger, and other challenging specialty training. In 1944, being 
Airborne was still a very new and scary proposition. Consider that air flight itself was 
barely over a quarter century old.   Add the prospect of jumping out of a perfectly good 
airplane into a field where people are shooting at you, and the picture is darker still.  Yet, 
for the Airborne soldiers, there was a pride and dignity that took a stronger hold on its 
members than the fear.  Men like Ridgway and Gavin recognized the need for such units 
to have more esprit de corps and higher standards, so that men who were motivated for a 
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higher purpose would be proud to be part of that unit.  In the two-volume study by 
Stouffer and the War Department, (1949), this issue was examined.   Additionally, this is 
a further indication of the Hawthorne Effect written about by Elton Mayo in his 
observations from work studies in the 1920’s (Hersey, Blanchard & Johnson, 1972, pp. 
57-59).  Although drill and ceremony can be repetitive and details can be monotonous, 
soldiering goes far beyond this, especially for Airborne soldiers and Rangers. 
Did training play a role in this, or was there something more? To understand this, 
we need to understand a little bit of the background of why some men chose to even 
become members of parachute units. Part of the drive and motivation for being part of 
such units may have come from a desire to distinguish oneself from being simply another 
member who was out doing his duty just by being part of the machine. According to The 
American Soldier, Volume II, by Stouffer and colleagues (1949), by World War II, the 
distinction between combat soldier and non-combat soldier was sharper, while at the 
same time, society was not so judgmental if one had not been in combat, so long as one 
had at least shared in the burdens of serving the country in war.  There was an 
expectation of service, but Stouffer (1949) notes a marked shift in societal mores from 
those of World War I.  A good portion of the men in the accounts were looking for a 
greater challenge, and they found it at D-Day.  One passage from the Stouffer book 
highlights some of the aspects of this societal shift: 
 
In  World War II there was much less community pressure  on the young 
man to get into the Army  There were few  real counterparts to the white 
feather, painting homes yellow, use of the epithet “slacker.”  The general 
attitude was that everyone should do what he was assigned as well as he 
could, but it was not considered essential that the individual ”stick his 
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neck out.” To over-simplify, it might be said that in World War II the test 
of social manhood began much farther from actual fighting than in World 
War I.  In the First World War, a man was more severely censured for 
failing to enter the armed forces; this time, the test was more nearly 
whether he adequately filled his role once placed in the combat situation. 
 
Combat posed a challenge for a man to prove himself to himself and 
others.  Combat was a dare.  One never knew for sure that he could take it 
until he had demonstrated that he could.  Most soldiers facing the prospect 
of combat service had to deal with a heavy charge of anticipatory anxiety.  
The more they heard about how tough the fighting was, the greater the 
anxiety and the insecurity that came from doubt as to whether they could 
handle the anxiety.  Thus, combat might actually come almost as a relief—
it joined the issue and broke the strain of doubt and waiting (Stouffer et 
al., 1949, p. 131). 
 
In summary, it seems that Airborne training and other training like it played a 
vital role in satisfying the desire for adventure and warrior spirit that had, according to 
this study, diminished throughout much of society by the early 1940s. The warrior spirit 
of these men was not satisfied with clerking or KP duty, and so they looked for 
opportunities to step out and become something more.  Knowing this explains some of 
the reasons why many of the men in our accounts voluntarily underwent extremely 
rigorous and dangerous training, just to get the chance to be the first in either by scaling a 
cliff to get shot at or by dropping from the sky and getting shot at. Either way, it took a 
lot of raw, courage, determination, and leadership to get to such a point.  The following 
accounts give a picture of the training these men endured, as well as how they responded 
to it. For example, Frank Bilich enlisted in the Army a week after he graduated high 
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school.  Despite flat feet and a heart murmur, Bilich not only completed the standard 
training, he even went on to jump training.  His Sergeant, nicknamed Flash Gordon {after 
the serial film hero} led by example: 
 
There was a sergeant we called “Flash Gordon” who could really do 
anything. If he told us to run five miles, he would do those five miles with 
us. At the end of jump training, we all knew what we had to do.  While I 
was in paratrooper training, my mother had run into a woman in a store 
whose son was with me and found out that I had joined the paratroopers. 
Of course, this wasn’t part of what she had envisioned when I originally 
joined the infantry and she called the Chaplain at Fort Benning and 
arranged to meet with me. She took a train from Chicago all the way to 
Georgia to try and talk me out of staying with the paratroop regiment but 
there was no way I was going to give up (Bilich, p. 269). 
 
Bilich disregarded his own congenital frailties and his mom’s entreaties to avoid 
such dangerous duty, and made his way into Airborne history.   Fellow Division member 
Francis Lamoureux recalls the training even more vividly:  
 
 Intensive training, training, training, all the time.  But that training at 
McCall was fantastic, that’s where I got really know what kind of man 
Colonel Mendez was. 19  He would run our ass off.  He would run us until 
we’d drop.  When you see that guy ahead of you and he doesn’t drop, 
you’ve got to keep up.  Of course that first week at jump school, if you 
don’t survive that first week you’re out, they don’t want paratroopers that 
can hold on, so they really put us through the ropes.  The marines can brag 
about what tough training they got, but I think we got a damn tough 
                                                 
19
 Lieutenant Colonel Louis Gonzaga Mendez, Jr. was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his 
actions during combat in World War II (Zabecki, 2009).  
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training down there when we were at Fort Benning in paratroop school 
just that one week there.  Different stages, you’ve got first stage, second, 
third, fourth stages of it, but that first week was like hell, they put you 
through hell, obstacle courses, ju jitsu, you’d get so, at the end of the day 
you’d be luck to climb up and throw yourself on the bunk.  The next 
morning every muscle in your body is stiff and you try and go down the 
stairs and you’re crippled and think how am I going to survive another day 
of this … but then by the end of the week, you’ve got it made. 
 
Lamoureux completed training at the Airborne school in Fort Benning. This 
training was followed by training at Camp McCall, where Lamoureux participated 
in exercises that went on regardless of the weather: 
 
… those exercises took you out in the woods in the rain and lightning. 
Guys were being killed by lightning.  We’d have little battles and 
skirmishes, we’d go out with water with just a canteen and spend a whole 
day out and come back and you had to have a canteen left, and if you 
didn’t you were in trouble.  Go get some pushups.  Yeah, they put us 
through the test at McCall (Lamoureux, p. 123). 
  
Another 82nd soldier who went through the tough training that was typical of the 
Division was Duke Boswell. His summation of the training is wrapped up in this 
statement: 
 
The training we got before the invasion was the most important part of our 
success, I think. Having enough ammunition was the next thing along with 
watching each other’s backs all the time. We knew that the awareness of 
the man next to you might be the difference between life and death for 
everyone on the team.  
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We – the airborne soldiers had done so well in our missions that the 
ground commanders requested us to join their forces often. We were 
always moving, and always fighting (Boswell, p. 5). 
 
Duke Boswell said that the training he received as an Airborne Soldier prior to the 
invasion gave him a confidence in his ability to do his mission, and, more importantly, it 
helped him develop a trust in the men on his team. One explanation of this would be that 
the training was a catalyst for bringing out bonding traits that helped cement the group 
response.  Thus, the application of stress prior to the invasion resulted in better 
performance of the men when they reached combat, at least according to their points of 
view.   This gives further support to the premise that leadership traits emerge in a crisis 
atmosphere, real or perceived, or under battle stress, and are part of the internal make up 
of most people as a survival mechanism. 
 Bilich, Lamoureux, and Boswell all had tough training prior to D-Day. They were 
mentally tested, physically challenged to their limits, and subjected to restrictions that at 
times were almost prison-like.  Tucker and Cannon both described humble backgrounds 
and had entered the Army prior to the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor.  All three men 
had to have passed tough challenges just to become Airborne soldiers.  However, the 
challenge to get into the unit, and that they overcame that challenge, leads to the 
observation that training was what catalyzed their leadership abilities, just as was 
reported in the conclusions of the empirical data in the Army Study.  A good measure of 
the success of the training was the fact that these men survived D-Day and the War, and 
they were leaders in their own right, in separate units.  Thus, the organizational training 
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effect should not be discounted as a factor in leadership and the emergence of trait 
leadership in a crisis.   
 It is important to note, that it seemed to be more the triggering action of what was 
already within rather than something that they got because of the particular training. This 
is an important point.  Training is important and necessary, but the individual has, as has 
been shown throughout the accounts, a certain level of innate ability. From these 
observations, it seems that the training brings out what is already there in the solider, but 
training does not place the ability in the individual. This is an important distinction which 
sheds light on training and its purpose and value for developing leaders.  The summation 
of this principle is that good training will bring out good leaders, but it will not bring all 
leadership traits to the surface. Different training experiences will trigger different traits 
at different times, and this is also contingent on the readiness and maturity of the 
individual. 
 
Integration and training of new soldiers   
 A critical job of a leader is to ensure continuity within the organization. In 
combat, this became a monumental task.  The leader had to take care of his soldiers who 
were already trained veterans, as well as had the additional task of getting replacement 
troops ready to fight and do their mission.  Leaders who displayed concern for their 
soldiers and took the time to train the recruits were also taking time away from their own 
rest or recovery, putting themselves at risk when they had to rely on the courage of 
untested soldiers, and were forced to carry a heavier burden of responsibility, in addition 
to the actual job training that had to be done.   
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 The leadership traits required to lead a team and integrate new members into it 
included maturity, communication skills, and intelligence, as well as a level of 
compassion and understanding that allowed them to sense what needed to be done to get 
the individual soldier up to a level of confidence to function in combat. This was no easy 
task.  Many men were suspicious of the untried green soldiers.  Those who succeeded in 
this task were indeed special men.  The United States Army calls the non-commissioned 
officer the backbone of the organization.  The accounts from non-commissioned officers 
in the study demonstrate this in many ways. The men from our study who were charged 
with this training and leading these soldiers were from all types of units.  The things they 
had in common were the sense of responsibility and the intrinsic motivation to look out 
for their troops, in this case, rookies.   
 Don L. Dicks was a member of the 82nd Airborne Division’s 508th Parachute 
Infantry Regiment.  He took his role as squad leader seriously and watched out for the 
new men:  
 
On D-Day I was a squad leader in the 1st platoon, Co. “I”, 508th 
Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division. We had basic 
infantry training in the states and after the Tennessee maneuvers in ‘43 we 
came over to Ireland and trained there for about 30 days while they was 
getting our tent city ready in England.  
 
The Normandy peninsula was our last big go around. We went back to 
England and got our replacements, and went through some training. I tried 
to match recruits up with what I call “regulars” when they first come to 
our unit, always with a fellow who had experience and so I told the young 
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men, “You listen to what he tells you and do what he tells you and he’ll 
train you (Dicks, pp. 58-59). 
  
The wisdom from more than 60 years in the past is as relevant today as it was 
then.  Dicks did not lead from reading a manual or a focus group.  He told his men what 
they needed to do and what they needed to know.  He used a typical Army approach by 
making sure each newcomer had a battle buddy to learn from and keep him out of 
trouble.  He followed his instincts and took care of his squad. 
 The use of veterans to train new troops was hardly a new idea. It was part of the 
integration plan for maintaining the 82nd Airborne Division’s unit continuity, and it was 
applied in many different ways in other organizations as well.  For example, Clifford 
Goodall, a Navy Signalmen recalls his experience of being shipped from the Atlantic 
theater to the Pacific theater in anticipation of the Invasion of Japan: 
 
This was probably around September, but I had been over in England 
since January of 1944.  They said we need all you guys with the supposed 
experience out on the west coast so that you can train these other sailors 
for the invasion of Japan. …I got out there and spent about three months 
doing absolutely nothing (Goodall, p. 97). 
 
Fortunately for Goodall he did not have to participate in the Invasion of Japan, as 
the War ended before that became necessary.  Nevertheless, he and many others, Army, 
Navy, or otherwise, were sent in large numbers back to the States and the West Coast to 
prepare for it. Many accounts in the study make reference to this, indicating that the men 
who served at D-Day were not only survivors; but also leaders and trainers whose 
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knowledge and experience on the battlefield and carrying out operations was seen as a 
critical skill.  
This review has shown that the experiences in training and integration from the 
veteran’s accounts gives weight to the theory that leadership traits surfaced under the 
stressful, event-packed conditions of D-Day, and other similar experiences. It shows that 
integration played an important part in triggering this behavior for the role of the leader, 
as well as in creating the conditions for the integrating soldiers to have their own 
leadership traits emerge as they became part of the team.  
 
Other training 
 
Airborne and elite unit training was not the only training that was a priority for 
the invasion.  Other training required men with certain skill sets and traits that were not 
common to all soldiers.  One example of this critical training was in intelligence 
gathering.  Arnold C. Franco, the radio message interceptor for the Air Force, had parts 
of his account introduced in earlier in this work.  His skill sets were not in hand-to-hand 
combat, but nonetheless he had to perform as a leader and execute missions that were 
critical to the effort.  His account is a portrait of someone who was smart, mature, 
responsible, and dependable, with a strong work ethic.  One had to have these qualities in 
order to do the mission he was called to do.  Franco describes the process of training, and 
how he and the team he was on stepped up their performance as the mission became real 
time. He and nine other men were first trained at Michigan State University in German. 
This was followed by training at Vint Hill Farms in Warrenton, Virginia at a signal 
intelligence center. The men joined a newly formed organization called the 3rd Radio 
Squadron Mobile G (for Germany).  It was a part of the Ninth Air Force.  The Air Force’s 
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job was to win the Air War in Europe. Franco and his men played a crucial role 
monitoring transmissions of the German Luftwaffe: 
 
It was given extreme priority.  The job was to monitor the German Air 
Force, the Luftwaffe, and it had several sections.  One was what we called 
the Voice Intercept – people who were listening to German pilots talking.  
Others, like me were trained in Code Breaking; we listened to German 
radio messages, which came from German aircraft talking to German 
Ground stations.  The third section was called Direction Finding; their job 
was to pinpoint those aircraft that we were listening to and find out their 
direction so they could be intercepted by allied fighter aircraft (Franco, 
p.66).   
  
Franco’s work was top secret. Many documents about it were never released to 
the public until years later. One was released as late as 1996.  Franco wrote a 
book about his work called Code to Victory, as told to Aselin Spellman. Franco’s 
efforts were noted by the British Commander who trained them: 
 
Well the British who trained us, [and] the Commander of that group, who 
turned out to be a very famous man – Group Captain Scott-Farnie.  In 
October ’44, four months after the invasion, he wrote a memo to SHAFE 
saying that we were the most effective mobile unit on the continent.  So 
our teachers…in effect, we outdid our teachers (Franco, p. 66). 
  
The training Franco received was very specific and required a person with special 
talents.  Others received training in one area and then found themselves doing a 
completely different job.  But the important thing was what the training evoked in the 
individual.  Frank Bilich, who was mentioned earlier, was a Croatian immigrant from 
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Chicago.  He joined the Army and earned his paratrooper wings serving with the 82nd 
Airborne.  He described how he received one type of training but ended up doing another 
job. His account shows a combination of several themes that have been already 
discussed:  mentorship and loyalty from his First Sergeant, trust in the men around him, 
and confidence in his mission and his cause.  Overall, he sums up what the purpose of all 
that training was about: to be able to trust the men around him as they performed their 
mission together: 
 
When I joined the 505th in Northern Ireland, I sounded off my name and 
the First Sergeant asked to see me after the formation. It turns out he was 
my next door neighbor in Chicago who I used to play softball with when 
we were kids. He told me to pay attention to everything or that I wouldn’t 
make it home. Having my old neighbor with me made things a lot easier 
for me.  
 
The Army trains you for one thing but you end up doing another. I was 
trained for demolitions but ended up with a radio, which I only used one 
time during the entire war.  
 
The jump into Normandy was the easy part. It was what happened every 
minute after the landing that made everything scary. … My first 
experience in combat was about ten o’clock that morning. We were 
walking up a road and some Germans opened up on us. We scattered in all 
directions until some of our guys knocked them down and we were on our 
way.  
 
I was perfectly at ease in the battles we fought because the guy on my left 
and the guy on my right was the best that could be and I could trust my 
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life to them. We had a job to do, and we didn’t question it. I knew we were 
all family and we still are today. (Bilich, p. 269)  
  
Franco, Bilich, and countless others trained to do one job and did another, but 
ultimately they were all soldiers.  They all went to D-Day and did their duty and were 
ready for the leadership within them to emerge when the circumstances and events called 
for it.   
 
Tragedy in Training 
 
Training was difficult.  The exercises that people participated in were often 
dangerous.  Particularly, Slapton Sands was a training disaster of such magnitude that 
survivors or men involved had to be kept separate from the rest of the soldiers and sworn 
to secrecy so that word would not get out and affect morale, or perhaps overall public 
opinion, so great was the scale of the loss of life due to enemy activity, security breaches, 
and failure of leaders and equipment. Slapton Sands was a training beach off the coast of 
England.  The Allied plan was to use this area as a warm-up for D-Day because it 
allowed them to replicate many of the conditions that the invasion force would be facing 
in Normandy. Unfortunately, the training had some terrible twists that more than 
replicated the conditions, and it turned from a training exercise into a tragedy. 
The event at Slapton Sands was a test of not only the mettle of the soldiers who 
trained there, but also of the commanders and the leaders who planned it, and who had to 
live with the consequences of the event.  It was to be a large scale exercise to prepare for 
the invasion.  Unfortunately, things went very wrong.  The D-Day veterans provide the 
details about what happened.  We can see from their accounts what traits surfaced under 
 244 
 
the stress of that event, how leaders acted, and how their followers, the men who recalled 
the events and experienced it acted and reacted.  The analysis of this event and its impact 
on the veterans prior to D-Day is important, despite the training tragedy that occurred, 
because it gave leaders at all levels the opportunity to experience the combined effects of 
running multi-phased operations and a last minute reality prior to the invasion. 
Irv Smolens, of the 4th Infantry Division, discussed Operation Tiger in his 
account.  He said that although it had tragic results, it served an important role in 
preparing for the Normandy Invasion, and that without the lessons learned from it the 
invasion would not have been as successful. But there was a high price.  This idea was to 
be tested on Slapton Sands in “Operation Tiger”:  
 
We completed our part of the practice invasion and returned to our billets. 
Later on that evening, the support units were attacked by German E-Boats, 
like our PT boats on the water, sinking two LST’s and almost 1000 Army, 
Navy and Coast Guardsmen were killed during that afternoon. 
 
The local fishermen were complaining for years after the war that their 
nets were being caught there all the time. So, they sent a diver down and 
they found a Sherman Tank on the bottom. It was a secret operation and 
the families were not notified until after D-Day that their loved ones had 
died.  Ike made sure that every one of the bodies was recovered because 
some of the officers had the D-Day invasion plans on them when they 
were really killed, which was April of 1944. 
 
To me, this was the biggest part of the D-Day story. Without exercises like 
the one at Slapton Sands, the invasion would never have been the success 
that it was (Smolens, p. 235). 
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Harold F. McCauley was a 4th Infantry Division DUKW operator at D-Day. His 
abbreviated account describes his background in the war prior to D-Day. McCauley’s 
account of Slapton Sands was partially presented in the Chronology Chapter. The account 
we examine in this section gives more detail about the event and specifically how the 
mistakes by commanders impacted the soldiers only weeks prior to the invasion. He gives 
details of the formation of the unit and, specifically, he gives a perspective of Slapton 
Sands that does not gloss over what happened. McCauley was a veteran of several 
invasions (North Africa, Italy) by the time he reached Utah Beach.  His unit was the first 
amphibious truck company formed, and saw action in North Africa, Sicilay, and 
Normandy.  He took part in many actions of the War. Yet, Slapton Sands stood out from 
all of this and left an indelible imprint on him.  His account is lengthy, but it gives a vivid 
portrayal of the life of what the men and the organization faced the challenge of 
participating in an invasion.  Additionally, it shows the breadth of interaction between 
leaders and average soldiers, as McCauley discusses how he met Eisenhower and was at 
many of the same briefings prior to the invasion.  In other words, McCauley, though 
separated many degrees by rank from his commander, nevertheless shared many 
experiences with him.  McCauley describes his experiences below. His account not only 
describes Slapton Sands, but also the ordinary, mundane details of average soldiers in the 
war.  His first action was in England and Ireland where they trained and then went on to 
North Africa where the Allied forces fought the French Legion until they joined the 
allies: 
 
M: At that time there was no amphibious DUKWs. And we were still part 
of the 1st Engineer Amphibious Special Brigade. It was kind of a hand-
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picked bunch. We fought the French Foreign Legion for nine days. We got 
the first five DUKWs in Africa and we changed the name to 479th 
Amphibious Truck Company. 
 
I: Okay, you want to explain what a DUKW is... 
 
M: It was a G.I. truck made into a boat. Eighty percent of the parts were 
interchangeable. There was thirty, I would have said thirty-one but they 
say thirty-two in the book now... They were seven feet high and you had 
to crawl up the side of them to get in and jump out of them. And if you 
were getting bombed you would come out in a hurry…  We hauled 40,000 
casualties off of this beach{Editor’s note: Utah Beach}, and the DUKWs 
never quit going for 120 days... 20 
 
I: They made life easier for landings? 
 
M: Well we never had a port, everything that was taken in from in Sicily 
was hauled in by our company, 200 men and every wounded and every 
prisoner hauled out was by our company in Sicily.  
 
We thought we were going home… they said they were going to train 
guys to go into France and it didn't quite work that way. I was on that 
exercise tiger lock [Editor’s note: Exercise Tiger] invasion.  
 
I: Okay, where was that.  
 
M: In the sands where we landed back in. We was never briefed until that 
night, and maybe I shouldn't say this but …were supposed to have been 
guarding our convoy. At 4:00 there were no escorts out there. Not an 
                                                 
20
 Editors Note: 4th Infantry Division was at Utah Beach.  McCauley is most likely referring to his unit, and 
not simply his own DUKW’s for which he was responsible. 
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escort. The British took off… we was doing with no protection, and about 
midnight they opened the ramps and told me to hit, it will be England, we 
didn't know whether we was going to land in France or England. And 
there was a tube with a blue light in it that was two feet across. And I must 
have been out trying to follow the ships … they must have sank the ship 
that I was on a few minutes after I got off (McCauley, p.155). 
 
McCauley was in charge of three DUKWs.  In his account he discusses some of 
the events that he and his comrades faced together. For example, he had a fight with one 
man who ended up becoming one of his best friends:  
 
One guy was an engineer and had been in every outfit in the Army. He 
ended up in our outfit because there was only one place worse than our 
company, and that was Dyers. If we couldn't handle them they went to 
Dyers. This guy had been an engineer and I got into a fight even. I was, he 
said something to me and I broke his nose. (Laughter)  He shouldn't have 
said it and he broke my nose, we fought for twenty minutes. It ended up 
the best fight that any two men ever fought. (talking about after the fight) 
(McCauley, p. 154).  
 
McCauley finished his account by going to back to the Slapton Sands event again. 
As mentioned in the Chronology, McCauley and his friend Dwight Coles went out and 
picked up the floating bodies of men in the water afterwards. He describes bodies being 
bulldozed over and he and his men on lock down for the last weeks prior to the invasion.  
He also describes the briefings, and despite the tragedy of Slapton Sands, shows how 
both leaders and followers kept going and readying themselves for the invasion of 
Normandy:  
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A few guys got out... The 478th Amphibious Truck Company had taken 
cavalry in England out of our company to form and they didn't have 
enough men to have roll call when we got back … they were keeping us 
quiet so they put us in barbed wire for fourteen days with guards on us. 
Seven men per tent and I can't tell you where it was in England but … 
about every two or three days we'd get briefed by Eisenhower and 
Montgomery… (McCauley, pp. 157). 
 
McCauley’s account gives a human touch to the event.  Although he wanders a bit 
with his recollection, it actually gives more substance to the total experience of the 
typical soldier and leader of his day.  One example of this was when as a leader he had to 
deal with a subordinate who was out of line.  He directly confronted the man. There was 
a fight, certainly an unorthodox method in modern leadership conflict resolution, but in 
the end it resolved the issue.  As an experienced leader, he was able to deal with the 
tragedy of loss of lives at Slapton Sands and continued to search for soldiers who had 
been lost in the water.  As a leader, he kept what he knew secret for forty years. It was a 
burden for him to carry, and he was not alone. He mentioned that a General committed 
suicide over what had happened.  It was in fact Rear Admiral Donald P. Moon’s suicide 
that was attributed in part to the Slapton Sands incident (Yung, 2006).  McCauley was 
fortunate to have survived.  History records two major blunders at Slapton Sands: the 
lack of the protection for the LSTs by the Naval Forces, which enabled the German E-
Boats to attack the LSTs, and the live fire that mowed down soldiers as they hit the 
beaches of South Devon, England.  The other issue was that the flotation devices caused 
men to float upside down.  (This was not only bad engineering and design, but also poor 
training for the hundreds of men who ended up drowning both at Slapton Sands, and 
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again at D-Day, as has been mentioned in other accounts).  McCauley also describes how 
he reached a culminating point about burying the dead after Slapton Sands.  He is 
referring to information about the event.  But underlying this is another thought, and that 
is that for him he lost a lot of faith and confidence in the overall leadership around him.  
On the other hand, he still supported his chain of command and did his duty, displaying 
loyalty and discipline.  He searched for lost comrades, again showing loyalty and 
courage, as he and others fished men from the water instead of simply leaving them there, 
despite the dangerous waters and being overwhelmed by the unexpected loss of their 
comrades.  He and the others who survived the event had to have a high level resiliency 
in order to bounce back and then go on to do the mission at D-Day only a few weeks 
later.  Lastly, they were prepared for tough training, but they were probably not expecting 
to deal with a tragedy of this sort to occur, basically under the very eyes of their leaders 
at a training event.   
 
Summary of Training Observations 
 
 The accounts of the study demonstrate that training played an important role in 
energizing and bringing to the surface the myriad traits that were requisite for successful 
leaders.  Clearly there was a link between success on the battlefield and training before 
the event. The more challenging and realistic the training, the better prepared it seems the 
leaders were when they reached Normandy.   However, it also shows that the men all had 
to have a certain level of raw material of their own - traits- which enabled them to pass 
the tests and challenges set out before them.  Lastly, the tragic events at Slapton Sands 
show that although tough realistic training plays an important role as a catalyst in 
developing leaders and preparing soldiers for training, it can come at a high cost, and 
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senior leaders have to weigh this when making plans for large scale exercises which 
require close coordination between several organizations. 
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CHAPTER 15 
WHY THEY DID IT 
 
One question which is related to the study of the leadership at D-Day and 
Normandy is why did they do it?  We have looked at leaders in action at many levels. We 
have described the first line leaders and senior leaders as perceived by the men in the oral 
histories.  Several leadership traits have been shown to emerge either through the 
hardship of battle or through the challenge of tough, realistic training.  What was the 
internal mechanism that propelled these men forward into danger?  This chapter will look 
at some of the factors that made these men act the way they did.   
Private Will Reagan was in the first wave of soldiers who landed at Omaha beach.  
He gives a vivid portrayal of landing at Omaha beach at 0630 on the 6th of June 1944: 
 
Well, there was thirty-six of us in an LCS, I think it was called. Two jeeps 
and two trailers loaded with TNT. Our objective was to go into their 483rd 
Red Dog. No, Dog Red beach… And clear a way for the infantry and the 
tanks and the trucks to come in behind us. Fighting was very heavy. …  
And we were caught in crossfire and we lost quite a bit of our, quite a few 
of our company. I was one of the fortunate ones that made it up to this 
point here. I think our objective was to get to a little town by the name of 
Saint Lo. No, Saint Laurent.  Saint Lo is later. Saint Laurent was up on 
top… and our objective was to get there by noon and I don’t think we 
made it ‘til around three o’clock when the tanks got rolling (Reagan, pg 
202). 
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Reagan continues his narrative of the landing in another part of the interview 
where he recalls how a fellow soldier was concerned about being charged for a 
radio that was damaged by enemy fire.  Reagan himself describes how he was so 
occupied with trying to stay alive and get off the beach that he did not really have 
time to think actually process the idea of the invasion not being successful. For 
Reagan and thousands of others like him, all that mattered was getting off of that 
beach alive: 
 
I: What do you remember about first hitting the beach?  About actually…. 
 
R: Scared. Scared. Very scared, but then after we got going just means that 
you have to keep going or you were going to die there on the beach. 
 
I: Yeah, was the gunfire… 
 
R: MVA’s, MVA’s, artillery, (inaudible) guns, and machine guns. Heavy, 
very heavy. 21 
 
I: Did you lose a lot of equipment? 
 
R: Someone in my company came up to me and he says “My radio doesn’t 
work”. I looked at him and it, looked like Swiss cheese.  I said throw the 
damn thing away, it’s no good anymore or it’s not good to you, not good 
to anybody else. Doesn’t even work. He says “I don’t want to pay for it.” I 
said you never have to pay for it.  And he says… “My radio’s not 
working. It looks like Swiss cheese.”    ….  I’d say out of the thirty-six in 
the platoon, we lost about twenty men that day. 
 
I: Twenty men…so it was fifty percent? 
 
R: Right. 
                                                 
21
 Military Vehicle - Armored 
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I: And how long did it take you to move up the beach, under the firing? 
 
R: I want to say two hours but I’m not really sure… You know, I wasn’t 
really timing it. So it’s hard for me to remember really. 
 
I: Were you just ducking behind whatever was around. 
 
R: Hiding and running to keep going. 
 
I: Yeah. 
 
R: ‘Cause all of us were scared, this was our first time in combat. Well, 
kind of. 
 
I: Was there, was there a feeling that the day just wasn’t going to work 
out? 
 
R: No, I didn’t even think about that. Thought about getting off of there 
and getting home safely. All I wanted to do was get home. And I believe 
that’s the way most of us men felt at the time (Reagan, p. 203). 
 
Reagan’s account gives the picture of an ordinary man caught up in extra-ordinary 
circumstances.  He was too busy to be overcome by the fear that everyone felt.  They had 
to concentrate on the task at hand: getting off of that beach and out of the line of fire.  
Half the men in the platoon had been lost in the initial landing.  Reagan and the other 
survivors from his platoon made it to their objective after a long and grueling day. 
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How did Reagan’s platoon of soldiers hold themselves together?  Part of the 
answer is found in group training - the induction and indoctrination of the troops who 
made up the Army.   Stouffer writes: 
 
The rigid and complexly hierarchical Army organization, with its accompanying 
set of formal rules, was the Army’s main answer to the stress and confusion of 
battle.  The soldier was not an individual atom in the tide of warfare; he was an 
integral part of a vast system of discipline and coordination.  The chain of 
command was implemented by stringent sanctions for failures to conform.  Men 
faced combat in tightly organized formal groups, and were held in those groups 
by the ultimate sanctions their society wielded, including the power, almost never 
used, of punishment by death.  Thus, the individual in combat was simultaneously 
guided, supported, and coerced by a framework of organization (Stouffer et al., 
1949, p. 97). 
 
 In other words, part of what propelled these men forward was the organizational 
pull of the group. The glue that made this pull effective was seen in the societal norms 
and expectations that were like gates that pulled the soldier further and further into the 
unit, until he felt compelled to act as the others, and that to not do so, would become 
unthinkable.  This was a combination of external and internal coercion. It had to be done 
quickly in order to turn an average citizen into a soldier who could perform missions 
under fire.  One wounded veteran who served in the Sicily and Italian campaign 
described it this way in the Stouffer study, “You get a habit of taking orders when you’re 
in training so that when they tell you to do something, you do so without thinking” 
(Stouffer, 1949, p. 98). 
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 Fighting for the Team with Faith 
  
Empirical data from the Stouffer study suggests that more often than not, soldiers 
performed better and did their mission because they felt a strong bond and loyalty to their 
unit.  In other words, they often did their duties because they felt they could not let the 
team down.  But faith and prayer also played a role alongside the team motivation in 
moving them forward and to maintain their composure.  Daryl Whitfield made this 
remark about his faith at Normandy: 
 
The worst battle in Normandy for me was at a crossroads near a town.  A 
guy from my unit captured some German artillerymen.  I remember 
learning how to talk to God when a German 88 {Author’s note: anti-tank} 
gun was firing at me at a place called Hill 13122 (Whitfield p. 274). 
 
In the same table, parallel comparisons are shown for the men who did and who 
did not say that it helped them a lot to think that they “couldn’t let the other men down.”  
This provides an interesting contrast, since the differences are for the most part small.  
They consistently indicate that (1) one was helped a lot by thinking that one cannot let the 
other men down was associated with lower fear and higher self-confidence and 
willingness for combat, whereas (2) saying that prayer helped a lot was associated with 
the opposite characteristics. When scores on a scale of psychoneurotic symptoms and 
rank are simultaneously controlled, it turns out that saying that prayer helped a lot, and 
saying that it helped a lot to think that one could not let the other men down, were thus 
related  to the men’s reported battle reactions in 19 out of the 20 sub-comparisons.  The 
                                                 
22
 The German 88mm Anti-tank Gun was one of the most well know n weapon s in World War II.  It was 
used in many variations against both ground and air targets.  
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difference in pattern is consistent and remains when the influences of rank and 
personality differences are ruled out as much as possible (Stouffer et al., 1949, p. 183).  
Thus, according to Stouffer et al. (1949), some men who were more confident in 
the group had less need of prayer, and those who were less sure tended to pray more.  
Together the two factors played an important role in keeping soldiers in the fight. In 
terms of leadership traits, these are faith and fraternity, and they played a joint role: 
- Faith in a higher power and faith in your team. 
- Fraternity- comradeship with one’s fellow soldiers as well as feeling the 
presence of someone else unseen who is watching over you. 
 
When men were questioned on combat motivation, “when the going got tough,” 
they provided several explanations on how they and their leaders handled the stress and 
found motivation.  We have seen the attitudes towards leaders in Tables 2 and 3 in 
Chapter 13.    In both cases, according to Stouffer et al. (1949), prayer was a motivating 
factor, but also, that it helped to think “that you couldn’t let the other men down.”  
Specifically, in the survey of men from the European theater, this was the primary 
motivating factor in keeping leaders going, 81% for responsibility to others versus 57% 
for prayer.  For enlisted soldiers, the ratio was reversed, with 83% for prayer, but 56% for 
“couldn’t let the other men down.”   Nevertheless, this was still double the percentage of 
the other factors of the questionnaire, such as “finish the job, hatred of the enemy,” and 
“what we are fighting for” (Stouffer et al. (1949), VOL 2, pp. 174-175).  This statistic 
repeats itself in table after table of surveys of veterans regardless of education or rank.  
The main difference being that prayer (faith) was a lesser factor in the officer statistics. It 
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should also be noted that perhaps at the time when the surveys were conducted, combat 
motivation might have been more of a blanket term for many aspects of internal 
mechanisms that kept soldiers focused on and able to endure combat. If this were the 
case, then a more appropriate way to describe the phenomenon is that prayer was a factor 
in sustaining combat motivation. The empirical data from Stouffer and the Army suggests 
that faith and fraternity were critical factors in getting soldiers through the rough times.  
While these are not the same as motivation, they were factors that made up a critical part 
of the total motivation template.  
Taking care of one’s men or a buddy was also the most referred to reason in the 
oral history analysis done of the D-Day 60 Veterans for leadership type actions and why 
they did what they did.  However, Whitfield’s example of learning to talk to God is 
illustrative of the faith factor in these men.  
 
No other choice 
 Henry French was a Sergeant who, along with his soldiers, got separated from the 
main body of his company during the early inland fighting at Normandy.  He was 
mentioned in another section as a first line leader.  In this section, we look at Sergeant 
French from the point of view analyzing why he and his men moved forward.  We have 
already discussed several other factors. Is there another factor or reason, and does it relate 
to our discussion on emergent leadership at D-Day?  The answer is, “yes.”  This trait may 
have several descriptive terms, but one that is fitting for a leader in this case is being 
resolute: when there is no other choice but to go on and do the best one can do with what 
one has.  Sergeant French led 15 men and was awarded a Bronze Star Medal for helping 
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out a machine gunner and was wounded in action twice.  He describes the actions of his 
men and himself, and also shows other ways that he was good leader by taking care of 
another group of soldiers who got mixed up with his in the chaos of the fight: 
 
I: You just wanted to do your job and get home. 
 
F: Just wanted to do my job and take care of my men. 
 
I: What was your rank? 
 
F: Sergeant. 
 
F: Well, I just had, uh, you know, about fifteen men under me… I’m not 
bragging but I had no trouble…you take control out there.  
 
I:  The regular soldiers…. 
 
I: They thought highly of you? 
 
F: Well, yes, they did. 
 
I: They wanted to go with you. They thought that you weren’t going to do 
anything stupid. 
 
F: No. 
 
I: Well that’s a good sign of a non-commissioned officer. You know, you 
don’t get people unnecessarily hurt. 
 
F: No. No. 
 
I: So, you get to the top of the hill. You get reinforced up there? Or did 
they... 
 
F: Just keep (Coughs) moving in. Coleville was our objective. But 
anyway, when we got to the top of the hill, I don’t know how we got 
separated but myself and oh, I’d say fifteen to twenty more men, got 
separated from the Company Commander, and the Company and we just 
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taken a dark trail, no road, and went around and … we were out there…so 
we got into the woods up there and we got a little sniper fire but it was 
getting too late than in that. So we just said well we’ll find a place 
somewhere and we found a big ditch and we all got in it and… 
hunkered down for the night. And the next morning we got in touch with 
the Company telling ‘em that, so (Inaudible) found their company and we 
found ours. 
 
I: Oh so you had, you had like a mixed unit when you moved out… you 
might have had a couple of guys with the 29th with you and you were with 
the 1st and everybody was just moving. 
 
F: It didn’t matter. We were just trying to take care of each other. 
 
I: You knew there was only one way to go, right? 
 
F: Yeah. Only one way to go. 
 
I: Yeah. At some point, did they sort things out and get everyone kind of 
all gathered in their proper units? 
 
F: Uh-huh… we all got back to the unit… it was chaos (French, pg 82).  
 
 
SGT French really makes a key distinction in one segment of his account:  
 
I: You just wanted to do your job and get home. 
 
F: Just wanted to do my job and take care of my men (French, p. 82). 
 
 
Although we do not hear the tone he used, it does not matter.  SGT French’s focus 
was to do his job and take care of his men.  This was a man who led his men through 
multiple periods of heavy fighting. As a leader, though, he was not looking for 
recognition.  He simply did what had to be done.  He had 15 men, and then another group 
almost as large that he eventually was shepherding through the skirmishes around them, 
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leading them to shelter to “hunker down.”  Eventually, he was able to get back to his unit.  
He had no other option but to perform as a leader because not doing so would have most 
likely resulted in the deaths of not only him, but possibly the entire group.  SGT French 
does not indicate if there were other NCOs with him, but still, from language he uses, it is 
pretty clear that he knew he had to keep going, keep his men going, and get the mission 
done. 
Another trait that emerged from the combat experiences was a situational 
awareness that had to develop quickly or a soldier would not survive.  1LT Robert Landis 
gave his thoughts about the emergence of this survival trait: 
 
I was waiting for hand to hand combat.  We knew, you hear the German 
burp gun, the Schneizzer machine pistol. {Editor’s Note: The Schnauser 
MP 40 Machinen Pistole was a mass produced automatic firing weapon 
nicknamed the “burp” gun because of the sound it made when fired.} 
You’ve never been in combat to hear those things coming closer to you, 
didn’t take us long until everyone knew what a Schneizzer was.  We didn’t 
learn that.  We never learned what the Germans had, or what a machine 
pistol is or what it sounded like until we got into battle.  We’d been 
through an infiltration course in the States, so we knew what it was like to 
have bullets roaring over your head and staying close to the ground, but 
then you hear that Schneizzer, wow.  It’s getting closer and closer, and 
you think where are they going to come, you’re aware of everything.  All 
of your senses, you’ve got to be aware, we’re in the dark.  So they’re on 
patrol and they’re looking for us (Landis, p. 135). 
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Summary  
         The compelling drive that brought the men ashore at the beaches of Normandy had 
many components.  This study has identified several examples of these components in 
action.  These include the following: 
 Social Pressure- the need to perform one’s duty because of the thought of how 
society and peers would react if one did not do their best to complete the mission. 
 Fraternal loyalty- The bond that was developed by the members of the units that 
went ashore or jumped from the planes on D-Day.  The men performed because 
they could count on each other to do their part of the mission. Their shared 
hardships and common experiences became this bond which held them together, 
no matter what the situation. 
 Personal faith – The belief that a higher power played a role in helping them to go 
through the crisis an individual was facing, whether it was in terms of protecting 
the individual from harm, or to serve as a source of re-assurance during a crisis. 
 Training- The regularity of giving and taking orders, following procedures and 
practice of repetitious actions that eventually became second nature to the soldier 
when ordered to move forward and perform his duty. 
 Noble  courage- The courage leaders, especially those on the ground and on point, 
displayed when responsible or when they felt responsibility for the welfare and 
lives of those around them and then took actions to lead them through the crisis 
situation, whether under fire or otherwise. 
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 Additionally, the emergence of the situational awareness survival traits should be 
noted in this summation, as a leader would have had to have these as a pre-
requisite to have survived combat.   
 
This chapter has explored many reasons for “why they did it” and some of the 
traits that were required to survive in battle.  The personal accounts of the veterans in the 
study attest to the fact that there were many factors that played a role in this.  However, 
we believe the six components identified above played prominent roles in getting the 
majority of soldiers to function and survive on the battlefield as team members and 
leaders. Likewise, the leadership traits that were brought out were catalyzed by one or 
more of these same factors.  If this was leadership, and not simply courage, then there 
should be evidence that many of these men went beyond the initial germination of the 
leadership within them and went on to become successful leaders at higher levels and 
continued to grow.  We shall discuss this in the next chapter as we take a look at what 
they did beyond D-Day.  
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CHAPTER 16 
THE D-DAY EFFECT 
 
Introduction 
Having looked at many accounts of the veterans from D-Day, we now turn to 
examine whether leadership at D-Day and the traits which surfaced were in fact 
behaviors that were long term and lasting in nature.  We have seen many examples where 
the soldiers stood up and emerged as leaders, through circumstance, training, and 
personal initiative.  Many people define epochs in their lives by large events or disasters. 
For many people of the current generation it might be the day President Kennedy was 
shot, the challenger disaster, or the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001.  For the 
generation of veterans in this study, the attack on Pearl Harbor was an event that was 
burned into their memories. D-Day was different.  It was more of a life-defining event.  
Several veterans described D-Day and the events during that time in before and after 
terms; in essence, the campaign was the defining rite of passage for them.   
 Arnold Franco from the Ninth Air Force described his experience during this time 
in this excerpt from his account. He gave the following account about how the War 
changed him: 
 
… it definitely changed my life.  The fact that we got to Paris when it was 
liberated; I became 21.  I think Andy Rooney wrote a book called My 
War.  He said anybody who had been to Paris at the time of liberation as a 
young man, that’s the high point of his life.  And, actually, it was.  I mean, 
I felt my whole life afterwards was an anti-climax.  I mean I got home, I 
started a business, I raised a family, I have four kids, I’m very active, still 
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working.  As you can see I am an active person.  But, that was the high 
point in my life (Franco, p. 72). 
 
Joseph Bruckner Sullivan described D-Day and its effect on his life in this way: 
 
In hindsight of years gone by, it was sort of a watershed event in my life.  
At 79, I still think in terms of “before Normandy” and “after Normandy.”  
The day I got married.  But of course Normandy was a big event in a 
young life.  Of course, I saw a lot of carnage of the war.  I've been strong 
on national defense, so no one will ever be put through that terrible task 
again (Sullivan, p. 261). 
 
 Will Tucker related what General Ridgway told him and his fellow paratroopers 
just prior to the invasion: 
 
I knew we were getting ready to do something big.  I remember General 
Ridgeway speaking to us and how he said we “would be involved in the 
greatest event of our century, and some of you will make it and some of 
you will not make it back” (Tucker, p. 269). 
 
Whether historians agree on the magnitude of D-Day’s actual impact on the 
course of the war or whether it was the battle of the century is up to the historians to 
continue to argue.  But it is clear from the accounts of the men in this study that most of 
them would agree that it was an extraordinary, pivotal point in all of their lives. It 
changed them and stayed with them.  
Ray Tolleson, the Ranger whose account was presented earlier, described the 
lifetime bond and resultant success enjoyed by his fellow Rangers and himself as a result 
of their experiences in these terms: 
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 … I don’t know if you’re aware of the Ranger Battalions of World War 
II... Well, we had formed in the States way before we had been training... 
we have a tremendous amount of men that have been so successful. You 
could tell the grade of Ranger we had because they have been so 
successful in life, and here we are… (Tolleson, p. 264). 
 
 Both of these accounts reflect the general confidence and pride that many of these 
veterans felt. Arnold Franco described it as a crusade.  They show the excitement they 
felt by being part of something truly important.  Ray Tolleson’s account is tempered by 
the sadness of seeing the passing of his comrades after so many years.  He manages to 
include a dramatic and tragic history for his Ranger comrades in only a few sentences.   
He illustrates the esprit de corps that stayed with the unit, long after the war, as illustrated 
in his references to the wild, rowdy meetings in Chicago. He also speaks of the 
tremendous success that a large number of them went on to enjoy, which he attributes 
directly to what he terms “the grade” of Ranger.  No further words are necessary to 
explain what he so clearly stated. 
Ralph Widener brought up another lesson learned, although not from D-Day, but 
certainly one he felt important to mention: 
 
I don’t know.  I grew up during the Depression years and I know how 
tough that was and everything. And my dad always said if you can, put 
away at least ten or twenty percent of whatever you make and I was able 
to do that always (Widener, p. 287). 
 
Widener’s views on D-Day were reflective of the values of his time.  He and 
many others from our account weathered D-Day and then went back home to re-build 
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their lives.  They did this through hard work and using the lessons they learned about life, 
appreciating the things that perhaps others who had not experienced such events might 
take for granted, even today.  The combination of the effects of War and Depression went 
deep into him and many others from this study.  The composite character of a D-Day 
survivor was one of a hard worker, able to endure unimaginable horror in battle, never 
knowing whether he would live to see the next day.  This was a person who understood 
that there was a job to be done once the battle and the war were over.  The knowledge of 
a termination, an eventual finality to their efforts gave them hope. The traits that emerged 
as part of their experiences gave many of them the tools to go on to lead very successful 
lives.  
How does one define personal success? Captain Milnor Roberts, aide to the V 
Corps Commander, went on to become a Major General.  His account of loyalty and 
observations of leadership while working as the Aide to the V Corps Commander has 
been discussed earlier.  But he was only one of many men from the group who went on to 
achieve above average success. 
  The 82nd Airborne’s Will Tucker went on to become a lawyer as well and 
summed up his greatest success as the fellowship of the men he served with:  
 
The whole war was a challenge. There was no particular moment for me 
when some battle in the war would stick out as a special challenge. It was 
all about discipline. You had to accept the fact that you could get killed. 
Once you did that, you knew what to do. I became a sergeant and was 
with the company the entire time. My single greatest success was the 
fellowship I have maintained my entire life with the men I served with.  
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After World War II I finished law school.  During the early 1960’s I was a 
lawyer for the Kennedy administration in the Commerce Department. I 
was able to author books based on my war experience in the 82nd 
Airborne Division (Tucker, p. 269). 
 
 Tucker identifies two solid and consistent traits seen throughout this study:  his 
loyalty and bond with those who served with him, and the discipline which enabled him 
to get through his challenges. Discipline is a trait that made the difference between 
success and failure for many of the men in the group. It was noted in earlier accounts. It 
was what Ralph Widener was talking about when he was discussing saving money over 
the years. It was what made men like MG Roberts go back and find the family of a 
comrade killed on the beach at D-Day.  It was a self-discipline that drove leaders to keep 
going then, and to keep going afterwards, and eventually to come back 60 years later to 
speak of their moments in history.  
Harold McCauley went through D-Day, completed the European Campaign, and 
then headed home to Wisconsin.   McCauley applied the principles of consistency, self-
discipline and hard work in his civilian life and went on to become a success in the 
civilian world.   He ended up running the family farm and raising a family of 10 
successful children: 
 
I went back to camp McCoy Wisconsin and got discharged. I had three 
different jobs in Madison Wisconsin, one was a Greyhound bus driver,   
and I could have gone to work in two weeks at Chevrolet as a parts man. I 
could pick the job on a Monday morning. I went home to get clothes and 
my dad got me to take over the farm.  I raised 10 kids.  They all went to 
college, and paid for the farm. Eight years after I bought it, I rented it for 
 268 
 
many years.  My wife is a nurse, I have five daughters who are nurses and 
one a doctor. I have a granddaughter who is a doctor at St Mary’s Hospital 
in Madison, Wisconsin (McCauley, p. 152). 
 
Artilleryman, Major Raymond Mason of 4th Armored Division, was successful 
after the war as well - both in business and in continued military service.  The personal 
initiative and leadership he displayed while a young lieutenant leading soldiers carried 
over into his professional life.  He also went into the family business, but he had to start 
over when he arrived back home. Later in his life, because of his expertise in trucking, he 
ended up becoming a Major General in the Army and retired after a long career in the 
Reserves:  
 
I came out of the war and went back into the family business. My father 
had been a pioneer trucker, but he had gone out of business during the 
war.  
 
The Army started up the Army Reserve Schools.  I had a good record and 
knew more about artillery than most people. So I figured I should become 
an instructor in the service school... One thing led to another and the next 
thing you know I was in the 83rd Infantry Division and eventually became 
the Division Artillery Commander. 
 
They wanted me in Washington for the Army Materiel Command because 
I knew how to drive a truck and shift gears with a diesel engine.  They 
didn’t have too many generals that knew that. From then on I got a two 
star job in the Pentagon, and finally retired. 
 
Mason goes on to talk about how he was successful in business. He went into the 
cattle business and eventually owned three ranches in Florida, as well maintaining 
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a trucking business in Columbus, now run by his son.  Mason’s account closes 
with a note on his humble beginnings, sharing a perspective that many soldiers, as 
well as ordinary people, of his generation share.  He lived in an austere 
environment, saving a dollar here and there, all while undergoing the hardship and 
regimentation of military life: 
 
When I became a lieutenant in 1941 after ROTC we were paid $125 a 
month. That was not very much even then. After we got married I got a 
$40 housing allowance a month. She came to live with me in Watertown 
NY in a little beat up half assed apartment. We lived on 160 dollars a 
month and saved some of it. I was on duty on post and not allowed to 
come in except on Wednesday night and on weekends.  I had to be back 
for reveille on Monday morning (Mason, p. 148). 
  
Major General Raymond Mason was a successful leader.  He had to work hard to 
become a success, but as others in the study, he used the skills and traits that emerged 
from his service at D-Day and beyond to make this possible.   
Bob Cleary of the 83rd Recon Troop, 83rd Infantry Division was another veteran 
who went on to success.  He came through Omaha Beach as part of Patton’s Third Army. 
After the War he graduated from Ohio Wesleyan University, stayed in the Active 
National Guard, and retired as a Colonel.  As a young Lieutenant, he was on point in the 
83rd Recon.  Out front and away from the safety of the main body of troops, Cleary and 
his men had to be self-disciplined and display initiative and teamwork in order to survive.   
One important aspect of his service occurred some ten months after D-Day, when during 
a recon mission he and his men made a grisly discovery when they pulled up to one of 
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Hitler’s concentration camps. Such a profound event was only a part of what made up his 
individual road to leadership.  Cleary describes his mission as part of the recon element: 
 
My claim to fame (chuckle), if you want to call it that, is that I’m the first 
American officer to liberate a German concentration camp…  In 
Ohrdruf(dorf) …and that was a “sub-camp” of Buchenwald and it’s the 
camp where Eisenhower, Churchill, Bradley, Patton, Montgomery all 
came to within a week and Patton was so upset by what he saw, he went 
back in the town, got a hold of the mayor, and had him bring everybody in 
that town to the camp…walking…there were two guards on the gate. We 
shot one and the other ran off. Inside…we set up a perimeter defense. The 
guys in the barracks were so weak they could hardly get out of bed. But 
they had…ten (10) foot by forty (40) foot dugout holes you know and 
bodies were all in these holes. Then they had spread lye all over them to 
try to hurry their {decomposition} (inaudible) and uh, it was the worst 
sight I have ever experienced in my life. They were stacked eight (8) feet 
high like cordwood. Dead you know. Dead just inside there … and, one of 
my guys gave a candy bar to an inmate and within thirty seconds he threw 
it up. Couldn’t handle it at all and we left. We called troop headquarters, 
got our instructions to wait there until 354th Infantry or one of the 
companies came and relieved us, and we went out on a new mission. So, I 
was not there for all of the hoopla… But, all of the people who came to 
Ohrdorf, the mayor and his wife and all, when they went back home after 
seeing it, the mayor and his wife committed suicide… Our mission was 
eyes and ears of the division. We were supposed to be out in front. We 
weren’t supposed to engage unless we got in trouble…we were given 
assignments every couple of days in different sectors… that was the job of 
the recon troop. We ended up on the Czech border and lost a fair number 
of men. I managed a Silver Star and two Bronze Stars with oak leaf 
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clusters, two purple hearts and a French Croix de Guerre. (Cleary, pp. 39-
40) 
 
Later in the interview, Cleary comments about his feelings about the waste of 
lives and material in the War.   His older brother was killed in action and was 
posthumously promoted to Major. He avoids going too deeply into his own thoughts of 
the Camp liberation, and it seems more out of respect for the lives lost and to avoid 
drawing attention to his own actions as a leader.  Certainly with multiple awards of the 
Silver Star and the Purple Heart he had achieved many feats of leadership in action.  The 
lessons of his earlier life served Cleary well.  He was not only a successful leader. He 
was also a successful parent: 
 
C:  I had a boy in Florida, I mean in Miami, Oxford… And what’s the one 
in Springfield? … Anyway, had one there. One at the University of 
Pennsylvania, Georgetown, one at the University of California. Six kids. 
Six colleges and a few Masters (degrees). It was all part of the trip. 
 
I:  So, any overall feelings about the war? 
 
C:  I get--I really--you know, I’ve been here before and I’m always in awe 
when I visit either the American or the German cemeteries. It really gets 
me…Because of the vast quantities, you know, just the terrible waste of all 
these young guys including my brother who was killed at the Battle of the 
Bulge. He had the 87th Recon Troop…He was a captain…Two days after 
he died he was promoted to Major and of course he was older.  (Cleary, 
pp. 41-42). 
 
 Men like Bob Cleary and others discussed in this chapter saw some of the worst 
atrocities of humanity.  Instead of self-destructing, they emerged as leaders. Instead of 
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seeing only the senselessness of war and losing hope, they appreciated what life had to 
offer and imparted that to their children, passing the values of hard work, self-discipline, 
and their leadership on to them.  They went on to live what is today known as the 
American dream. For many of them, this success may have been because they understood 
why they had been fighting.  They may not have liked what was happening, but they 
understood there was no other way.  Seeing what they were fighting for gave them a 
sense of closure for the violence they endured and participated in as soldiers.  Eugene 
Cook describes this process with his account: 
 
 I always tell everybody: I was only eighteen, and I turned nineteen just 
before Bastogne. I always told everybody that you never really got a hell 
of a good feel of what you were fighting for until we took the 
concentration camp at Landsburg.  After that we had all these displaced 
persons.  It was just a final recognition of what the hell you were fighting 
for.  Other than that it wasn't too nice (Cook, p. 50). 
 
Summary 
 
 The picture that emerges of the D-Day soldier 60 years after surviving the battle 
and the war is one of a successful, but often humble, diligent, focused and resilient 
character.  A composite taken from these accounts of how this leader looks: 
 Resilient: Despite having seen countless horrors from the War the majority 
of these men went on to success because they were able to bounce back 
from the challenges and difficulties they faced. 
 Diligent:  The men in the study we review had the ability to stick with a 
project to success.  This showed up early as they went through training 
and formative leadership challenges in the War, and was followed up by 
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their continued affiliation with successful long term endeavors, such as 
continued military service or founding businesses. 
 Focused:  The D-Day veteran came back from the war with a sense of 
understanding of the World that others who had not experienced combat 
and the human tragedy to such a degree as they did, could not understand.  
The y were able to see what the fighting was about and knew why they 
had been fighting in Europe. This left them with a more resolute a view of 
what needed to be done, especially in terms of National Defense issues, 
and explains why they continued their service, or answered the call once 
again in subsequent conflicts. 
 Confident:  The men who came back from the War were confident in 
themselves and their capabilities.  Whether it was through the strong bond 
of fellowship developed in units like the Rangers, or an internal 
confidence that came from leading soldiers as a squad leader or platoon 
leader, the men who survived were transformed and empowered. 
Additionally, these soldiers translated these traits into an example for their 
children to emulate, in both service and education.   As many of the veterans recall, there 
was life before and after D-Day.  The event had a profound impact on them, and what 
they experienced in Normandy was internalized and built into their permanent character.  
The circumstances of the War gave them no other option but to grow into their leadership 
roles or face elimination in the harsh circumstances of combat.  The price for failure to 
lead was much higher than in the business world that they faced when they returned from 
the War.  Having faced life or death based on a split second decision, they could better 
lead subordinates, keep challenges in perspective and complete tasks, as well as unleash a 
creativity that enabled so much of the American expansion in the years following the 
War. 
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CHAPTER 17 
Discussion of Theoretical Findings 
 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter presents the findings of our study when applied to the hypothesis put 
forth in the beginning of this work: there is a core of leadership competencies that emerge 
when people are put into crisis situations regardless of their background.  There are two 
models that are presented here to illustrate how this theory functions.  Additionally there 
are several examples taken from earlier sections to show the practicality of the model and 
how it works.  It is by no means the only way to explain leadership or why some people 
lead and others do not. But it does offer a clear and concise explanation for those who 
carry the requisite leadership material, maturity, and who by chance or design, happen to 
meet with a triggering event that can cause the phenomena of leadership growth 
catalyzed by the event.   
 We note two types of model: ELDC and ELOT, both defined in the following 
section.  One does not necessarily rule out or negate the effects of the other.  The 
principal difference is the time frame involved. 
 
Discussion of findings in relation to Emergent Leadership During Crisis Hypothesis 
 
Emergent Leadership During Crisis- ELDC 
 The accounts in the study evoked multiple examples of emergent leadership 
during crisis, the descriptive term we use to describe the process that occurs within 
individuals as crisis precipitates reaction, based on circumstances of the event, the 
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individual’s readiness in terms of trait maturity (the level of development of particular 
traits needed to act in the situation), and the event itself.   
  
Emergent Leadership Over Time- ELOT 
 The accounts showed that leadership also emerged over time.  Many examples 
illustrated how training and development of the soldier prior to D-Day was a method of 
bringing out leadership traits and skills.  This also catalyzed development from one level 
to another, as in CPT Goranson who went from enlisted soldier to Company commander.  
The qualifying factors for ELDC or ELOT are the Circumstances, that is, the 
subject’s trait maturity level, or readiness to act, the experience level, and the position 
(formal or informal).  These factors come together and combine to produce the action that 
occurs when a precipitating event occurs. This could be a chance or planned event.   
Our observations show that emergent leadership is catalyzed in similar fashion, 
but when events dictate, this development is expedited. The basic format that applies to 
either is: 
 
Subject + Circumstance (Trait Maturity + Experience + Position) + Event   = Leadership Action 
 
The significant difference between ELDC and ELOT is the time involved.  The following 
examples illustrate how this theory fits into the situations discussed at D-Day.  
Case 1 shows an example of ELOT.   
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 In Case 1, we see how Goranson developed as a leader in high school and went 
into the military with some level of leadership already apparent.   His leadership emerged 
over time.  After Officer Candidate School, he had to decide on the spot whether to take 
the command or not.  Forced to act, he made his choice, and the resulting action allowed 
his leadership to continue to develop.  If he had not taken the command, then his 
leadership development would have been delayed.  He might never have had the same 
circumstances again for emergence of leadership to occur.   However, because he was 
ready, and due to the increased pressure and need to perform under greater stress, 
Goranson’s skills as a leader further developed.  He ended up becoming one of a handful 
of Ranger company commanders at Normandy. 
Case 2 is drawn from the earlier excerpt of SSG Paul Merriman’s account of an 
accident that occurred during combat.  This illustrates how ELDC is catalyzed by an 
event that forced Merriman to act.  His prior experience and maturity level enabled him 
Case 1- Goranson p. 141 
 
Subject  + Circumstance (Trait Maturity  +  Experience + Position)    +  Event    = 
Leadership Action 
 
Goranson  +  ( TM + D&C experience + Reg CDR-ROTC) + OCS Board =  Commission  
 
Ralph Goranson had a high work ethic and quickly assimilated into the Army. He entered the 
Army with some drill and ceremony experience from high school, where he was the 
regimental commander.  This helped set him apart from his peers. He was given advanced 
levels of responsibility and sent to the OCS board where he passed, and then went on to OCS 
where received his commission. 
 
 
Goranson + (TM + Add’l experience + PLT LDR) + Offer of CMD= CDR @ D-Day 
 
As Goranson’s level of leadership confidence was increased and his traits honed to a higher 
level of performance, he was noticed by his battalion commander, who offered him a 
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to act swiftly and decisively. At the same time, he was suddenly forced into a leadership 
position. This triggered the response in him that resulted in several lives being saved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Merriman’s quote from the first chapter offers explanation why this rapid process 
occurred.  One had to grow up in a hurry.  There was no time for mistakes. If mistakes 
were made people died. Experiential learning was rapid, young inexperienced soldiers 
became veterans overnight.  If not, they did not make it. Leadership had to emerge, 
because someone had to lead the way. As SSG Merrriman said, “It was always a sergeant 
or a corporal who would go out on point because somebody had to be in charge, the guy 
with the stripes (Merriman, p. 173)”. 
 
Multiple examples of ELDC occurred in soldiers throughout the D-Day beaches 
landing area, as well as among the paratroopers as they landed scattered across the 
hedgerows and fields.  The two examples provided earlier from Norman Schein describe 
what process had to occur in order to survive on the battlefield.  Schein took a direct 
leadership role when he was the leader of a two man team that went out on a decoy 
reconnaissance mission. Even though it was just the two men, Schein felt the leadership 
responsibilities of any leader. He had to perform his mission and get his team back to 
safety.  When faced with the challenge of being caught behind enemy lines or going 
Case 2- Merriman  
 
Subject  + Circumstance (Trait Maturity + Experience + Position)    + Event    = Leadership 
Action 
 
Merriman + Driver in a Convoy + Explosion= Took charge in aiding wounded 
 
SSG Merriman was a driver in a convoy when a landmine was struck. He took charge in aiding the 
wounded and stayed with them and then went on to catch up to his unit.  
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between vehicles in a German convoy, Schein made the decision and took action. He 
knew the risks, weighed them and then executed.  Later on, he saved his comrade’s life 
during another mission. This shows that given the right circumstances this effect will 
occur again.  Schein took risks at times, but as a leader he felt compelled to do so. He 
understood what would happen if he did not act, and so, even knowing there was danger, 
he did so without hesitation.  His comment to his battle buddy, “yeah, but we made it” 
(Schein, p. 225) shows a level of relief, and also self-confidence.  Schein appears to have 
matter-of-factly accepted the situation and acted the way he did as if it were second 
nature to him. 
Schein was not supposed to succeed. Yet, he did.  In the theoretical context of 
ELDC, we see how he carried the balance of traits, maturity, knowledge, and his position 
as leader of the two man team going on a reconnaissance as his circumstances.  We see 
the catalyzing event being the mission and the dangers he successfully faced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schein’s natural traits had been developed to some extent before the event. This 
was the maturation process. However, when placed in the leadership position and faced 
with the odds against him, Schein took action.  This action required more than simply 
 
Case 3- Schein  
 
Subject  + Circumstance (Trait Maturity +  Experience + Position)    +  Event    = Leadership 
Action 
 
Schein + (Trait Maturity + Experience + 1st line leader) + Encounter with Enemy  =  
Successfully brought his buddy team through enemy lines. 
 
Norman Schein was on a recon mission into enemy territory.  He found a way to survive and 
got back to Allied HQ. 
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raw courage, it required quick thinking, the ability to calculate many different courses of 
action and to pick one.  In another example, Schein saved his friend’s life during a 
reconnaissance mission when they were hit by shrapnel from an artillery shell. He acted 
quickly to fight off the attack and then applied first aid to his friend and got him to 
medical safety as quickly as possible. He did not freeze up or simply wait for someone to 
come along and give him an order.   Schein remarked on the reaction of the doctor, and 
the feedback he received for his actions.  “The doctor came up to me and he said are you 
responsible for this?"  I said "Yes sir."  He gave me a hug and he said. "You just saved a 
man's life."  If you hadn't gotten him here right away, he would have died (p. 226).” 
Thus, his leadership experience was also shaped by the additional positive reinforcement 
given for taking immediate action. 
  This shows how he was building on his leadership experience from the earlier 
recon mission where he evaded capture.  Schein found himself in an even more 
challenging situation.  Having already had a level of leadership developed over time 
(ELOT), plus recent experience, Schein was forced to go to an even more sophisticated 
level of leadership and action.  It was no longer thinking of a way through a situation. He 
had to take immediate direct, life-saving measures, followed up by a complex series of 
events.  His previous experience played a role in setting the groundwork, but he was 
ready to act because he carried the necessary innate skills or traits to succeed. 
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Doc Scanlon showed three examples of ELDC in Chapter 1, citing circumstance 
meeting events and the action that he took.  As the war progressed, he continued to be 
empowered and grew as both a leader, and, at times, a rebel. In Cases 5, 6, and 7, taken 
from accounts reviewed in Chapter 1, we see Scanlon’s actions in the context of ELDC.  
In Case 5 he took immediate action to stop incoming fire and save the lives of the men 
around him by standing up to a lieutenant who was calling in fire to the wrong location.   
In Case 6 he used German prisoners for moving the wounded and was going to have them 
fed.  When told by another lieutenant that they do not feed the enemy, Scanlon 
exemplified transformational leadership when he went ahead and took care of them and 
he again stood his ground and took care of the prisoners.  Although it was a form of 
rebellion, it was also leadership because he recognized that the prisoners, though 
Germans, were his responsibility.  Lastly, in Case 7, Scanlon stood up to a colonel who 
he was having a disagreement with over moving prisoners.  His sense of mission 
overtook his training as a subordinate, allowing him to put the welfare of his patients 
first, regardless of what the consequences might mean. 
  
 
Case 4- Schein  
 
Subject  + Circumstance (Trait Maturity +  Experience + Position)    +  Event    = 
Leadership Action 
 
Schein + (Trait Maturity + Experience + 1st line leader)  + Encounter with 
Enemy/wounded comrade =  Returns fire/ applies medical aid/ successfully bringing him 
to safety. 
 
Norman Schein’s jeep was hit and his buddy was seriously wounded.  He returned fire, 
performed first aid, and proceeded back to Allied medical support. 
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 Scanlon went on to receive the Bronze Star Medal for his actions.  The situations 
were critical. Wounded were coming in and he didn’t have enough soldiers to support 
him with the mission of carrying them around the aid station.  The circumstances of all 
three situations put him at odds with officers who were senior to him.  However, his 
personal traits as a leader emerged and he stood his ground.  His actions enabled him to 
complete his mission and save lives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Scanlon’s behavior was reinforced by the success of his earlier encounters with 
seniors when faced with mission challenges.  Later in the War he had an altercation with 
a colonel and faced the possibility of court martial for disrespecting an officer.  Case 7 
shows this encounter:  
 
Case 6- Scanlon 
 
Subject  + Circumstance (Trait Maturity +  Experience + Position)    +  Event    = Leadership 
Action 
 
Scanlon + (Trait Maturity + Experience + 1st line leader)  +  lieutenant refuses to allow over 
food for POWs. =   
 
Scanlon confronts the lieutenant and feeds his prisoners. 
 
Case 5- Scanlon 
 
Subject  + Circumstance (Trait Maturity +  Experience + Position)    +  Event    = Action 
 
Scanlon + (Trait Maturity + Experience + 1st line leader)  + confrontation with artillery officer =   
 
Scanlon takes action to stop fire, confronts lieutenant, receives support from Major O’Malley after 
he explains situation. 
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 Scanlon probably went too far in his actions in this example, but by this time in 
the War, he had seen plenty of fighting, and probably did not care about the 
consequences of his words or actions, only that he had a mission to do, and that it could 
not wait.   Scanlon’s examples show that if given follow-on events, that leadership 
continues to grow and rise to the challenges an individual faces.   It also illustrates that if 
this leadership grows unchecked or un-impacted by other styles, that the leader’s own 
personality is reflected in the style of leadership.   If his leadership opportunities had 
come in different ways, then he might not have emerged as a leader.  His set of traits and 
behavior were suited to the circumstances around him and thus was able to successfully 
emerge as a leader, and more importantly to accomplish his task of saving lives on the 
battlefield. 
 
 
Summary of Emergent Leadership Theory Observations 
 
 The preceding examples are only a small sampling of how multiple opportunities 
for leadership emerged during the course of the campaign at D-Day for the study group 
under the ELDC and ELOT model.  Though there are plenty of other models that could 
be applied as well, this is a clear efficient way to describe the process that occurs as a 
 
Example 7- Scanlon 
 
Subject  + Circumstance (Trait Maturity +  Experience + Position)    +  Event    = Leadership 
Action 
 
Scanlon + (Trait Maturity + Experience + 1st line leader)  +  confronted by COL who impedes 
his mission of caring for the wounded =   
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person’s leadership emerges. Multiple circumstances demonstrated how this can be 
applied.  Additionally, it allows for an explanation on how one’s leadership growth 
occurs: event and catalyst leads to further development and re-sets the base circumstance 
for the individual, allowing for a further phase of leadership development.  This would 
occur until the individual plateaus, either because no further development is required, that 
is the level of development they have achieved is sufficient for their circumstances, or if 
the development is arrested by outside factors that detract or hinder the individual from 
further growth.  These could be due to personality, professional issues, or any other of a 
number of reasons that retard a person’s growth in this area. 
 It is noteworthy that many of these same men continued in their development and 
went on to become civilian and military leaders at much higher levels, having survived 
such challenging experiences. We reviewed several examples of this in the D-Day effect 
chapter. It may be that the intensity of the catalytic event provides for a stronger long 
term leadership development phase.  This could be explored by further study.  
 Emergent leadership during crisis (ELDC) and emergent leadership over time 
(ELOT) are two ways of defining a similar model and approach to the study of leadership 
development. The examples presented through the D-Day 60 accounts give a good basis 
for the reasonability for this argument.  
 
 
Leadership growth: ELOT and ELDC 
Emergent leadership over time (ELOT) and emergent leadership during crisis 
(ELDC) differ significantly in how the process occurs in an individual.  ELOT is a 
gradual process and can be formal or informal.  Growth and maturity in leadership can be 
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attained through graduated levels of responsibility or progression through rank or 
educational milestones.   On the other hand, ELDC occurs in bursts, is not a planned or 
phased development, and often occurs in unexpected ways.   
 The Study of the D-Day 60 Veterans gave us several examples of both ELDC and 
ELOT.  The graphic model representation of the difference between the two can be 
illustrated by either a straight line or a curve, depending on the individual.  If there are no 
major crises, it is possible that an individual progresses in a normally linear fashion, so 
long as he or she is able to pass the next milestone, measure, or rank.  However, in the 
case of ELDC, this progression would be exponential, depending heavily on the 
circumstances, leadership maturity, and the event itself.  
 It is also possible for both ELDC and ELOT to be occurring at the same time.  
Thus, leadership growth can be attained and reinforced by formal schooling or 
developmental process, as well as key events that trigger leadership trait emergence and 
development.  Goranson’s account illustrates the growth he experienced as compared to 
other examples of soldiers who did not progress as far in rank and responsibility. The 
difference between the two is clear.   But it is only one indicator of the kind of growth 
that occurred for Goranson versus others who might not have had the opportunities and 
circumstances for their leadership qualities to surface.  A squad leader was responsible 
for 10 men, but a company commander was responsible for over one hundred. These 
values are only hypothetical, but the point is that key events along the way propelled 
Goranson ahead of his peers.  Goranson carried the traits, but it took circumstances and 
events to bring them out. If Goranson had not had early training, or a command climate 
that recognized his talents or was willing to allow him to develop, where would he have 
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ended up after four years?  Furthermore, Goranson was not an anomaly.  There were 
thousands of men who went from the enlisted ranks to the officer ranks during WWII 
(Stouffer et al, 1949).  They were forced into leadership positions by the circumstances 
around them, and when the events called for it, had to perform in order for both 
themselves and their men to survive. 
 
Summary of Emergent Leadership Theory Observations 
 
 The preceding examples are only a small sampling of how multiple opportunities 
for leadership emerged during the course of the campaign at D-Day for the study group 
under the ELDC and ELOT model.  Though there are plenty of other models that could 
be applied as well, this is a clear efficient way to describe the process that occurs as a 
person’s leadership emerges. Multiple circumstances demonstrated how this can be 
applied.  Additionally, it allows for an explanation on how one’s leadership growth 
occurs: event and catalyst leads to further development and re-sets the base circumstance 
for the individual, allowing for a further phase of leadership development.  This would 
occur until the individual plateaus, either because no further development is required, that 
is the level of development they have achieved is sufficient for their circumstances, or if 
the development is arrested by outside factors that detract or hinder the individual from 
further growth.  These could be due to personality, professional issues, or any other of a 
number of reasons that retard a person’s growth in this area. 
 It is noteworthy that many of these same men continued in their development and 
went on to become civilian and military leaders at much higher levels, having survived 
such challenging experiences. We reviewed several examples of this in the D-Day effect 
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chapter. It may be that the intensity of the catalytic event provides for a stronger long 
term leadership development phase.  This could be explored by further study.  
 Emergent leadership during crisis (ELDC) and emergent leadership over time 
(ELOT) are two ways of defining a similar model and approach to the study of leadership 
development. The examples presented through the D-Day 60 accounts give a good basis 
to the reasonableness of this argument. 
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CHAPTER 18 
Personal Reflections on ELDC 
 
Chapter 17 concluded with the stark difference between ELDC and ELOT.   
Regardless of the circumstance, there is a place for the study of emergent leadership.  The 
evidence of this has been presented, examined, and broken down into these two 
categories in our study.  The comparison and contrast of the findings drives home the real 
lessons for today’s leaders: 
 
-Individuals must be placed in real leadership positions of both accountability and 
responsibility in order to grow as leaders.  They must be empowered to act, as 
well as to fail and re-group, in order to maximize their growth development.  This 
means more empowerment of individuals and making them commanders and 
chiefs instead of staff officers or managers. 
-Senior leaders have a responsibility to groom all subordinate leaders for 
promotion, regardless of personal feelings or subjective criteria.  This is 
especially true in organizations like the military where an individual is very likely 
to get promoted to the next rank, especially if he or she has completed all basic 
job and professional development requirements.   
 
 Just as Goranson’s performance improved with his increased responsibilities and 
rank, so is it likely this will occur with others in similar situations. Not everyone is a 
Goranson; but if an individual is going to get promoted, and it is commonplace for this to 
occur, then senior leaders are helping themselves and the organization by developing the 
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skills of these subordinates with meaningful mentorship.  Failing to do this and at the 
same time allowing personnel to be promoted without the requisite developmental 
positions only creates issues for future senior leaders who have to deal with a senior staff 
composed of personnel who may be just as smart or competent as anyone else, but who 
through no fault of their own do not have the background and experience required to be 
successful, or to successfully add their own talents to the organization.  
 
-Junior leaders and individuals can change the paradigm and overcome challenges 
by seeking out additional responsibilities, schooling, or other professional 
development.  Their personal successes should not be defined by their rank or 
position but by what they are capable of accomplishing and how successful they 
have been as leaders at their level.    
 
 Not every person is going to become a general, or president of a company.   
However, if individuals look for and participate or act in ways to change the equation and 
overcome challenges, either real or simulated, then growth will occur- both personal and 
professional.    
 
Fixing Average  
If senior leaders are hesitant to place subordinates in positions where more 
responsibility and growth occurs because they do not have the confidence in them, then 
they must look at training opportunities to allow for growth.  These training opportunities 
should differ from training events relating simply to work or the mission at hand.   This 
will benefit the organization, individual, and ultimately the leader, who will get more 
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productivity and performance from a previously untried performer, or an improved one 
who has passed critical milestones that reflect his or her potential to perform.  There are 
many leadership training opportunities in the Army, but how many of them re-create the 
D-Day effect? Ranger School is one example of a course that spurs personal growth, but 
that is the exception and not the rule.  The challenge that organizations face is to create 
these leadership settings to develop their leaders that will propel them and the 
organization to success. 
 
Further Study 
 The study of emergent leadership during crisis has shown that this phenomenon 
exists and should be studied further.   Studies on inter-generational leadership among 
families, where the phenomena can be compared from the actions of those raised prior to 
one war period versus those raised in another, would help highlight which of these traits 
are the most prevalent and constant.   Studies involving subjects from previous conflicts 
would also show other aspects of emergent leadership which may manifest differently 
over time. That is, the same trait may be present or constant, but it may emerge under 
different circumstances.  Soldiers of earlier wars, such as the American Civil War, 
Spanish American War, World War I, and World War II could be compared to soldiers of 
the Korean War, Vietnam, the Gulf War, and today’s conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Indeed, ELDC may appear differently from one theater to the next because of the types of 
challenges being faced.  Another aspect of this is to look at ELDC in conventional war 
versus counter-insurgency conflicts.  For example, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
initial experiences faced by soldiers were more typical of past conflicts.  However, the 
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nature of the two conflicts changed, and both became conflicts where most soldiers were 
dealing with an asymmetrical enemy who could come out of any place at any time. For 
soldiers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, the leadership challenges have been different 
in some ways but have also been strikingly similar in others. It is important to study this.   
 Furthermore, ELDC in World War II may have been encouraged and fostered 
better than in today’s environment.   America’s Army in World War II was not a 
professional army.   This contrasts with today’s smaller, but more professionally-oriented 
one that has its own cultural mores that may or may not be consistent with those of the 
rest of American society.   In many ways, the military might be in the lead on some 
issues, such as integration. Are the techniques developed for the World War II Army still 
present or appropriate to developing situations where ELDC can occur?  In other words, 
if we take civilians from a technologically, freer-thinking society, and we put them into 
an Army requiring higher levels of mental agility and training than in the past, are we 
training them in a way that will maximize their performance and growth potential? 
 Other areas where the study of ELDC is important are found in countless civilian 
organizations.   The well-known television show, The Office, examines relationships in 
the office environment and shows different aspects of the hierarchical struggles in one 
corner of the business world.  Leaders and managers in the business world can benefit 
from studying ELDC by creating and reinforcing a framework where subordinates can 
grow and fail, and then pick themselves back up.  Is this utopian thinking?  For short-
term thinkers and people who are too focused on immediate results, it is. However, for 
business leaders who can see beyond this, the answer is no.  
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This demonstrates the importance of the earlier points on ways to foster better 
leadership through developing programs that will help ensure emergent leadership 
processes can occur. Boot camp experiences similar to those used to indoctrinate soldiers 
in the military have been a method used as a way to get teenagers with delinquency issues 
to straighten out.   However, long-term, leadership development is not about yelling, 
marching, and boring, repetitive tasks.  It is about developing the intrinsic motivation 
processes within a person to help them propel themselves forward.  The study of ELDC 
shows that the way to trigger the response necessary to grow as a leader, (and 
coincidentally as a by-product, a better citizen), is to have programs in place to make 
people responsible to work with others and lead in challenging conditions.  
 
Experiencing the D-Day Effect: A personal perspective 
The D-Day effect (ELDC) played a role in my development as a leader.  I refer to 
this development though, not from my military life, but from my pre-military life, where 
the conditions and circumstances were created for my own leadership to emerge, giving 
me, like Goranson, a chance to become a leader.  One is hesitant to include a personal 
account of everyday life triggering the D-Day effect after such a study of World War II 
veterans who went through extreme crises. Yet, that is precisely where the practical 
application of emergent leadership during crisis is most common. The question of 
whether these challenging conditions can be replicated for people without being caught in 
a firefight or going to Ranger school is “yes.”  Goranson and many of his peers were not 
under fire until well after they were on their way to become leaders or were already 
leaders in their own right because of critical situations where they had to act. Nearly all 
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people have had moments in their lives when they felt their backs were up against a wall 
and they had to perform well or make a critical decision. Such moments create the 
conditions where ELDC occurs. There are many ways where ELDC is replicated in 
everyday life.  Countless sports programs foster good leadership values. Student 
government projects and work place initiatives such as self-directed working teams are 
all ways that leadership can be developed.    
The challenge for mentors and current leaders is to create more opportunities for 
this to happen.  For example, sports programs that encourage only a select few to be 
leaders on the field might be better served to focus on sports where everyone on the team 
must have a constant stake and role in the outcome. One colleague of mine used the 
analogy of football versus rugby. In football, he said, everyone on the team is important, 
but clearly the quarterback, wide receivers, and other star positions have a more 
prominent role. These roles do not shift.   On the other hand, in rugby, it is an 
asymmetrically competitive environment.  Team members must work with every other 
member on the field to pass and carry the ball down the field.  It is truly a team effort for 
the entire 80 minutes of the match. Another example is cross-country. This has long been 
called an individual sport. However, it turned out to be a team sport for me. It was this 
sport that brought out the emergent leadership traits I needed to become a successful 
leader, first as a team member, and then later as a coach.    Looking back at some of my 
own formative experiences, it is clear to me that there were certain points where 
development occurred, either through an internal perception of crisis or one impressed 
upon me by the need to perform in order to achieve success for my team. The events that 
propelled me forward meet the parameters of the ELDC definition.  When one runs a 
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cross-country race, there are seven runners on the team.  Although the top five score, if 
there is a tie, the 6th and 7th place finishers determine the outcome. Thus, every runner in 
the race is as important as any other.  I knew when running that my contributions 
mattered most when I was part of the top seven runners.  I remember countless times 
when Al Carius, the coach at the college I attended, would reinforce the importance of 
the team effort and to constantly strive for success, not at the expense of the others but by 
bringing other team members along through the creation of synergy that came from 
success at graduated levels.  He would run the top runners in one meet, and rather than 
allow the second tier runners to run in scoreless, non-competitive races, he arranged for 
them to compete at lower-level competitions. This led to success by the second tier 
group.  Everyone had the opportunity to become an integral scoring part of the team, not 
simply the top runners.  Over a period of time, these runners would later emerge as top 
tier performers. It must have worked, because at last count he had trained over 300 All-
American runners, won 40 conference championships in cross-country, and some 10 or 
more NCAA Division III National Championships in the sport. More remarkable than 
this was the success that followed his students once they left his tutelage.  Many of them 
became successful, top-ranked collegiate and high school coaches, with winning teams at 
the State cross-country level.  Though I never became a top runner, this experience 
created part of the foundation that made me a leader.  Concurrently, I was also being 
given opportunities in youth ministry. I led youth groups for several years at various 
churches. I had my share of failures and successes, but most importantly, I was learning, 
without realizing it, the different ways to work with different types of people under 
different conditions, learning to counsel and be empathetic, as well as build a community. 
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Soon after college, I felt unhappy in the standard work place mold.  I needed 
challenges and the thought of working at a desk for the rest of my life was not motivating 
me to perform at my best.  I considered coaching at a local university. I received a call 
from the coach there who offered me a job.  Joe Mittel was willing to give me a chance to 
lead his team. He gave me the latitude to train them using his vision of workouts, and 
empowered me as head coach of the women’s team. It was a big opportunity to be 
offered the chance to be a coach for both men’s and women’s cross-country at a Division 
I university. While the reputation of my own college’s success preceded me, I readily 
admitted that I had not been the top performer on the team. However, because I had been 
placed in graduated levels of challenging situations where I had to perform, I had 
developed some skills.  Little did I know that the real skills I had developed were the 
ability to speak out and make corrections and purposefully attack a goal, reinforce my 
team members, paint the vision, and create a plan for success.  I experienced success as a 
coach, with both men’s and women’s teams performing the best they had in many years. 
The next spring, I took a position at a high school for highly performing academic 
students. Although not known for their athletic abilities, the team did very well, setting 
over 25 school records our first year.  Some months later, I joined the Army and soon 
applied to officer candidate school and graduated.   Although I was very new to the Army 
and I made many mistakes during the course, it reinforced my positive traits of 
determination and initiative. If I had failed the course, I am sure I would not have made a 
career of the Army.  My maladroit ways of handling issues with some of my peers taught 
me lessons that made me a better leader. I went on from OCS to command multiple times 
as a company commander.  I know that during that time in command, all of my past 
 295 
 
experiences served me well in making the best decisions and helping my soldiers achieve 
success along with me in our missions. 
What were the D-day moments for me? When did ELDC occur in my past? It 
may have happened my senior year in college a few weeks after I had an appendectomy. 
During a team meeting, I erupted with a speech about how one should not wait for things 
to happen and miss the opportunities given. I said that four years goes by fast.  Use this 
time and train while you can and stay focused on the goal. As I recall, the words may 
have been sprinkled with various four-letter words, and I was really talking more to 
myself than my peers.  Nevertheless, I went out and ran like I was on fire that day as well 
as at the next big meet.  Although I was not the best on the team, I had run inspired, and 
one of our coaches, a former world-class miler named Ken Popejoy, was moved to give 
me the plaque he won at the meet because of the leadership I had displayed.  Another 
occurrence of this was at the first meet at the university where I started coaching. During 
our first meet one of the runners fell out of the race. He had not warmed up properly, and 
as he began to feel the effects of this after the first loop, he had quit.  I ran up to him, and 
said “Phil, you’re going to finish this race, come on...” We talked and he started running 
again. Phil grew that day and became a leader on the team. His experience with failure 
and the way I turned it around for him motivated him to do better. He became a 
consistent, hard-working member and leader on that team. Our mantra became, “Do 
something about it!” - a phrase I introduced and used quite early in the season while 
working with them.  Soon, the head coach was putting the phrase at the bottom of the 
team stat sheets he would print out every week. At the end of the season we had a dinner, 
and the team presented me with a shirt with this phrase on the back.  Another by-product 
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of this was that now that I was a coach, I felt I had to work harder in my own running. 
For the first time ever, I was performing at nearly the same level as the top runners from 
where I went to college.  Thus, being a leader made me become a better performer, even 
though I had already been out of college for several years. One of the women’s team 
members told me that the reason she felt so inspired was because I had never ever said 
anything negative in terms of her and the team’s performance. Later on, while reading 
“The Boys of Pointe du Hoc (Brinkley, 2005), I recalled this as I read the words of 
Ranger Leonard “Bud” Lommel describing COL Rudder, who, “talked to you softly, but 
firmly, like a big brother…he inspired you to do your best…”(Brinkley, 2005, p. 38).  
Without knowing it at the time, I was demonstrating similar skills, the same ones which 
would take me from a civilian to a soldier, and then to be an officer and a commander in 
my own right, where I would be responsible for much more than how fast people could 
run. 
My account is no story of battle leadership in crisis. I have had a few challenges 
while deployed to Iraq, but nothing I could ever compare with those of the WWII 60 
Veterans whose interviews are reported in this study.  Nevertheless, the parallels of those 
experiences can be found in my own life experiences, and they have shaped me. In my 
own small way, I made choices along the way that enabled me, someone who was never 
on the student council or the football team or even a captain of any team or a formal 
leader until half-way through college, to develop into an effective leader.   The things that 
set me apart from others is that having had other previous experiences, as well as being 
under the tutelage of a couple of exceptional leaders who created events and 
circumstances that shaped me prior to joining the Army,  I saw a bigger picture, a vision 
 297 
 
of where I could and should go and what I could achieve. There was a personal 
expectation that if I applied myself, I would achieve and realize goals and objectives by 
following the blueprint of success I had learned from mentors along the way.  The result 
of this was a faster progression to levels of increased responsibility. In 1992, I was a 
newly enlisted Private in the Army. By 2001, I was a Captain and had successfully 
completed two company commands. 
The key to exploiting the experiences of ELDC and applying it in an organization 
is to apply a consistent, steady, positive leadership style and an environment that allows 
for growth.  The medium for developing leaders can be as varied as the challenges that 
befall people. The real key is empowerment, working within an atmosphere where one 
has opportunities to lead, develop, and yes, to fail.   Only then will the person really be 
intrinsically motivated and own his or her mission. From this, individuals will gain the 
energy and spirit needed to become effective leaders.  I consider myself to be a product 
of ELDC because of those moments where I had to act and take charge in the many tests I 
had along the way that prepared me for entry into the armed forces, even if I was never in 
any real personal danger. The combination of circumstances and events I faced along the 
way forced the traits within me to develop and emerge.   
For every one story of the great coach, I can give many more stories of other 
coaches, officers, or leaders who never quite got it, never really cared, or who just cared 
about winning.  I have known countless people, in both sports and in life, who were able 
to give great short-term performances, but who soon afterwards were burned out and 
were done with their respective sport or professional position. Had I given in to the 
negativity that surrounded me after one bad experience as a youth director, I would never 
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have gone on to another position, nor had the confidence to later enter the military. I was 
fortunate to have great mentors such as my college advisors Professor Lebeau and 
Reverend Barbara Isaacs while attending a small college in the Midwest.  These people 
recognized that although young and untrained, I had potential to develop into a leader.  
They provided me the leadership opportunities to grow. They helped put me into 
positions where I would develop as a leader, even though I did not know it at the time.  
The personal challenge for me has been to continue that chain and help others to achieve 
whatever their highest potential for leadership may be.   Leaders cannot develop alone in 
a vacuum- it requires circumstances and events to trigger their growth. 
 
Emergent leadership tomorrow 
The study of emergent leadership during crisis has taken us from Plato and 
Aristotle to Nietsche and Zaccarro.  We have come full circle back to the ideals of the 
ancient Greek school where we see that young leaders were developed by great scholars 
who mentored them.  My experience was shaped by great teachers, coaches and advisors 
who helped me learn the balance of sports, study, and service.  If there is any final word 
on this subject, it is that service seems to be the constant that brings out the best in every 
leader. Effective organizational leadership requires this as a pre-requisite, and it is sorely 
needed in today’s challenging business climate.  Those who are willing to serve more, 
and understand what it means to be a servant to those whom they lead, may profit more in 
the long-run than their peers.  The veterans in our study took care of their troops and saw 
to their needs and the needs of the mission. They understood they had a higher calling. 
They epitomized selfless service, and their service saved lives and influenced the world 
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in many positive ways.  As further studies are done in ELDC and other aspects of 
leadership during crisis, this point should be kept in mind. Wars may change from 
generation to generation.  Business environments may change and go from boom to bust 
economies. Sports teams may have dynasties and then become perennial losers. But over 
time, in all of these situations, the constant process of developing leaders is ongoing, 
preparing the world for the next generation of leaders regardless of success or failure. 
Thus, one should have confidence in the future, knowing that in a thousand different 
ways, parallel leadership experiences are occurring.  We can be sure that when called, the 
next greatest generation will be there to pick up where the previous one left off, ready to 
carry the torch of leadership into the future. 
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Georgia 
 
Williamson, Francis, Staff Sergeant, 82nd Airborne Division 
Interview conducted in France by Sergeant Sepko on 4 June 2004. Interview 
transcribed by Lisa A. Zafirov, May 2006, proofread by LTC Alan R. Koenig, HQ 
First US Army, Ft. Gillem, Georgia 
 
 
From an interview conducted in Elsenz, Germany of World War II Veterans by Michael 
D. Pierce. 
 
Luchner, Max, Carpenter 
Interview conducted 22 August 2007, Elsenz, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Germany.   
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Zabecki, David T., MG, PhD, Executive Director World War II 60 Executive Committee, 
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APPENDIX C:  i. MAPS AND CHARTS 
 
D-Day Map 1. 
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D-Day Map 2 
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D-Day Map 3 
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D-Day Map 4 
 
 
 
 
 
Map Source: http://www.internet-esq.com/ussaugusta/overlord/ 
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APPENDIX C:  ii. Photos 
 
 
 
Photos of captured British Spitfires with German Markings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reference: Private John Paulson’s account of General Bradley being strafed at Omaha 
Beach in June 1944 (p. 186). 
 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
http://www.luftwaffe-experten.org/forums/index.php?showtopic=310
  
 
 
